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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Developing countries are increasingly af-
fected by environmental pollution. Air pol-
lution resulting from fossil fuel combustion 
for power generation and transport is hav-
ing an increasingly high impact on life expec-
tancy. Deforestation, soil degradation, air, soil 
and water pollution, and poor resource man-
agement are an obstacle to poverty allevia-
tion. All economic predictions indicate that 
climate change will hit developing countries 
hardest. 
Environmental taxes can address some of 
the environmental problems faced by devel-
oping countries while encouraging sustain-
able production and consumption patterns 
and delivering the financial means necessary 
to enhance environmental and social indica-
tors. However, environmental taxes may re-
sult in both direct and indirect price increases 
of goods and services, which can have nega-
tive impacts on social equity, particularly in 
poor households.
This report aims to address this potential 
conflict and to consider the trade-offs and 
complementarities between environmental 
taxation and social equity. It analyses the role 
that environmental taxation has to play in ob-
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to what extent environmental taxation can 
contribute to more progressive and sustaina-
ble tax systems and more equitable societies 
in developing countries. 
This report is divided into two chapters. 
The first chapter examines possible linkag-
es and complementarities between environ-
mental taxation and tax justice, by purport-
ing to explain the policy considerations coun-
tries, and particularly developing countries, 
ought to undertake when introducing envi-
ronmental taxes. The objective is to provide 
guidance both from the fiscal and regulato-
ry perspectives, while exploring the poten-
tial for environmental taxes to contribute to 
more progressive and sustainable tax systems 
and more equitable societies in developing 
countries.
The second chapter looks at specific ex-
amples of environmental taxes in low- and 
middle-income countries. The objective is to 
analyse the environmental, social, economic 
and fiscal impacts of environmental taxes in 
these countries and to draw conclusions on 
the compatibility of environmental taxation 
and the principles of tax justice. 
 
 
CHAPTER I  
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(by Jacqueline Cottrell and Tatiana Falcão)
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: DEFINITIONS, 
INSTRUMENTS, LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The report starts by proposing a definition for 
environmental taxation whereby an environ-
mental tax would be defined as any compulsory, 
unrequited payment to general government imposed 
for an environmental reason and levied on a tax 
base that has a proven specific negative impact on 
the environment. An environmental tax, for the 
purposes of this report, is one that is regarded 
to have both an environmental purpose and 
effect. 
The report thus draws a conceptual dis-
tinction between environmental and envi-
ronmentally related taxes, which are revenue 
raisers but only bear an indirect environmen-
tal purpose. This distinction might appear to 
be only theoretical in nature, but it is of ut-
most importance when it comes to monitor-
ing country action in connection with the Par-
is agreement commitments. The conceptu-
al distinction does not place one type of tax 
in prominence with respect to the other – it 
merely highlights the purposes intended by 
the countries pursuing each of these policies. 
In the context of this definition, an inven-
tory of environmental taxes and environmen-
tally related taxes is provided and highlights 
the kind of policy measures that are current-
ly available to developing countries when it 
comes to the imposition of taxes that are mo-
tivated by environmental concerns. 
Furthermore, a number of fiscal approach-
es to environmental taxation (charges or sur-
charges, fees, consumption taxes like VATs, 
subsidies and incentives, prohibition and ex-
cise taxes) are considered against the back-
drop of the theoretical underpinnings of 
environmental taxation, which call for the 
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internalisation of external costs and the im-
plementation of the polluter pays principle. 
The focus in this report will be on taxes, due to 
their greater potential for domestic revenue 
mobilisation. Subsidies, incentives and pro-
hibitions are not addressed. Fees and charges 
tend to be measured against the provision of 
a public service, and therefore are not generic 
in nature.
The commitments assumed under interna-
tional environmental agreements such as the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement underline the high relevance of 
environmental taxation to the fulfilment of 
mid and long-term environmental goals with-
in other action plans such as the Agenda 2030 
for Sustainable Development and the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda. The requirement for 
the international community to fulfil these 
international obligations has created a politi-
cal momentum for the advancement of envi-
ronmental taxes and environmentally related 
policies. 
Very few countries are on the right path to 
get to the required level of taxation by the due 
date. With the predominance of very low car-
bon pricing initiatives, and most of them be-
ing set at under USD 10 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2e), further escalation 
of carbon prices is needed in most countries 
in order to further stimulate emission reduc-
tion and achieve the goals set by the Paris 
Agreement.
Action needs to occur within the context 
of the existing international legal framework, 
so that the implemented measures are con-
sistent with the general principles of envi-
ronmental taxation, the general tax princi-
ples and the broader social justice principles1 
which safeguard equitable taxation. The ob-
1 (1) Fairness, (2) equality, (3) equity, (4) tax justice, (5) gender justice  
servance of the general principles of environ-
mental law2 and tax law3 are particularly rel-
evant to achieve a coordinated approach be-
tween countries. Likewise, countries should 
be aware of the obligations assumed under 
the context of the World Trade Organisation 
Agreements. 
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
The impact of environmental taxes on en-
vironmental degradation, social equity and 
the economy, examining trade-offs between 
them, is further examined. The criteria used 
are: 
(1) Environmental effectiveness: analysing 
whether the tax is capable of leading to an 
overall reduction in pollution and/or result 
in reduced consumption of energy or other 
scarce resources. 
(2) Social impacts: including indirect impacts, 
resulting from changing relative prices, and 
the potential for regressive impact of the 
tax.
(3) Economic and fiscal impacts, including 
impacts on GDP, international competi-
tiveness, employment, and government 
revenues.
Evidence that environmental taxes can bring 
about environmental improvement in devel-
oping countries, such as emission reductions, 
cleaner energy generation, and improved re-
cycling rates is presented. In some cases (like 
Thailand), it can be shown that even a small 
difference in the tax rate between more or 
2 (1) The Polluter Pays Principle, (2) The Precautionary Principle, (3) Common but 
differentiated responsibilities and (4) Principle of historic responsibilities (not 
worthy of pursuit under a domestic environmental tax framework) 
3 (1) Price parity across different segments and businesses, (2) Minimisation of 
regressiveness in the administration of environmental taxes, (3) avoidance of 
economic and juridical double taxation, (4) gradual introduction of new taxes 
and predictability when it comes to the readjustment (increase) in taxes 
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less polluting substances can be enough to 
change consumer behaviour. Policy recom-
mendations for tax design (particularly for 
policymakers from developing countries) are 
provided. Approaches to minimise trade-offs 
between environmental impact and social, 
political or economic considerations are dis-
cussed.
The regressive nature of environmental 
taxes is only one aspect of inequality associat-
ed with environmental policy. There are four 
dimensions of inequality which are further 
examined, all of which correlate to a great-
er or lesser extent to inequality of income: 
Inequality of (1) exposure to environmental 
degradation, (2) contributions to pollution, 
(3) outcomes resulting from environmental 
taxation, and (4) representation in policymak-
ing. This highlights an important facet of tax 
justice in view of the objectives of this report. 
However, equity considerations rarely enter 
the policy discourse when defining environ-
mental policy approaches, and environmental 
improvements are seldom taken into account 
when estimating the social equity impacts of 
environmental taxation.
The report finds that the greatest concern 
in developing countries in terms of equity im-
pacts lies with indirect taxes on domestic fuel 
(electricity, cooking, heating), because substi-
tutions are rarely available and poor house-
holds thus often have no alternative aside 
from paying the tax. There is also a gender di-
mension to this debate, as the impact of envi-
ronmental taxes on domestic energy use may 
have a greater effect on women, who tend to 
pay for household costs. 
The report explores how in countries with 
relatively unequal income distribution, envi-
ronmental taxes in the transport sector may in 
essence act as a luxury tax, affecting high-in-
come households far more than the poor. 
The report demonstrates that environmen-
tal taxation might have the potential to ad-
dress inequality resulting from environmen-
tal degradation as experienced by different 
income groups, particularly if social welfare 
measures are implemented in parallel to ad-
dress potential negative equity impacts.
Earmarking of environmental tax reve-
nues is examined as a policy approach of par-
ticular interest to developing countries, in al-
locating expenditure for environmental pro-
tection. It is contended that in the developing 
country context, it may be necessary and ben-
eficial for governments to make political dec-
larations regarding the use of revenues from 
environmental taxation to communicate pol-
icy priorities, boost government credibility, 
foster political acceptance and prevent policy 
reversals or the diversion of revenues to less 
desirable outcomes. In addition, spending a 
proportion of the environmental tax reve-
nues on green infrastructure, renewable en-
ergy and energy efficiency technologies can 
increase the overall environmental effective-
ness of tax measures and lessen the cost of re-
ducing pollution.
The report also examines the competitive-
ness impacts of taxing environmental exter-
nalities, especially with regards to possible 
negative effects on employment, and looks at 
a range of potential economic benefits result-
ing from environmental taxes, including job 
creation in “green industries” and innovation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
When formulating the legal framework 
for the introduction of environmental taxes, 
countries should be sensitive to the differ-
ence between applying a tax directly aimed at 
the pollutant itself, and applying a tax on an 
element of pollution, or a by-product of pollu-
A CLIMATE OF FAIRNESS: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
11
tion. The former will generally harness greater 
environmental effectiveness than the latter. 
In this report, we define an environmental tax 
as one which should have both an environ-
mental purpose and effect, and should not be 
a simple revenue raiser. 
In terms of design, environmental taxes 
should have the broadest possible coverage 
with few or no exemptions. If pollutants are 
taxed at different rates or exempt, policymak-
ers should be aware of unintended, environ-
mentally harmful behavioural responses, like 
fuel switching. Environmental tax exemp-
tions for business should only apply to sectors 
exposed to international competition, and be 
limited in time. 
Trade-offs between fiscal (revenue raising) 
and environmental objectives should be ad-
dressed. In the long-term, if environmental 
taxes are effective, revenues will decline as a 
result of behavioural change. This is a natural 
consequence of the application of an environ-
mental tax: The successful application of the 
tax will most likely lead to a long-term reduc-
tion in revenue. 
To stabilise revenues in the short-term, 
governments might find it useful to index the 
tax rate to inflation or GDP growth or to fore-
see regular tax increases. A range of possible 
tax rates can give policymakers flexibility to 
adjust the tax as necessary. 
Governments can mitigate negative equity 
effects by using environmental tax revenues 
to improve capacity to implement and target 
social welfare schemes and pro-poor invest-
ment accurately. Governments can overcom-
pensate as an interim solution: If policymak-
ers are ambitious in their implementation 
of environmental taxation, revenues raised 
should be sufficient to overcompensate poor 
households and deliver on other policy goals 
at the same time. Transformative social wel-
fare policies, or co-benefits policies designed 
to foster green economy transition, are prefer-
able to unconditional compensation, such as 
cash transfers.
Identifying which taxes have the potential 
to be most progressive can be helpful in all 
developing countries to introduce redistrib-
utive taxation, while raising revenues. Due 
to many developing countries’ capacity con-
straints, it might be advisable to first target 
a tax base for which existing effective collec-
tion mechanisms exist. Revenues can subse-
quently be used to improve fiscal capacity.
Publicising the data may be an important 
tool to harness popular support for the tax 
and raise awareness capable of inflicting a 
change in consumer consumption habits. 
In developing countries, fiscal space is lim-
ited and environmental policies tend not to 
be prioritised. In this context, loose symbol-
ic earmarking, or even legal earmarking of a 
proportion of revenues, can be an important 
tool to raise awareness of the implementa-
tion of the tax, gain popular support, and to 
ring fence funds for a specific environmental 
cause. A trust fund supported by environmen-
tal tax proceeds can be a useful tool to make 
sure that at least part of the environmental 
tax revenues are used for the development of 
new technologies, or to protect the environ-
ment. Independent agencies can be set up to 
fulfil a similar role. However, countries should 
be aware of potential domestic limitations to 
earmarking revenues for a particular purpose, 
as revenues may not correspond to the cost of 
addressing the environmental problem they 
have been earmarked to address. 
Countries should reach out to other coun-
tries adopting similar taxes to work in a co-
ordinated fashion. Cooperation on envi-
ronmental tax policy will protect countries 
against loss in competitiveness and may help 
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build a geographic region with heightened en-
vironmental protection standards. 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: 
POTENTIALS AND PROSPECTS
The potential for environmental taxation 
to address equity issues in developing coun-
tries is analysed while highlighting prospects 
for the future application of environmental 
taxes. The role of environmental taxes in the 
improvement of fiscal governance is also as-
sessed. Because environmental taxes are hard 
to evade (as they tend to be levied on immo-
bile tax bases), the fiscal governance frame-
work can be bettered by contributing to a 
framework of improved tax compliance and 
tax morale.
The problem of stranded nations is also 
looked at within this context. That is the prob-
lem faced by resource-rich developing coun-
tries dependent on revenues from fossil fu-
els. They might face severe financial losses 
due to divestment in the extractive sector as 
countries shift onto a low-carbon develop-
ment path. The report proposes a solution to 
this problem along the lines of the REDD+ 
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation) scheme, which would entail de-
veloped countries paying developing coun-
tries not to extract fossil fuels. A REDD+ type 
approach could work in tandem with other 
forms of environmental taxation.
MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
From a multilateral perspective, the role of 
border tax adjustments is assessed as a possi-
ble measure to enable high environmental tax 
rates or a high carbon price in particular coun-
tries or groups of countries, without jeopard-
ising international competitiveness. Border 
Tax Adjustments work by either taxing an im-
port, so that it is taxed at the same level as 
the domestically produced product, or reduc-
ing the tax on an export, in order not to im-
pose an undue burden on the nationally pro-
duced product when it is known that the for-
eign product is not burdened by a like tax. By 
grouping countries and creating a framework 
for them to act collaboratively, this approach 
also has the potential to create momentum to 
enable other countries to join a carbon pricing 
strategy. 
Moreover, the creation of a multilateral, in-
tergovernmental body on environmental tax-
ation under the auspices of the United Na-
tions to address a number of global tax justice 
issues is further considered to place environ-
mental taxation within a framework of mul-
tilateral cooperation. Joint oversight by the 
UN and the WTO would be required to align 
the legal framework of carbon tax regulation 
with international tax competition and trade 
regulation. 
CONCLUSIONS
All countries must commit to more am-
bitious Greenhouse Gas emission reduction 
targets. Environmental taxes can help all 
countries, but particularly developing coun-
tries, deliver on the commitments assumed 
through international environmental agree-
ments and generate a double positive, by 
bringing about an improved environment 
while mobilising domestic revenues for the 
achievement of the SDGs.
In many developing countries increasing 
the amount of revenues raised through envi-
ronmental taxation has also the potential to 
reduce state dependence on aid and debt fi-
nancing, and to facilitate the mobilisation of 
domestic resources for public services. 
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As environmental taxes are harder to evade 
than e.g. corporate or personal income tax-
es, they also have the potential to strengthen 
state accountability, improve tax morale and 
enhance fiscal governance. In countries with 
high levels of tax evasion, the benefits of a 
tax on carbon emissions – aside from any cli-
mate or environmental benefits – outweigh 
the costs, simply as a result of welfare gains re-
sulting from reduced tax evasion. 
This chapter has shown that there could be 
a role for environmental taxation in address-
ing inequalities, and that tax justice and the 
implementation of environmental taxation 
can indeed be compatible in theory and in 
practice. It calls on policymakers to take steps 
to bring together the joint agendas of envi-
ronmental taxation and tax justice to make 
progress on both agendas and to set the stand-
ards under which environmental tax and en-
vironmentally related tax mechanisms will be 
judged for the coming ten years. 
It is imperative to get the conceptual 
frameworks, priorities and standards right, in 
order to both advise developing countries on 
the implementation of sound policies, and to 
assess the extent to which those policies are 
effective, both from an environmental and so-
cial justice perspective. Pollution sees no bor-




ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN PRACTICE
Environmental, Economic and Social Effects of Environmental Taxes in Selected  
Developing Countries
(by Jacqueline Cottrell)
Chapter II of the study works through a se-
ries of examples of environmental taxation 
in industrialising countries. For each case, on 
the basis of available data, it was considered 
whether or not an environmental tax was a 
successful policy within the specific policy 
context of the country in question. As used 
in Chapter I, the criteria used are: (1) environ-
mental effectiveness, (2) social impacts and 
(3) economic and fiscal impacts. 
The cases examined were chosen to pro-
vide a balance between different regions 
of the global South – Asia, Africa and South 
America. However, finding good cases under-
pinned by robust data on the impacts of spe-
cific environmental tax measures in low-in-
come countries in particular is quite challeng-
ing. The four country cases therefore look at 
the impacts of environmental taxes in mid-
dle-income countries – Vietnam, Morocco, 
Mexico and China. These country case stud-
ies are followed by an analysis of environmen-
tal taxes in low-income countries (LICs) and 
attempts to draw some general conclusions 
for these countries.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
TAX IN VIETNAM
Vietnam implemented a broad-based pack-
age of environmental taxes in the Environ-
mental Protection Tax Law in 2012 (EPT). Tax 
rates can be relatively easily adjusted within 
a given tax rate range. The tax is one element 
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within a broader process of greening the Viet-
namese economy.
The EPT in Vietnam is often held up as a 
best practice example of environmental tax-
ation in the context of non-OECD countries, 
because the tax law is quite comprehensive 
and covers a wide range of pollutants, and the 
design of the tax facilitates easy adjustment. 
There is some evidence for positive behav-
ioural responses and reduced pollution and 
emissions as a result of the EPT. It may have 
had a small negative impact on GDP growth 
and employment in comparison to a busi-
ness-as-usual scenario. The EPT also appears 
to have had a progressive impact on house-
hold welfare, with modelling indicating that 
the richest income quintiles lost a compar-
atively greater proportion of their income 
in EPT payments – presumably because a 
large proportion of EPT revenues are raised 
through transport taxes, which tend to be pro-
gressive in developing countries. Nonethe-
less, for households living on or below the 
poverty line, even a small decrease in house-
hold income can impact quality of life and 
ability to pay for essential goods and services. 
While there is no data available to indicate 
the extent of such impacts, the report recom-
mends that policymakers pay more attention 
to equity impacts when introducing higher 
tax rates in future and to ensure that targeted 
social compensation measures are in place.
THE PLASTICS TAX IN MOROCCO 
Morocco’s National Waste Manage-
ment Programme (Programme National des 
Déchets Ménagers, PNDM) included a num-
ber of ambitious measures to increased recy-
cling and improve solid waste management. 
To achieve the objectives of the programme, 
the PNDM included in its second phase a new 
environmental tax on plastics, which came 
into force in January 2014. Tax revenues are 
directed to the National Environment Fund 
(Fond National pour l’Environnement, FNE) 
and are used to finance activities to promote 
the recycling and recovery of plastic waste, 
and to create a formalised waste separation 
sector. A minimum of 20% of total tax reve-
nues are to be allocated to informal waste col-
lectors, with particular attention paid to gen-
der issues in fund distribution. 
The tax has had a positive environmental 
impact by boosting resource efficiency, as it 
created an incentive for manufacturers to use 
recycled plastics as inputs for production. Rev-
enues have been used to increase the number 
and size of sanitary landfills in the country. 
The plastics tax has had positive economic 
impacts, as it affected imported goods more 
than domestic products. As a result, the com-
petitiveness of domestic industries in Mo-
rocco was not adversely affected. Revenues 
have been considerably higher than predicted. 
These revenues have been used to create new 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the 
waste sector and bring informal waste-pickers 
into formalised cooperatives.
Given the low value of many plastics, it is 
unlikely that the tax had more than a mini-
mal impact on household welfare. Because 
the tax was introduced as part of a package of 
measures to bring about improvements in the 
waste sector, the overall impact of the tax and 
expenditure of plastics tax revenue has been 
positive, both environmentally and socially. 
CARBON TAXATION IN MEXICO
The carbon tax in Mexico was intro-
duced as part of a range of measures to re-
duce Greenhouse Gas emissions in Mexico in 
2014, which also included fossil fuel subsidy 
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reform and from 2019, the piloting of an emis-
sions trading system. The introduction of the 
carbon tax and the implementation of subsi-
dy reform were internationally significant, as 
the Mexican economy had traditionally been 
reliant on income from oil sales, and because 
Mexico was one of the first newly industrial-
ised countries to have introduced carbon tax-
es in the run-up to the UNFCCC COP21 (also 
known as the 2015 Paris Climate Conference) 
in Paris.
When the carbon tax was introduced, it was 
one element within a broad fiscal reform in 
Mexico, covering personal, corporate, con-
sumption and energy taxes. Tax rates imple-
mented were substantially lower than those 
originally proposed and natural gas (the main 
fuel for power generation) was ultimately ze-
ro-rated. Given the unequal income distribu-
tion in Mexico, it is likely that the direct im-
pact of the carbon tax on transport fuels was 
that of a “luxury tax”, affecting high-income 
households far more than the poorest quin-
tiles. Due to the low tax rate, the carbon tax 
had a very limited impact on domestic energy 
prices. Thus, the carbon tax is not likely to have 
had negative impacts on domestic household 
income, or to have had a significant negative 
effect on the poorest households.
The report notes that the effectiveness 
of the tax could be enhanced by broadening 
the tax base in future to include natural gas, 
and by increasing the tax rate. This would 
also raise additional revenues to compensate 
poorer households, to create employment, or 
investments to drive inclusive growth. While 
the equity impacts of the carbon tax itself ap-
pear to have been broadly neutral, fossil fuel 
subsidy reform may have had a negative im-
pact on social equity and household incomes 
in early 2017 when the oil price increased and 
transport fuel prices rose rapidly as a result. 
The report concludes that the carbon tax 
rate was too low to have a significant impact 
on climate mitigation, or on social equity, at 
the time of writing. Nonetheless, the tax and 
associated reform in the energy sector repre-
sent an important shift away from subsidising 
of fossil fuels and towards taxation of their 
use.
DIFFERENTIATED ELECTRICITY 
PRICING IN CHINA 
In the 2000s, reducing air pollution in gen-
eral and SO2 pollution in particular became a 
matter of political urgency in China. In 2003, 
the pollution levy was reformed with the ob-
jective of improving the effectiveness of the 
levy and preferential grid prices for desul-
phurised electricity were introduced to help 
fund technological improvements and incen-
tivise the installation of flue gas desulphurisa-
tion (FGD) technology. However, these initial 
steps did not result in SO2 emissions being ef-
fectively reduced, in part because the levy on 
SO2 was so low that it was cheaper for enter-
prises to pay the fee than take action to abate 
SO2 emissions.
In China, getting the price right for SO2 
emissions proved crucial. In 2007, preferential 
grid prices were complemented by the intro-
duction of penalties for electricity production 
without the application of FGD technology, 
and the pollution levy on SO2 emissions was 
doubled. These taxes made it economical for 
power stations to install desulphurising tech-
nologies and thus reduce SO2 emissions. The 
political commitment expressed by the gov-
ernment ensured that emissions targets were 
taken seriously, both by provincial govern-
ments and by the managers of state-owned 
power producers.
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There were no direct social equity impacts 
resulting from these tax measures, as elec-
tricity prices in China are strongly regulated. 
Hence, the increase in the production cost 
of electricity due to penalties and the cost of 
the pollution levy were not passed through 
to electricity consumers. In economies where 
prices are regulated, the impact on poorer 
households of an environmental tax is less 
of a concern than in economies where energy 
prices are unregulated and all price changes 
can be passed through to domestic consum-
ers. Given the strict regulation of electricity 
prices at government level, there were also no 
direct impacts on GDP growth due to higher 
prices.
The report notes although there were no 
negative social impacts resulting from the 
measures, the benefits of subsidies attribut-
able to price regulation in the domestic elec-
tricity sector are captured far more by wealth-
ier households than by poorer households. 
There is therefore potential to enhance so-
cial equity and fairness in the country by in-
troducing fairer electricity prices and target-
ing subsidies or social protection measures to 
those in need of them.
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES IN LOW-
INCOME COUNTRIES 
There is insufficient literature and data 
available on the impacts of environmental 
taxation in low-income countries (LICs) to 
analyse one specific environmental tax in-
strument as a specific case for this report. The 
report analyses the impacts of both environ-
mental taxes and environmentally related 
taxes in LICs, as they tend to implement what 
is referred to in this report as environmentally 
related taxes, rather than taxes with an explic-
it environmental objective. Furthermore, giv-
en the lack of research and robust data avail-
able, this approach broadens the number of 
cases available for the analysis. 
In the context of limited domestic fiscal 
capacity in LICs, the report notes that reve-
nues from environmental taxes levied in LICs 
could be used to facilitate higher levels of 
spending for the achievement of the Sustain-
able Development Goals. Currently, LICs col-
lect much lower tax revenues and social insur-
ance contributions than high-income coun-
tries (13.4% on average in 27 LICs, compared 
to 28% in HICs). These low tax-to-GDP ratios 
severely restrict the capacity of governments 
to tackle shortfalls in fiscal governance and 
to invest in measures for poverty reduction, 
infrastructure, healthcare, education, or green 
economy transition. Implementing environ-
mental taxes to increase fiscal space could be 
part of the solution to this problem. 
The report examines measures imple-
mented in LICs in East and Southern Afri-
ca to highlight the range of environmental-
ly related taxes implemented in LICs. Near-
ly all countries levy environmentally related 
fuel taxes on petroleum products and impose 
vehicle taxes and annual circulation charg-
es, often related to cylinder capacity. Royal-
ties, taxes and fees on natural resource use 
are common, although they tend to be purely 
revenue-raising instruments and do not have 
positive environmental impacts. Fisheries are 
subject to fiscal measures, whereby a large 
proportion of fisheries revenue stems from 
distant water fleets, rather than from domes-
tic fishers. Royalties are levied on timber ex-
traction, and taxes on timber volumes. User 
fees on electricity and water services are wide-
spread and usually include a lifeline tariff for 
low-income households or progressive tariffs 
based on the amount of electricity or water 
consumed. Finally, some LICs levy wastewa-
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ter fees targeting pollutant emissions. As in 
OECD countries, the highest proportion of 
environmentally related tax revenues in LICs 
is attributable to transport fuel taxes.
LICs suffer from poor governance, lack of 
fiscal capacity and the negative impacts of tax 
competition, tax avoidance, trade mispricing 
and VAT evasion on the part of multinational 
enterprises. Environmental taxes may be part 
of the solution to these challenges, as they are 
comparatively difficult to evade. In addition, 
the report suggests that a stronger focus on 
taxation and domestic revenue mobilisation 
in LICs may have the potential to contribute 
to state building processes. 
With regards to social impacts, the report 
contends that transport fuel taxes are often 
in effect luxury taxes. Indeed, transport fuel 
taxes have been shown to be strongly progres-
sive in African and large Asian countries. In 
LICs, negative impacts on the poor may re-
sult from the indirect effects of environmen-
tal taxes, when public transport and food pric-
es increase. However, there is evidence that 
fuel taxes can even be progressive when tak-
ing these costs into account. However, as even 
a small decrease in income can impact poor 
households’ ability to pay for essential goods 
and services, policymakers must ensure that 
social compensation measures are in place to 
protect the vulnerable from price increases.
Definitive statements on the economic and 
fiscal impacts of environmental taxes in LICs 
cannot be made. In wealthier countries, there 
is evidence that environmental taxes have at 
best a positive impact on GDP growth and at 
worst, have a less negative impact than other 
direct and indirect taxes.
CONCLUSIONS
Environmental taxes did not result in price 
increases of a magnitude that could have had 
a significant impact on social equity or house-
hold income in the countries covered in this 
report. Many environmental taxes are levied 
upstream – at the start of the value chain – 
and as a result, may impact consumer pric-
es to a limited extent. Other taxes examined 
were levied directly e.g. on the consumption 
of transport fuels, but due to the low tax rate, 
also had a limited impact on household in-
come.
In the future, it is reasonable to expect envi-
ronmental tax rates to be increased in low- and 
middle-income countries, particularly carbon 
and energy taxes. Environmentally related 
taxes, most notably fuel excise duties, have 
been levied at a higher rate in many countries. 
Higher environmental tax rates, even if im-
plemented by means of stepwise increases 
over time – desirable from a theoretical per-
spective to compensate for devaluation due 
to inflation and maintain the dynamic incen-
tive created by the tax – will require policy-
makers in low- and middle-income countries 
to evaluate carefully whether and to what ex-
tent targeted compensation measures or im-
proved social welfare are necessary. 
Indirect impacts of environmental taxes 
are particularly difficult to measure. Policy-
makers should take care to monitor not only 
direct impacts but also the pass through ef-
fects of price increases on basic commodities. 
Lack of capacity to target social welfare meas-
ures effectively amplifies this concern, as in 
many low-income and lower-middle-income 
countries, coverage of social compensation 
schemes does not exceed 50% of the popula-
tion. 
The second chapter of the report concludes 
that environmental taxation has considerable 
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potential to contribute enhanced tax justice, 
if it is well designed and carefully implement-
ed. First, environmental taxation can act as a 
progressive tax policy that supports people to 
share in local and global prosperity and access 
public services and social protections. Second, 
environmental taxation can contribute to tax 
justice by shaping the economy so that it acts 
in the interest of the environment. 
Finally, the report highlights the inequal-
ity of the outcomes of severe environmen-
tal degradation and climate change, both of 
which are significant obstacles to poverty alle-
viation. To prevent these significant negative 
impacts on equity and achieve climate jus-
tice, all countries must step up and commit to 
more ambitious GHG emissions reductions. 
The most cost-effective and thus politically 
feasible way of achieving these emissions re-
ductions is the introduction of a carbon price, 
alongside additional measures to facilitate the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. 
Ultimately, the predicted outcome of the 
climate crisis is just one of several dimensions 
of inequality in environmental policy exam-
ined in the report. The report highlights the 
potential role of environmental taxation in 
addressing some of these dimensions – by 
implementing the polluter pays principle, by 
reducing negative environmental impacts, 
and by ensuring equality of policy outcomes 
by designing compensation in a way which 
protects the vulnerable from price increases. 
Thus, the report concludes by emphasising 
the ways in which the vision and objectives 
of the tax justice movement for more pro-
gressive and more sustainable taxation can be 
compatible with the implementation of envi-
ronmental taxation.
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CHAPTER I  
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX 
JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(by Jacqueline Cottrell and Tatiana Falcão)
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION AND 
OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This report sets out to examine possible 
linkages between environmental taxation 
and tax justice. Hence, both environmental 
and social dimensions are taken into account 
when evaluating environmental taxation in 
the developing country context. For the pur-
poses of this report, for an environmental tax 
to be considered effective, it should have, on 
balance, no negative equity impacts left unad-
dressed by policymakers. 
Environmental taxes are closely related to 
the economic dimensions of sustainable de-
velopment, as they foster innovation (Sus-
tainable Development Goal, SDG 9) and en-
courage more sustainable consumption and 
production patterns (SDG 12). Environmen-
tal taxes can also foster the achievement of so-
cial indicators within the Agenda 2030, such 
as target 3.4 to reduce premature mortality 
from non-communicable diseases through 
prevention (reduced air pollution), or target 
7.1 of universal energy access. Indeed, if en-
vironmental taxes are effective and result in 
lower levels of pollution and environmental 
degradation, they have the potential to have 
positive equity impacts – although these must 
always be weighed against potential negative 
impacts to equity due to changes to the rela-
tive prices of goods and services. This report 
examines this balance and considers whether 
and in which ways environmental taxation 
and the tax justice agenda can be combined.
1.2 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
A great deal of recent research has high-
lighted the problem of global inequality. The 
wealthiest 1% of the global population was 
found in 2017 to own an estimated 50.1% of 
the world’s wealth, according to Credit Suisse’ 
Global Wealth Report 2017 (Credit Suisse 
2017). Figure 1 shows that wealth is concen-
trated in the USA, Canada, Western Europe, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan, while the 
entire continent of Africa has the lowest con-
centration of wealth per adult. 
Economic inequality between countries 
is a fundamental policy challenge, given the 
many factors required to provide parity be-
tween states: Economic equality requires im-
provement in social welfare, education, access 
to basic infrastructure, improvement in over-
all living conditions and is, in a way, depend-
ent on the elimination or reduction of ine-
quality within a state. 
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In many rapidly growing emerging econ-
omies, the benefits of growth have not been 
evenly distributed. Although millions have 
been lifted out of absolute poverty, inequali-
ty remains a significant domestic policy chal-
lenge. The Gini index measures the extent to 
which income is distributed amongst individ-
uals and households within an economy – the 
higher the rating, the greater the inequality. 
In relatively equal societies, such as Denmark 
(29.1) and Germany (30.1), the Gini index is 
relatively low, while in middle income coun-
tries such as Chile (50.5), Mexico (48.1) and 
Brazil (51.3), or in low income countries, such 
as Congo (48.9) or Rwanda (50.4), the rating is 
much higher (World Bank 2016a). 
The lack of comprehensive data on tax eva-
sion and avoidance means that statistics on 
the wealthiest 1% globally probably underes-
timate both intra and inter-State inequality 
(Falcão and Chowla, 2016). Therefore, tax eva-
sion and avoidance may perpetuate and ex-
acerbate inequalities in and between nations 
and deprive developing countries of urgent-
ly needed domestic sources of revenue to fi-
nance development. 
Developing countries, particularly devel-
oping countries rich in mineral resources, are 
hard-hit by tax evasion and avoidance, due to 
their governments’ susceptibility to corrup-
tive practices, lack of fiscal capacity to col-
lect revenues, the large informal sector in de-
veloping economies, and the opportunities 
available internationally for multinational 
companies to shift their profits to low-tax ju-
risdictions. Increased transparency in the pol-
icy making process, improved fiscal govern-
ance, and better regulation of the institutional 
frameworks would be required to curb these 
unwarranted flows. 
Figure 1 1: World Wealth Levels (average wealth per adult in USD in 2017)
Wealth levels (USD)
Below USD 5,000
USD 5,000 to 25,000
USD 25,000 to 100,000
Over USD 100,000
No Data
Source: Davies, J., Lluberas, R. and Shorrocks, A. (2017). Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2017.
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These losses to the exchequer in many 
countries, and the lack of capacity to mobi-
lise domestic revenue, are endangering the 
achievement of the SDGs – and pose a huge 
challenge to developing countries trying to 
improve social welfare and prosperity. 
While environmental taxation cannot tack-
le the root causes of global inequality, it can 
be part of the solution, as it offers policymak-
ers one route to solving the problem of a lack 
of domestic resources, while improving out-
comes for the poor and vulnerable and in-
creasing capacity to achieve the SDGs. 
1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
There are close linkages between social 
justice, climate change and environmental 
degradation. The financial and social welfare 
costs derived from climate change, environ-
ment-related industrial hazards and natural 
disasters, and natural resource management 
is significantly higher in non-OECD coun-
tries than in the OECD (OECD 2008). Devel-
oping countries are plagued by environmen-
tal problems. Air pollution resulting from fos-
sil fuel combustion for power generation and 
transport emissions – specifically, emissions 
from old and dirty diesel engines – are having 
an increasingly high impact on life expectan-
cy worldwide. Deforestation, soil degradation, 
poor water quality and degrading supplies, 
pollution of waterways, contamination due 
to waste dumping, and so on, have a huge cost 
to human health. In 2012, the World Bank es-
timated that the cost of environmental and 
natural-resource degradation was on average 
equivalent to roughly 8% of GDP, while spe-
cific assessments revealed a cost of 9% of GDP 
in China, over 8% in Ghana, more than 7% in 
both Nigeria and Iran, and 6% in Pakistan (The 
Economist 2012). 
All economic predictions indicate that cli-
mate change will hit developing countries 
hardest (Hallegatte et al. 2016, OECD 2008). 
Nicholas Stern has predicted losses of 5-20% 
of global GDP per annum if the targets of the 
Paris Agreement are not met: an estimate that 
does not accurately reflect the cost of climate 
inaction for the poor and vulnerable (Stern 
2007). 
Given these close links between environ-
mental degradation and inequality, this report 
explores whether and to what extent the im-
plementation of environmental taxation has 
the potential to address the inequality of out-
comes currently experienced by different in-
come groups as a result of environmental deg-
radation.
1.4 REPORT OBJECTIVES
The objective of this report is to: 
1.  analyse environmental taxation from a tax 
justice perspective. The report will do so by 
highlighting the ways in which the tax jus-
tice and environmental taxation agendas 
overlap and can be complementary.
2.  provide policy approaches to the introduc-
tion of environmental taxes in general and 
carbon taxes in particular.
3.  provide a review of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks surrounding environmental 
law and taxation.
4.  provide an overview of environmental tax-
ation and its impacts (economic, social, en-
vironmental) in the developing country 
context.
5.  qualify what are the most efficient envi-
ronmental taxes for domestic resource 
mobilisation and reduction of a country’s 
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pollution ability (as perceived in the Paris 
Agreement).
6.  share positive country experiences (i.e. ex-
periences leading to environmental and 
revenue gains) with environmental taxa-
tion in developing countries. 
7.  explore the potential for environmental 
taxation to contribute to tax justice and 
more progressive and sustainable tax sys-
tems as well as more equitable societies in 
developing countries.
8.  discuss how environmental taxation can 
contribute to the achievement of the SDGs.
1.5 STRUCTURE AND CONTENT 
OF CHAPTER I 
Part two of this chapter defines environ-
mental taxation, explains its theoretical le-
gal framework, and analyses the interaction 
between international environmental agree-
ments and taxation mechanisms. Part three 
looks at environmental taxation in practice in 
developing countries and considers the pos-
itive and negative impacts of environmental 
taxation on the environment, social equity 
and economic prosperity. Part four focuses on 
the way forward for environmental taxation 
and the tax justice agenda, identifying a num-
ber of possible routes to draw the two topics 
closer together. Part five concludes.
PART TWO: THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THIS REPORT
2.1 DEFINITIONS 
2.1.1 Environmental taxes versus 
environmentally-related taxes
Several agencies have attempted to de-
fine environmental taxes without building a 
coherent normative conceptual framework 
which would differentiate between environ-
mental policies that are driven by an environ-
mental purpose and pursue an environmen-
tal effect, and policies that are mere revenue 
raisers, and are ineffective at promoting a be-
havioural change, although they may bring 
about an indirect environmental gain. In this 
paper, we refer to the former an environmen-
tal tax, and the latter, an environmentally re-
lated tax. 
This failure to distinguish between these 
two kinds of environmental tax can make it 
difficult both to monitor countries’ environ-
mental tax policies, and to provide clear guid-
ance to new entrants in the environmental 
tax world, as to the best policies to pursue ac-
cording to the envisaged goal.
If the goal is to apply a tax that is going to 
lead to a consequent reduction of carbon di-
oxide emissions by bringing about a change 
in consumer behaviour, then the type of tax 
applied should be one capable of attaching a 
price to the final product that is proportionate 
to the implicit carbon content of the product. 
In this paper, we are calling those taxes that 
both have the express purpose of, and result 
in, behavioural change and environmental 
gain, environmental taxes.
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If, on the other hand, the goal of a particular 
measure is merely to raise revenues, or to ad-
dress an environmental externality to a lim-
ited extent, without necessarily achieving an 
environmental gain or a behavioural change, 
then we consider this measure to be an envi-
ronmentally related tax, rather than an envi-
ronmental tax. 
The nomenclature currently adopted by 
international organisations to address these 
policy goals does not take the objective of 
the tax into account. Agencies will identify as 
environmental tax any tax that is associated 
with an environmental item or good, even if 
there is no ulterior environmental motivation 
for the tax, or if it is a revenue raiser. 
The OECD alone has four different defini-
tions for an environmental/environmentally 
related tax, definitions that change according 
to which segment of the organisation is us-
ing the term. For the purposes of illustration, 
these are:
According to the OECD’s Glossary of Sta-
tistical Terms, an environmental tax is “a tax 
whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) that 
has a proven specific negative impact on the environ-
ment. Four subsets of environmental taxes are distin-
guished: energy taxes, transport taxes, pollution tax-
es and resource taxes.” (OECD 2005a) 
According to Eurostat and the OECD, an 
environmental tax is “a tax whose tax base is a 
physical unit such as [a] litre of petrol, or a proxy of it, 
for instance a passenger flight, that has a proven spe-
cific negative impact on the environment (OECD 
et al. 2001).” 
According to the OECD’s Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration, an environmental 
tax is a “tax imposed for environmental reasons, e.g. 
to provide an incentive to reduce certain emissions to 
an optimal level or taxes on environmentally harm-
ful products.”(OECD n.d.) 
Environmentally related taxation, which 
does not entail tax shifting, has been defined 
as any compulsory, unrequited payment 
to general government levied on tax bases 
deemed to be of particular environmental rel-
evance (OECD 2004). 
However, for policymakers it is useful to 
make a clear distinction between environ-
mental taxes (that is, taxes with both an envi-
ronmental purpose and effect) and environ-
mentally related taxes (that is, taxes with only 
an indirect environmental purpose) (Falcão 
2013).
Making this distinction at the internation-
al level would allow countries to follow suit 
and implement policies that are effective-
ly geared toward environmental protection 
and pollution reduction. The United Nations’ 
Committee of Experts in International Tax 
Cooperation (“UN Tax Committee”) has re-
cently established a Subcommittee on Envi-
ronmental Taxation, which has been mandat-
ed, among other things, to create a conceptual 
framework to encapsulate these terms (Fal-
cão 2018b). An environmentally related tax is 
any tax with an environmental essence, even 
if the conferred benefit is only indirect. For 
example, a transport tax related to the own-
ership and use of a motor vehicle is as a gen-
eral rule considered to be an environmental-
ly related tax, because they tend to be levied 
on vehicles, ships and aircraft using public 
highways, rivers, and airports maintained by 
the government. The tax is not related to the 
size or the consumption of a vehicle, but to its 
potential to use public infrastructure main-
tained by the government and thus to con-
tribute revenues for maintenance and use. In 
spite of that, several systems of motor vehicle 
registration taxation include differentials on 
the basis of CO2 emissions, or other environ-
mental impacts of the specific vehicle in ques-
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tion, to encourage consumption and use of 
fuel-efficient and low-carbon vehicles. If that 
were to be the case, the tax would be an envi-
ronmental tax.
Any of the above definitions is apt to por-
tray the purpose of an environmentally relat-
ed tax, that is, a tax that derives revenues from 
an environmentally related tax base, but that 
might ultimately not derive a benefit to the 
environment through the reduction of corre-
sponding carbon emissions, or reduction and/
or elimination of a particularly polluting sub-
stance or product.
Such measures differ from an environmen-
tal tax such as a carbon tax, for example, where 
the application of a tax on carbon can have the 
effect of changing consumer behaviour and 
reducing the consumption of carbon-based 
products. A carbon tax is a tax that has an en-
vironmental purpose and effect, in the sense 
that the sole application of the tax is capable 
of leading to a reduction in the consumption 
of carbon based products and to a reduction in 
carbon based emissions. 
Falcão has argued that there ought to be 
a distinction between environmental taxes 
(taxes with both an environmental purpose 
and effect) and environmentally related tax-
es (taxes bearing an indirect environmental 
purpose in its conception) (Falcão 2016 and 
Falcão 2018b).
Therefore, and in order to distinguish our 
proposed definition from the existing ones 
previously mentioned in the literature, we 
add the “purpose and effect” doctrine to our 
definition of an environmental tax. For the 
purposes of this report, therefore: 
An environmental tax is defined as any 
compulsory, unrequited payment to general 
government imposed for an environmental 
reason and levied on a tax base that has a prov-
en specific negative impact on the environ-
ment. It is thus regarded to have environmen-
tal purpose and effect.
This definition is significant because the 
tax base is the only objective basis to identify 
the nature of the tax: neither the name, nor the 
purpose of the tax, the motivation for imple-
menting it, or the use of revenues collected 
are taken into account. In order to be consid-
ered a tax with an environmental substrate, 
the tax has to work so as to inflict a direct fi-
nancial burden on an environmentally rele-
vant base. 
We will use this definition for the purposes 
of this report, while emphasising the impor-
tance of the use of revenues raised by environ-
mental taxes, for example to mobilise domes-
tic sources of revenue to fund the achieve-
ment of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
to protect the vulnerable from possible nega-
tive impacts of environmental taxes, and to fi-
nance the transition to a more sustainable and 
progressive tax system.
It is to be noted that an environmentally 
related tax may over time convert into an en-
vironmental tax and vice-versa. A purely rev-
enue raising tax that over time acquires an 
environmental purpose and effect may be just 
as effective as one conceived with an environ-
mental purpose in mind. Setting the two cate-
gories apart is also not synonymous with set-
ting them into a main and a sub-category, but 
an instrument of measurement and control. 
Environmentally related taxes can have an 
important role in the control of certain forms 
of pollution which are not behavioural, or that 
do not lead to the release of, per se, harmful 
emissions into the atmosphere, such as noise, 
water, and others. 
Setting environmental taxes apart from 
environmentally related taxes is important, 
among other things, in order to monitor and 
assess how effective countries are in admin-
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istering policies that are effective in reducing 
carbon-based emissions, and other forms of 
polluting emissions. Because most environ-
mental taxes create a direct correlation be-
tween the item subject to tax (the pollution) 
and the revenue derived therefrom, the reve-
nue data alone is enough to inform how high 
the price of carbon is set in a determined ju-
risdiction, and how efficient that jurisdiction 
is in reducing carbon-based emissions. The 
decline in revenue accumulation via the tax 
will be proportionate to the pollution (emis-
sions) reduction verified domestically. By dis-
tinguishing the taxing types via an objective 
nomenclature, monitoring agencies would 
ideally be capable of verifying how efficient 
countries are in meeting the objectives of the 
Paris Agreement through the administration 
of taxes, by using revenue data. This last point 
is further explored in section 2.4. 
2.1.2 The significance of revenue raising 
The relative importance of revenue raising 
and expenditure is reflected in the OECD-
DAC (Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD) definition of environmental 
fiscal reform (EFR) in developing countries:
EFR can contribute to poverty reduction directly 
by helping address environmental problems […] that 
impact the poor […] and indirectly, by generating or 
freeing up resources for anti-poverty programmes 
[…]. (OECD 2005b, p. 12).
Although relevant to achieve the SDGs, the 
revenue raising aspect of the tax should not 
drive the policy in its entirety. Revenue rais-
ing is a feature which permeates both envi-
ronmental and environmentally related taxes. 
2.2 FISCAL APPROACHES
Further developing the conceptual frame-
work outlined in the previous section, the 
next step would be to explore what fiscal 
frameworks would be appropriate to inflict 
a change in consumer behaviour, in order to 
derive the intended environmental effect. We 
propose six categories within the framework 
of fiscal approaches: (1) a charge or surcharge; 
(2) a fee; (3) consumption taxes like Value 
Added Taxes (VATs); (4) subsidies and incen-
tives; (5) a prohibition; and (6) an excise tax. 
A charge or surcharge. Charges tend to be 
applied in counter-payment for a public offer-
ing or the provision of a service. A surcharge 
is an addition to the list price of a good or a 
service. Generally of short duration reflecting 
unusual cost pressures affecting the produc-
er. An example would be a fuel surcharge for 
transport operators (OECD 2003). 
A fee4 is a public price. It is formally defined 
as a “compulsory, requited payment to either gener-
al government or to bodies outside general govern-
ment, such as for instance an environmental fund 
(…)” in return for a service (OECD et al. 2001, p. 
15). It is a compulsory payment to the govern-
ment because the benefits are more directly 
linked to the value disbursed. There has to be a 
direct correlation between the fee and the ser-
vice provided by the public body. 
A consumption tax such as a VAT can at 
times be used with the dual purpose of tax-
ing consumption and internalising the cost 
of carbon, by dedicating a percentage of the 
tax to an environmental cause, for example. 
Some scholars have called this technique a 
carbon-based VAT, or Carbon Added Tax (al-
though it is not always referenced according 
to the carbon content of the item subject to 
4 In OECD et  al  (2001), pg  15, the terms charges and fees are used interchangea-
bly  They are both seen as requited payments in exchange for a service 
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tax). According to the OECD Glossary of Sta-
tistical Terms, a VAT “is a tax on products col-
lected in stages by enterprises; it is a wide-ranging 
tax usually designed to cover most or all goods and 
services but producers are obliged to pay to govern-
ment only the difference between the VAT on their 
sales and the VAT on their purchases for interme-
diate consumption or capital formation.” (OECD 
2001a) The Carbon Added Tax would there-
fore work by taxing the emissions released in 
each stage of the consumption process. 
Subsidies are defined as “current unrequited 
payments from government to producers, with the 
objective of influencing their levels of production, 
their prices or the remuneration of the factors of 
production.” (OECD et al. 2001). Subsidies and 
incentives provide for a special derogation 
from the main tax legislation, by conferring 
an exceptionally low or no rate of taxation. 
These instruments are not capable of produc-
ing government revenues. On the contrary, 
they reduce the government’s revenue gen-
erating ability to provide financial support 
for private parties to pursue environmentally 
sound practices, or comply with the SDGs. 
A prohibition is inflicted in order to fore-
stall action or forbid behaviour. The difference 
between policy and prohibition is that a fiscal 
policy does not aim to prevent the conduct in 
an absolute way, but merely to discourage it. 
A penalty or prohibition on the other hand, if 
not followed, may result in a criminal offence 
punishable via a monetary fine or physical re-
clusion (Määttä, 2006, p.661). 
An excise tax is a tax imposed on an act, 
activity, or consumption, where there needs 
to be no correlation between the price paid 
by the consumer and the actual value of the 
commodity. There needs to be no reference 
price against which the tax is to be measured. 
Therefore, the tax can be moulded to suit the 
purpose intended by the legislator. Excise tax-
es can be charged as an ad valorem5 or a specific 
tax,6 which make them easy to correlate to a 
specific measure of volume or weight. Carbon 
taxes are usually excise taxes, applied on a spe-
cific basis. 
The focus in this report will be on taxes, 
due to their greater potential for domestic 
revenue mobilisation (DRM). Therefore sub-
sidies, incentives and prohibitions are im-
mediately discredited under the terms of the 
present study. Fees and charges tend to be 
measured against the provision of a public 
service, and therefore are not generic in na-
ture. Likewise, consumption taxes have to be 
measured against actual consumption, which 
imposes an obligation on the consumer to 
report, and one on the tax administration to 
certify and assess the tax. A surcharge is an 
extraordinary lump sum charge, and hence 
not suitable for a long-term policy approach. 
Therefore, the simplest policy approach 
would be to apply an excise tax on a particular 
pollutant. Other instruments, such as policy 
packages and hybrid instruments, are further 
discussed in part 3.
Table 1.1 below provides an inventory of 
the different taxes and carbon prices that are 
typically related to the application of envi-
ronmental or environmentally related tax-
es. It also specifies whether the tax would be 
one capable of conferring a carbon price, and 
hence act as an internalisation mechanism to 
forestall future carbon emissions. In the table, 
N stands for No, Y for Yes and M for Maybe 
(depending on the framework adopted). The 
classification adopted follows the examples 
conferred in each category. 
5 Percentage applied on the final price of the product 
6 Fixed price applied per litre, kg or kW of a product 
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Taxes on transport 
fuels
Differentiated fuel taxation on leaded and unleaded 
petrol or diesel and low-sulphur diesel – implement-






Taxes on heating 
 fuels, e.g. oil, gas
Taxes on domestic heating in the Netherlands are 







Taxes on power 
generation
Climate Change Levy in the UK is a tax levied on 











Taxes on carbon 
content in energy 
sources
Carbon tax in Mexico levied at import or production 
stage on all fossil fuels except natural gas, which is 
exempt. 
Y Y Y N
Taxes on CO2 
 emissions
CO2 tax in British Columbia, Canada, on purchase 
and use of fossil fuels. From April 1, 2018, B.C.’s 
carbon tax rate is USD27/tCO2e. The tax rate will in-
crease each year by USD 4 per tonne until it reaches 
USD40/tCO2e in 2021.
Y Y Y N
Carbon price floor 
(minimum carbon 
price usually en-
forced by means of 
a tax)
The carbon price floor in the UK sets a minimum 
price for emissions in the EU ETS. If the EU ETS 
price is expected to be below the minimum target 
price, carbon price support rates are imposed on the 
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Registration  taxes 
based on CO2 emis-
sions
Vehicle registration taxes in Thailand explicitly tax 








e) N Y N
Annual circulation 
taxes 
In the UK, circulation taxes are paid on a sliding 








Road tolls are environmentally-related taxes: their 
primary objective is to cover the cost of road mainte-
nance.
N N N Y
Transport taxes to 
enter city centres 
(often referred to as 
congestion charges)
In Milan, congestion charging differentiates between 
vehicles – cleaner vehicles, like motorcycles, electric 
vehicles, hybrid vehicles, natural gas, LPG and bi-fu-




Vehicle Taxes Recurrent taxes on vehicle registration or road use 
which do not reflect the climate or environmental im-
pact of a vehicle.
N N N Y
Air pollution taxes Explicit environmental taxes on air pollution from 
transport are rare, environmentally-related taxes on 
transport fuels, which also address air pollution, are 











Ticket taxes, e.g. air 
passenger duty
In the UK, air passenger duty differentiates between 
short-haul and long-haul flights and also between the 
space taken up by passengers in the aircraft – to re-
















































Air pollution  taxes 
e.g. on SO2, as well 
as VOC, NOx, PM, 
NH2, heavy metals, 
CO, NH3, etc.

















Environmental Protection Tax in Vietnam taxes HFCs. 
HFC commitments in the Montreal Protocol general-
ly ask for a regulatory prohibition on the emission of 
HFCs. 




Taxes on water sup-
ply and sanitation
Tap water tax and groundwater tax in the Nether-




















Taxes on  pollutant 
emissions into 
 waterways
Colombia, wastewater discharge fee. M N M M















































In Costa Rica, a PES programme spanning more than 
20 years has increased forest cover to over 50% to-
day, from a low of just over 20% in the 1980s.
M N Y N
Stump charges Stump charges in Ghana, levied per stump at the 
moment of timber extraction – which have been 
largely ineffective as retained at the same rate for 
many years, due to political pressure.
N N M Y
Tourism taxes – 
which may be in 
this context nation-
al park entry fees
Visitor entrance fees, differentiated by heavily visit-
ed sites in the Galapagos National Park in Ecuador, 
as well as by citizenship (higher rates for foreign 
 tourists).
N N M Y
Land taxation, e.g. 
taxes on land use 
change
Land use change tax in the state of Vermont, USA. M N M Y
Extraction taxes Forestry charge in Bosnia-Herzegovina on forestry 
products (charged at 3% ad valorem and 0.1% on 
non-forestry income on forest areas), revenues ear-
marked for reforestation and protection.




Landfill taxes Landfill tax in Austria introduced in 1989, all rev-
enues are earmarked for clean-up of contaminated 
sites.
N N M Y
Incineration taxes Waste-to-energy incineration tax in Sweden intro-
duced in 2006 to reduce incineration and encourage 
recycling.
N N Y M
Contamination fees In Bulgaria, a fee for excessive soil pollution is paya-
ble on many different kinds of waste (manure, pesti-
cides, heavy metals, radioactive waste).




All countries in the European Union with recycling 
rates above 45 % have used PAYT systems to drive 
high rates of recycling. Countries with recycling rates 
below 20 % have not – indicating PAYT are an effec-
tive instrument to drive up recycling.
N N M M
Plastics taxes In Morocco, taxes on plastics (imports and manufac-
tured plastics) have been levied since 2012.
M N M Y
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Taxes on natural 
 resources
In Latvia, the natural resource tax came into force in 
1991, but rate has remained unchanged – limited 
impact as a result
M N M M
Royalties for 
 resource extraction
In China, taxes are levied ad valorem on the ex-
traction of a wide range of resources – gold, oil, 
rare earths, ore – at rates of between 1-12% of the 
 pre-tax price.
N N N N
Rent taxes (e.g. 
 resource rent taxes)
Resource rent taxes in Tanzania. N N N M
User fees (e.g. 
 signature bonus)
A one-off fee for the assignment and securing of a 
 license for commercial entities to conduct exploration 
activities and extract natural resources such as oil.
N N N N








Contractual provisions foreseen in extractives 
 contracts. Most times do not have an environmental 
 concern.









In Norway, pesticide taxes payable in 7 tax bands 
 according to environmental damage resulting.

















) Introduce a 
 regulatory approach 
to price carbon. 
European Union ETS and British Columbia ETS are 
examples of existing market approaches. 
N Y Y N
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Different types of taxes can hence be ap-
plied with the intention of making up a gov-
ernment’s policy mix, and have as wide a cov-
erage as possible. Broader policy mixes will 
typically maximise emission mitigation 
and revenue-raising potential, and be more 
cost-effective. At the same time, which option 
(or combination of options) works best in a 
given jurisdiction will depend on factors such 
as the emissions profile of the jurisdiction; 
existing and planned climate, energy, and tax 
policies; the structure of key sectors; and gov-
ernment capacities for tax administration. 
The World Bank has issued a Carbon Tax 
Guide, which might be a useful tool for pol-
icy makers (World Bank 2017a). The United 
Nations Committee of Tax Experts is also 
currently producing guidance on environ-
mental taxation, starting with carbon taxes. 
The IMF’s handbook, Fiscal Policy to Mitigate 
Climate Change: A Guide for Policymakers (IMF 
2012) and the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee’s Environmental Fiscal Reform 
for Poverty Reduction (OECD 2005b) are two 
useful guides for policymakers wishing to im-
plement environmental or carbon taxation. 
South-south cooperation, and north-south ca-
pacity development are important tools to 
disseminate techniques for the development 
of environmental tax policies and environ-
mental tax reforms (ETRs). 
2.3 The theoretical underpinnings 
of environmental taxation 
Environmental pollution results in dam-
ages, such as impacts on human health, wa-
ter quality, and biodiversity. These damages 
can be of considerable economic significance, 
but are typically not reflected in market pric-
es and their consequences are usually borne 
by society as a whole. If the economy does 
not internalise these ‘external costs’, it will 
operate inefficiently, resulting in market dis-
tortions. Environmental taxes are a means 
of internalising these external costs within 
the market price of goods and services, thus 
generating welfare gains that result from a 
government’s increased revenue collection 
ability. Depending on how the environmental 
taxes are applied, and the type of tax applied, 
environmental taxes may also lead to an envi-
ronmental gain to the extent that they reduce 
carbon-based pollution, for example, or deter 
consumers from buying a particularly pollut-
ing item. The consumer behavioural shift that 
may be obtained from the application of envi-
ronmental taxes has the effect of reducing in-
efficiencies in the economy. 
Environmental taxes can internalise ex-
ternalities by either internalising all environ-
mental costs within the price – a so-called Pig-
ouvian tax, or by setting tax rates at a level 
commensurate to achieving a particular envi-
ronmental objective (Pigou 1932, Baumol and 
Oates 1988). 
Setting a tax rate at a level that is commen-
surate to achieving a particular environmen-
tal objective is a subject that has given rise to 
much debate. The International Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) has produced extensive 
studies on this issue, and the result has always 
been inconclusive, with different prices being 
reached depending on the parameters adopt-
ed by the economists in charge of the study. 
The result has been a wide spectrum of carbon 
prices, which has been unhelpful in carrying 
the debate forward (IPCC 2007). 
The High Level Commission on Carbon 
Prices of the Carbon Pricing Leadership Co-
alition, led by Nicholas Stern and Joseph 
Stiglitz, has predicted that a carbon price of 
USD 40-80/tCO2e by 2020, and USD 50-100/
tCO2e by 2030, would be necessary to achieve 
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Figure 1 2 Prices in implemented carbon pricing initiatives
Source: World Bank, Ecofys (2018). State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018. © World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29687 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. 
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the Paris targets (Carbon Pricing Leadership 
Coalition 2017). The most recent IPCC report 
released in 2018 presents models and scenari-
os that propose that, to be effective as a stand-
alone measure, a carbon price ranging from 
USD 135 and USD 5,500 per tonne would be 
needed in order to meet the target of limiting 
the average global temperature increase to no 
more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 
as set in the Paris Agreement in 2030 (IPCC 
2018a). A carbon price at the upper end of this 
range would be almost impossible to achieve 
from a political perspective.
Very few countries are on the right path to 
get to the level of taxation proposed by the 
High Level Commission on Carbon Prices in 
an appropriate timeframe. The carbon pricing 
schemes currently in force only account for 
20% of global emissions (World Bank 2018a). 
In spite of that, many emissions outside an ex-
plicit carbon pricing scheme are nevertheless 
subject to an implicit carbon price through 
environmental or environmentally-related 
taxes, although the implicit carbon prices ad-
ministered to date are still significantly low. In 
2018, 88% of carbon emissions covered by the 
OECD Effective Carbon Rates report (which 
covered 80% of total global emissions) were 
priced at less than USD 35/tCO2, which is not 
sufficiently high to achieve the Paris targets 
(OECD 2018). With the predominance of 
very low carbon pricing
 initiatives, with most of them being set at 
under USD 10/tCO2e, there is urgent need for 
the disaggregation of data, to be able to cor-
relate the carbon price floor to the social and 
economic gains derived from the incidence of 
the tax. Further escalation of carbon prices is 
needed in most countries in order to further 
stimulate emissions reduction, and achieve 
the goals set by the Paris Agreement.
2.4 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
AND TAX FRAMEWORKS
Strictly speaking from an environmental 
perspective, the United Nations has produced 
three key agreements on climate change di-
recting member states to undertake certain 
obligations and meet specific targets for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In 
chronological order, the agreements are: the 
United Nations Framework Agreement on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (United Na-
tions 1992), the Kyoto Protocol (United Na-
tions 1997), and more recently, the aforemen-
tioned Paris Agreement (United Nations 
2015a).
The UNFCCC, the first international 
agreement on climate change, is an umbrel-
la convention that provides a framework for 
both market and non-market approaches to 
address climate change. It was approved in 
1994 and contains an open pledge “to achieve … 
[the] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”
While the UNFCCC targeted all signatory 
countries — both developed and developing 
— only developed countries listed in Annex I 
overtly committed to adopting national poli-
cies and taking corresponding actions to mit-
igate climate change by, among other things, 
limiting their emission of greenhouse gases. 
Annex II countries,
 a more restricted group of countries, had 
the supplementary obligation to provide fi-
nancial resources to meet all costs incurred 
by developing country parties in complying 
with UNFCCC obligations.
Thus, the UNFCCC established different 
rights and obligations between developed 
and developing countries. However, it did not 
foresee a specific mechanism by which coun-
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tries were to meet those limited rights and 
obligations. 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted only three 
years after the UNFCCC entered into force. 
It was clear in introducing a market-based ap-
proach for the reduction and control of green-
house gases. 
The close proximity within which the UN-
FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were admitted 
made it appear like trading in emissions per-
mits was, at least in political terms, the only 
admissible instrument under the umbrella of 
the convention.
 Because of that choice, many countries and 
regions introduced cap-and-trade systems. 
The largest and most well-known emissions 
trading system is the one in the European Un-
ion, launched in January 2005 (European Un-
ion 2003). 
The Kyoto Protocol recognizes that devel-
oped countries are principally responsible for 
the high levels of greenhouse gas emissions 
in the atmosphere as a result of more than 
150 years of industrial activity. Therefore, the 
protocol only places an obligation to reduce 
greenhouse gases on certain developed econ-
omies (listed Annex I countries), applying the 
principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities.
It took the U.N. and its member states over 
15 years to realize that a pure market approach 
would not be enough to achieve the aims of 
the UNFCCC, a realization that was followed 
by the adoption of the Paris Agreement. 
Introduced in 2015, the Paris Agreement 
brought attention back to a broader set of 
tools to address carbon emissions specifical-
ly and climate change more generally — tools 
that include green financing, green bonds, and 
environmental taxes.
The Paris Agreement requires all parties 
(developed and developing) to use their best 
efforts through nationally determined con-
tributions (that is, domestic mitigation meas-
ures, with the aim of achieving the objec-
tives of the agreement) to curb greenhouse 
gas emissions and to continue to strengthen 
those efforts in the years ahead. The agree-
ment is thus a return to the original objective 
of the UNFCCC (Falcão 2016).
 
Fortuitously but not by accident, 2015 was 
also the year of admission of the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda (AAAA), which provided the 
foundation to support the implementation 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment. The AAAA foresees a global frame-
work for financing sustainable development 
by aligning all financing flows and policies 
with economic, social and environmental pri-
orities. 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment is a plan of action for people, planet 
and prosperity, which portrays 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets 
to build on the achievements of the Millenni-
um Development Goals. They seek to realize 
the human rights of all and to achieve gender 
equality. They are integrated and indivisible 
and balance the three dimensions of sustain-
able development: economic, social and envi-
ronmental (United Nations 2015b). 
The 17 SDGs are currently the basis against 
which all UN Actions Plans are reported. The 
environment is such an important dimension 
of sustainable development that it features in 
ten of the seventeen goals, with a dedicated 
action plan specifically referencing it – SDG 
13 on Climate Action. 
The AAAA and the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development have emphasized the 
need for countries to mobilise resources in 
order to enhance development and meet with 
the required goal. Several agencies have been 
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set in order to monitor countries’ progress in 
this field, and the UN itself produces frequent 
reports on countries’ initiatives for resource 
mobilization (United Nations 2018).
The Addis Tax Initiative (ATI) was initiated 
by the Netherlands, Germany, United King-
dom and the United States to enhance the 
mobilisation and effective use of domestic 
revenues and to improve the fairness, trans-
parency, efficiency and effectiveness of coun-
tries’ tax systems. It is therefore an important 
tool to stimulate capacity building and poli-
cy development, particularly in developing 
countries. 
It is clear from the above description of his-
toric documents that domestic revenue mo-
bilisation, as well as better and more compre-
hensive taxation systems, are becoming in-
creasingly important in terms of financing 
development and are seen as an important 
tool with which countries can achieve the 
SDGs.
Some might argue that the debate extends 
as wide as the OECD’s Base Erosion Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Initiative, an initiative that 
has outgrown the competence of the in-
tragovernmental organisation that instituted 
the debate. The OECD initiated a debate on 
tax avoidance techniques, which ended up be-
ing expanded to reassess the suitability of the 
existing international tax framework in allo-
cating income between source and residence 
countries, and between developed and devel-
oping countries (Falcão 2017). A new prin-
cipled framework for international taxation 
seems to be emerging, that allocates taxing 
rights to the country where the economic ac-
tivity takes place or value is created, instead of 
focussing on source and residence allocation 
rules that have long lost value and, to a certain 
extent, relevance under the existing commer-
cial (digital) setting (Falcão 2018a). 
Efforts to fight the erosion of the tax base 
can be coupled with other international 
agreements, such as the Paris Agreement, for 
example, and with wider environmental tax 
initiatives occurring under any of the SDGs 
to increase domestic resource mobilisation. 
The BEPS Project and the Paris Agreement 
are only two international mechanisms which 
may have the potential to act as powerful 
tools to reform national tax systems and raise 
additional revenues for environmental, social 
and economic reform (Falcão 2017).
 2.5 THE PRINCIPLED DIMENSION
An international framework already ex-
ists to guide countries as they produce their 
unique environmental tax approach. The 
principled approach can be subdivided into 
four main categories: (i) principles of environ-
mental law; (ii) tax principles of general appli-
cation; (iii) policy-based principles; and (iv) 
social justice principles. Each of these catego-
ries will be discussed separately below.
2.5.1 Principles of environmental law
These are the main principles supported 
or considered within the framework of the 
International Environmental Agreements 
covered in Section 2.4 – the UNFCCC, the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. This 
section discusses which principles should be 
upheld by countries wishing to promote en-
vironmental taxation, and which have been 
surpassed within the modern environmental 
conceptual framework. 
The Polluter Pays Principle: This principle pro-
motes the internalisation of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, 
taking into account the approach that the pol-
luter should, in principle, bear the cost of pol-
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lution, rather than shift the cost of pollution 
to the community as a whole. It runs from 
the premise that pollution that is unaccount-
ed for either through an economic or fiscal 
approach, is borne by society, and hence im-
pacts the general budget to the extent govern-
ments are required to bear the cost associated 
with the environmental degradation result-
ing from the private activity. 
The Precautionary Principle: In order for precau-
tion to apply, there should be a risk of future 
long-term harm to the environment that can-
not be fully assessed at the time of the deci-
sion-making process. The risk does not need 
to be eminent, nor does it need to be certain. 
The principle is based on a hypothetical threat 
that harm can or cannot happen. This princi-
ple was recognized in the UN Rio Declara-
tion, principle 15 that attests that: “the lack of 
scientific certainty is no reason to postpone action to 
avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the 
environment.”(United Nations 1997, p. 20)
Principle of Prevention: This principle is stat-
ed in multiple international environmental 
conventions, but more explicitly in Principle 
2 of the UN Rio Convention. It provides that 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of in-
ternational law, the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of nation-
al jurisdiction. It thus delves on inter-State 
responsibility and duty of care, to make sure 
that the economic activities pursued in one’s 
territory do not generate a harmful envi-
ronmental impact in neighbouring or third 
States.
Common but differentiated responsibilities: The 
principle assumes that all countries are to 
share the responsibility for environmental 
degradation, but with differentiated levels of 
engagement. The level of involvement is to 
take into account countries’ social and eco-
nomic development (Falcão 2016). This prin-
ciple has been formally recognized as such by 
Principle 7 of the UN Rio Declaration, which 
states that: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of 
global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In 
view of the different contributions to global environ-
mental degradation, States have common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in 
view of the pressures their societies place on the glob-
al environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.”(United Nations 1997)
Principle of historic responsibilities: The princi-
ple of historic responsibilities provides that 
the countries that have historically contrib-
uted the most to environmental degradation 
should bear the full economic cost for the pol-
lution. It runs from the premise that devel-
oped countries were, for centuries, the ones to 
contribute the most to the release of carbon 
emissions as a result of going through ear-
lier industrialisation processes. This princi-
ple was what drove the admission of a Kyoto 
Protocol where the obligation to reduce car-
bon emissions was only bestowed on Annex 
I countries (developed countries, generally). 
This principle can no longer stand in today’s 
day and age. To achieve environmental effec-
tiveness, total engagement of all countries – 
in the context of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities – is required. 
This principle should not be upheld under an 
environmental tax framework. 
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In sum, all the above principles, except the 
principle of historic responsibilities, are wor-
thy of pursuit under a proposed domestic en-
vironmental tax framework. There is schol-
arship to sustain that the first four principles 
mentioned above have become principles of 
public international law, as a result of their 
application in multiple international environ-
mental agreements (Falcão 2016). 
2.5.2 Tax principles of 
general application
These are principles that should be promot-
ed by any tax policy instrument in order to 
promote fairness, equity, social justice, and 
to promote a simple and transparent overall 
tax framework. Many of the stated principles 
are in line with business’ understanding of 
environmental tax (ICC 2012), and take into 
account some countries’ – and in particular 
developing countries’ – interest to continue 
exploring domestic natural resources. 
Simplicity and cost effectiveness: The environ-
mental objective should be clearly stated and 
measurable.
Price-parity across different segments and busi-
nesses: Prices imposed for environmental ex-
ternalities should be economy-wide, covering 
all relevant sectors without exception in the 
context of a global policy framework. Waive-
in periods and different pricing policies 
should only be considered on a temporary 
basis, and the legislation introducing them 
should include a sunset clause. The compet-
itive position of trade-exposed industries 
needs to be addressed until consistent envi-
ronmental taxation applies globally.
Minimisation of regressiveness in the administration 
of Environmental Taxes: The policies should be in-
tegrated so that they do not adversely impact 
low income households. Systems should be set 
in place in order to compensate for the possible 
regressiveness of the environmental tax. Gen-
der issues should be taken into account where 
relevant (see section 3.2.2).
Avoid economic and juridical double taxation: This 
might be a difficult task to pursue, particularly 
in cross-border transactions. However, dou-
ble taxation should be minimised to the full-
est extent possible, particularly in a domestic 
context. Environmental taxes should not be 
added on to the tax base of other indirect tax-
es, such as consumption taxes (see Box 1 dis-
cussing this topic, below). 
Gradual introduction of new taxes and predictabil-
ity when it comes to the readjustment (increase) in 
tax rates: The legal instrument introducing a 
new environmental tax or modifying an exist-
ing environmental tax, should account for the 
progressive annual adjustment forecast in the 
tax. Taxes should be introduced at a lower rate 
to start with, and gradually increased over the 
years in order to provide legal certainty in the 
overall tax system and so that the jurisdiction 
continues being attractive for foreign inves-
tors. 
2.5.3 Policy-based principles
Stable, predictable and transparent 
tax laws and assessment rules
Simplicity in tax allocation rules: Depending on 
the type of environmental tax, the election of 
a tax substitute might be possible to simplify 
tax collection
Provide an economy-wide price for the environmen-
tal externality, and apportion it according to the 
polluting potential of each person subject to 
the tax. 
Consistency between tax rules and trade obligations, 
as agreed under the framework of the WTO, 
as further denoted in Chapter I, section 2.7. 
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2.5.4 Social justice principles
Fairness: Tax should be fair towards all players 
and segments of the economy, taking into ac-
count ability to pay
Equality in the administration of taxes. No ex-
emptions, subsidies or reductions. 
Equity: Individuals should be taxed according 
to their ability to pay. See tax justice and fair-
ness for interrelated notions of equity. 
Tax Justice: no undue burden on the segments 
of society with least ability to pay. A redistri-
bution system or social welfare system might 
have to be put in place to compensate for ex-
cess taxes applied on the poorest segments of 
society.
Gender Justice where applicable, taking into ac-
count the particular circumstances of wo men. 
Box 1
THE CASCADING EFFECT OF TAXES
One of the general principles discussed 
above, is to avoid economic and juridical 
double taxation. Part of this principle delves 
on the idea that a tax, in this case in particu-
lar an environmental tax, should not be add-
ed on to the tax base of other taxes, inflating 
the tax base and as a consequence, augment-
ing the effective tax rate applied. 
According to M. Keen (Keen 2013), cas-
cading “makes the structure of the tax system 
opaque, running counter to basic notions of trans-
parency and simplicity: because the rate at which 
tax cumulates through the production chain de-
pends on the vagaries of input-output relation-
ships, cascading results in a pattern of effective tax 
rates that is ’…almost fortuitous and largely un-
known to policymakers’ (…)” The loss to the con-
sumer thereby exceeds the revenue raised 
by government, in a sort of deadweight loss. 
Cascading of taxes occurs when a tax is 
applied on top of a base that has already 
been burdened, and augmented by another 
tax. It acts so as to fictitiously increase the 
taxable base (input price) with a charge. It is 
a common practice in developing countries, 
increasing the complexity in the tax system. 
To illustrate, let us assume that Country A 
imports a product for 100. On that product, 
the following taxes will apply: Import tax, 
industrialisation tax, a social security contri-
bution, and a VAT-like tax. Let’s also assume 
all these taxes are levied at 10%. 
A tax system that applies taxes in a cas-
cading effect will assign an order for impo-
sition of the taxes, and will assimilate the 
“burden/cost” of the tax on to the price of 
the product, using a “tax on tax” approach. 
Using the example above, this is how the 
tax base would gradually inflate through 
the imposition of the taxes in the order de-
scribed above: starting tax base (100) Import 
tax (10%, @110), Industrialization tax (10%, 
@121), a social security contribution (10%, 
@133), and a VAT-like tax (10%, @146). 
The example might seem exorbitant, but 
it is widely used in emerging economies like 
Brazil, where there is a culture for the impo-
sition of taxes over a tax base that is not real, 
because already augmented by other taxes. 
For example, in Brazil the VAT applied on 
energy has as a tax base the individual’s en-
ergy consumption and a social security con-
tribution widely known as COFINS. 
Source: Tatiana Falcão
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2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
IN INDUSTRIALISED AND 
“DEVELOPING” COUNTRIES
Environmental taxation ought to be guid-
ed by countries’ current levels of economic 
and social development, take into account 
domestic governance structures, and tax ad-
ministration capabilities. Hence, higher tax 
rates should be administered first hand by de-
veloped countries, whereas developing coun-
tries’ environmental tax policies should be 
levelled with their economic development 
and with the level of environmental protec-
tion (through internalisation of negative ex-
ternalities) they aim to achieve. This is some-
times translated into longer timeframes to 
achieve the same level of environmental pro-
tection achieved by developed economies. 
The most successful case studies in imple-
mentation of environmental taxation, the 
Nordic countries, started with much lower 
tax rates than currently supported by their 
domestic tax regimes. Norway, for example, 
started in 1991 with a system that applied dif-
ferent carbon prices to different segments of 
the economy, and currently has a much broad-
er all-encompassing carbon tax priced at USD 
64/tCO2e (Statistics Norway 2009). Likewise, 
Sweden started with a carbon tax of only EUR 
26/tCO2e in 1991 and currently holds the 
highest carbon tax rate, valued at USD 139/
tCO2e. As shown in figure 1.2, Norway and 
Sweden both have different tax thresholds, 
with higher and lower carbon tax prices.
Of particular importance to developing 
countries is the need to establish transpar-
ent governance frameworks that will monitor 
and report on the tax revenues accumulated 
via the assessment of environmental taxes, 
and provide publicity to the data, in order to 
forestall corruption and mismanagement of 
the revenues derived from these taxes. Ideal-
ly, the tax administration should produce re-
ports to communicate where the tax revenues 
are being employed, what the tax-to-GDP ra-
tio is, and to report on success stories. Publi-
cising the data may be an important tool to 
harness popular support for the tax and raise 
awareness capable of inflicting a change in 
consumer consumption habits. 
Tax revenues could be earmarked to ful-
fil environmental objectives, so that the pro-
ceeds may be reinvested into the economy, 
be employed towards governmental sponsor-
ship of research in new renewable technolo-
gies, or be dedicated towards the alleviation 
of the natural regressivity of this indirect tax. 
Earmarking might be difficult, if not legally 
impossible for countries with constitution-
al limitations to earmarking. Options should 
nonetheless be investigated in the countries 
where earmarking is admissible. This topic is 
more thoroughly discussed in section 3.3.1.
Environmental taxes, such as carbon taxes, 
bear an intrinsic dichotomy, in that the suc-
cessful administration of the tax will necessar-
ily lead to a reduction in the accumulation of 
tax revenues. To the extent consumers change 
their behaviour and turn to consuming less 
carbon intensive substances, there follows a 
decline in the tax administration’s ability to 
collect surplus revenues. Tax administrations 
should be prepared for that outcome. Some 
possible responses to falling revenues are dis-
cussed in part 3.1.2.
Thus, legislation introducing the environ-
mental tax should ideally foresee or consider 
a contingency plan in the event of total car-
bon substitution. This is not a farfetched real-
ity. In Finland, for example, the government 
has introduced a stockpile fee to account for 
the loss in revenues derived from the reduced 
reliance on oil-based energy sources (GoFin 
A CLIMATE OF FAIRNESS: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
41
2013). This is a security tax, meant to maintain 
equilibrium in the Finnish public finances – it 
is expected that the stockpile fee will gradual-
ly increase over the years, as taxpayers switch 
to less carbon intensive fuels.
There is a real lag between developed and 
developing countries in implementation of 
environmental taxes. Most of the countries 
with successful policies in place are, in fact, de-
veloped economies. This report will attempt 
to recount developing country examples to 
the fullest extent possible. When that is not 
possible, it will resort to developed country 
practices, framing those experiences within 
the context of developing economies. 
National tax administrations should invest 
in national systems for environmental statis-
tics. Global players, such as intergovernmen-
tal agencies, the academia, NGOs, the private 
sector and investment agencies should invest 
in the development of an environmental da-
tabase, compiling carbon pricing-based prac-
tices in developing country markets. The mar-
kets that are likely to be most affected by cli-
mate change are also the ones with the least 
data reporting across all country groups. In 
reading the statistics reported in this study, 
one should bear in mind that most studies 
currently produced at international level only 
account for data derived from developed na-
tions, and therefore the outcome might be 
substantially different in a developing coun-
try context. 
2.7 THE WTO AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
In 1994, the WTO was created, having the 
Marrakesh Agreement as the constituting le-
gal text. The Marrakesh Agreement provided 
an umbrella for sixty agreements, annexes, 
decisions and understandings, which became 
collectively known as the WTO Agreements. 
By agreeing to the Marrakesh Agreement, 
members were automatically made to com-
mit to all the accompanying instruments. 
There was no opportunity for a partial with-
drawal (Falcão 2015).
The WTO has no (multilateral or plurilater-
al) agreement specifically dealing with the en-
vironment, but the objectives of: (i) sustain-
able development, (ii) environmental pres-
ervation and protection and (iii) optimal use 
and consumption of natural resources are im-
portant enough to be stated in the preamble 
of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO 2011a). It 
reads as follows:
“Recognising that their relations in the field of 
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring 
full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means 
for doing so in a manner consistent with their respec-
tive needs and concerns at different levels of econom-
ic development.” (emphasis added, WTO 2011c)
The Marrakesh Agreement is the Agreement 
establishing the WTO. It sets the guiding 
principles by means of which the WTO is to 
operate, including its scope, functions, struc-
ture, relation with other organisations, and 
decision-making power.
Therefore, it is an overarching agreement, 
guiding all other multilateral and plurilateral 
agreements operated under the WTO frame-
work. The preamble to the Marrakesh Agree-
ment is also to provide context to define the 
object and purpose of all the other multilater-
al and plurilateral agreements included in the 
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annexes. The inclusion of an environmental 
element in the object and purpose of the Mar-
rakesh Agreement means to say that all mul-
tilateral and plurilateral agreements operated 
under the WTO framework (including the 
GATT and GATS) are to be interpreted in light 
of this object and purpose (Falcão 2015).7
There are so many synergies between 
tax, trade and the environment in the WTO 
Agreements, that the introduction of a pluri-
lateral agreement providing for a direct con-
nection between the three topics within the 
WTO framework would not be an absurd con-
struction to make. According to the WTO:
“In addition to regulatory measures, national, re-
gional or multilateral initiatives that deal with cli-
mate change involve the adoption by governments 
of price-based measures such as taxes and tariffs, 
market-based mechanisms as well as a variety of 
other measures including subsidies. As they relate to 
trade, these measures may be subject to WTO rules 
and procedures. The design of climate change pro-
grammes and the pursuit of international cooper-
ation in this field will need to take into account the 
potential trade impact of these measures and the 
relevance of members’ rights and obligations under 
WTO rules.” (emphasis added, WTO 2018) 
As a result of the preambular language, the 
WTO has created a study group, the Commit-
tee on Trade and Environment (CTE), to ana-
lyse the interrelation between issues related 
to trade and the environment. Its task is to 
study and at times negotiate formal positions, 
regarding questions that arise when environ-
mental policies have a significant impact on 
trade.
The CTE includes all WTO members and a 
number of observers from intergovernmental 
7 As per: US–Shrimp, Appellate Body Report adopted on 6 Nov  1998, WT/DS58, 
para  153  For the full rationale see Falcão 2015 
organizations (Sampson 2001). Its mandate is 
broad and involves an analysis of: (i) the in-
terrelation between the WTO and Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), (ii) 
the interrelation between dispute settlement 
and MEAs, (iii) the relationship between the 
multilateral trading system and charges and 
taxes used with an environmental purposes; 
(iv) transparency in trade measures used for 
environmental purposes; (v) the effect of en-
vironmental measures on market access, es-
pecially with respect to developing countries; 
and (vi) the issues related to the export of do-
mestically prohibited goods (Falcão 2015 and 
WTO 2011c).
In 2001 the scope of the CTE was further 
detailed in the Doha Mandate, which re-
quired the CTE to concomitantly run Spe-
cial Sessions (CTESS), on negotiable issues, 
and non-negotiable sessions, (also referred to 
as CTE Regular) where much of the original 
agenda was still to be analysed.
Under the Special Session mandate, CTESS 
was to negotiate: (i) the relationship between 
WTO rules and specific trade obligations 
contained in MEAs, but only with respect to 
Members which are part of both WTO and 
MEAs; (ii) procedures for regular informa-
tion exchange between the MEA secretariats 
and the relevant WTO committees and the re-
quirements for granting observer status; and 
(iii) the elimination or reduction of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to environmental goods 
and services. (para. 31, WTO 2001)
Under the Regular CTE appointment, the 
Committee was to concentrate on: (i) the 
effects of environmental measures on mar-
ket access, especially with respect to devel-
oping countries and Least Developed Coun-
tries (LDCs); (ii) the relevant provisions of 
the TRIPS; and (iii) labelling requirements for 
environmental purposes (para 32). Paragraph 
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33 further called for technical assistance ac-
tivities in the field of trade and environment, 
in cooperation with the secretariats of UNEP, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and MEAs (WTO, 
2011c).8
The CTE was created on account of the en-
vironmental object and purpose pursued by 
the WTO via the WTO Agreements. The pre-
amble of the WTO Agreements is thus refer-
enced in the decision instituting it. Howev-
er, following developing countries’ concerns 
that environmental objectives would be for-
warded at the expense of international trade, 
the instrument creating the CTE expressed 
that the WTO is to “coordinate policies in the field 
of trade and environment (…) without exceeding the 
competence of the multilateral trading system, which 
is limited to trade policies, and those trade related 
8 In the discussions on technical assistance, the Members were also said to have 
encouraged further cooperation and coordination between the WTO, UNEP, 
UNCTAD and MEAs in delivering technical assistance  On the specific issue 
of Sustainable Development, para  51 calls for cooperation between the CTE 
and the Committee on Trade and Development in order to achieve the proper 
synergy between developmental issues and the environment in pursuance of 
developmental sustainability 
aspects of environmental policies which may result 
in significant trade effects for its members.” (WTO, 
2011b) 
Therefore the CTE’s competence is not to 
turn the WTO into an environmental protec-
tion agency. The WTO is to pursue trade liber-
alization by taking environmental protection 
into account (Falcão 2015).
Although the scope of environmental pro-
tection conferred by the WTO to date is one 
which is related to trade, there is a growing 
number of case laws (concerning the appli-
cation of the GATT and the GATS),9 delving 
on standards of environmental protection. 
Therefore, countries interested in the intro-
duction of environmental and carbon taxes, 
should be aware of the obligations assumed 
under the context of the WTO Agreements 
(Falcão, 2016).
9 See in this respect, for example: WTO, Report of the Panel, United States – taxes 
in Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (US-Superfunds case), L/6175 
– 34S/136 17 Jun  1987, WTO, Appellate Body report, European Communities – 
Measures affecting asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products (EC-Asbestos), 
DS135, 12 Mar  2001, US–Shrimp, Appellate Body Report adopted on 6 Nov  1998, 
WT/DS58, US-Gasoline, Panel Report, WT/DS2/R, 29 Jan  1996  
PART THREE: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN PRACTICE
3.1 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: 
EFFECTIVENESS, TRADE-OFFS, DESIGN 
3.1.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the effectiveness of 
environmental taxation in developing coun-
tries along the three dimensions of sustain-
able development – environmental protec-
tion, social inclusion and economic prosper-
ity, while also taking fiscal sustainability and 
domestic resource mobilisation into account. 
The objective of the chapter is to highlight 
ways in which environmental taxation im-
pacts environmental quality, social equity, the 
broader economy and the fiscal system. The 
chapter has a particular focus on how environ-
mental taxation can be implemented in a way 
that is fair to foster social equity. It also exam-
ines the trade-offs policymakers may have to 
consider when implementing environmental 
taxes, while operating in challenging political 
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environments which demand further com-
promise in order to secure buy-in from power-
ful opponents.
3.1.2 Design of environmental 
taxation in theory and practice
Trade-offs between environmental 
effectiveness and tax principles
As implied by the tax and policy-based 
principles described in part 2, to maximise 
environmental effectiveness, environmen-
tal taxes should target pollutants or polluting 
behaviour as accurately as possible (OECD 
2010). The tax rate should be set at a level com-
mensurate to achieving a particular environ-
mental objective (Baumol and Oates 1988) 
and increases should be predictable, while 
coverage should be as broad as possible, with 
exemptions kept to a minimum, to avoid dis-
tortions and minimise opportunities for tax 
evasion (OECD 2010).
A plastic bag tax is an example of an envi-
ronmental tax that can meet these criteria. 
The tax targets the pollutant directly – typi-
cally, the tax is paid by the consumer per plas-
tic bag purchased – and can be set at a high 
enough level to reduce plastic bag use in a 
relatively short timeframe. In Ireland, for ex-
ample, the plastic bag levy imposed in 2002 
resulted in a 90% fall in plastic bag purchase 
within twelve months, with increases to the 
levy in 2007 counteracting increasing plastic 
bag use. However, the levy reduced plastic 
bags to just 0.13% of total marine litter, where-
as prior to the levy’s implementation 5% of 
marine litter was made up of plastic bags (An-
astasio and Nix 2017). If the tax were to be 
set at too low a rate, as was the case in South 
Africa, then the response to the plastic bag 
tax would have been much less dramatic. In 
South Africa, there was a 44% fall in plastic bag 
use between the tax being introduced in 2003 
and the 2007/8 financial year. Although plas-
tic bag use fell by 90% in the short-term, con-
sumers adjusted to the slightly higher price 
and bag use crept up once more, meaning that 
the tax missed its target of reducing plastic 
bag use by 50% (Dikgang 2010). 
In practice, policymakers may have to ac-
cept trade-offs between environmental ef-
fectiveness, tax principles, and social justice. 
The policy-based principles of environmental 
taxation indicate that to maximise efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness, and avoid distortions, 
environmental taxes should have as broad a 
coverage as possible with few exemptions. 
This implies an upstream tax levied at an early 
stage in the supply chain (IMF 2012). Howev-
er, in some developing countries, the econom-
ic and regulatory context may mean that taxes 
are more effective when levied downstream. 
In regulated energy markets, for example, 
an upstream tax on the energy inputted into 
power generation will have little or no impact 
on energy prices on consumers, as prices are 
regulated and pass-through of price increases 
to consumers is limited. 
In some cases, the benefits can be verified in 
spite of a trade-off. India’s Clean Energy Cess 
is a tax levied per tonne of all domestic and 
imported coal, lignite and peat – while other 
fossil fuels, such as natural gas or oil for power 
generation, are exempt. The Cess is adminis-
tratively easy to collect, because all produc-
ers of coal, lignite and peat are registered with 
the central excise authority and the electronic 
systems already in place for the collection of 
customs and sales taxes are also used to col-
lect the Cess (Cottrell et al. 2016). However, 
the Cess does not ensure price parity across all 
sectors and businesses – a tax principle – and 
also does not implement an economy-wide 
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price for an environmental externality (in this 
case, greenhouse gas emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion) – a policy-based principle 
of environmental taxation. While fuel excise 
prices the externalities associated with the 
combustion of transport fuels, these differ-
ent instruments do not engender an econo-
my-wide price. Nonetheless, the Cess and the 
associated National Clean Energy Fund have 
been reasonably successful in driving renewa-
ble energy transition (see box 2).
Trade-offs between fiscal and 
environmental policy objectives
Policymakers may also come under pres-
sure to find a balance between environmen-
Box 2
THE CLEAN ENVIRONMENT CESS IN INDIA 
The Clean Environment Cess introduced 
in India in 2010 exemplifies the advantag-
es of using existing taxpaying mechanisms 
and implementing an upstream tax, which 
usually implies fewer suppliers and hence 
fewer taxpayers, which is often essential to 
ensure easy enforcement and collection. 
The Clean Environment Cess is an up-
stream tax levied on coal, lignite and peat. 
All producers of coal, lignite and peat are 
registered with the central excise authori-
ty. Electronic payments are made monthly 
on a self-assessment basis. Adjustments are 
made where producers overpay or under-
pay. Thus, the administrative effort is min-
imised to the point where the Ministry of 
Finance has stated that the Cess is not asso-
ciated with any additional costs above busi-
ness as usual (Cottrell et al. 2018). Reve-
nues from the Cess flowed into the Nation-
al Clean Environment Fund and were used 
to fund environment-related projects with-
in the ministries, covering half of the total 
budget of the Ministry for New and Renew-
able Energy from 2016-17, when revenues 
raised amounted to USD 4.5 billion. From 
mid-2017, revenues from the Cess flowed 
into the General Services Tax compensa-
tion fund, rather than being used for clean 
energy investment (The Hindu Business 
Line 2017).
The tax rate of the Cess has been in-
creased three times since the measure was 
introduced. The last increase in 2016 im-
plemented a carbon tax on coal, lignite and 
peat of USD 6 per tonne. The Cess has sev-
eral aims: to raise revenues for investment 
in renewable energy; to provide a clear indi-
cation of the risk of investing in fossil fuels 
in the future; and to boost business confi-
dence in the renewables sector by narrow-
ing the price gap between fossil fuels and re-
newable energy (Climate Home 2016). The 
Clean Environment Cess is seen as a cen-
tral policy instrument for India’s Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) target of 
40% of cumulative electric power installed 
capacity from non-fossil fuel based energy 
sources by 2030. (GoI, 2016)
As part of a package of measures to drive 
renewable energy investment in India, the 
Cess has had a positive environmental im-
pact, with annual renewable energy invest-
ment ranging between USD 6 billion and 
USD 14 billion since 2010, and the fourth 
highest investment volumes for renewa-
ble energy in the world in 2017 (Frankfurt 
School 2018). 
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tal effectiveness and fiscal objectives – i.e. be-
tween reducing pollution and creating a sta-
ble revenue stream over time (Schlegelmilch 
and Joas 2015). Two issues should be noted in 
relation to this problem. First, as noted in part 
2, the primary objective of an environmental 
tax as defined in this report is to bring about 
behavioural change and environmental im-
provement, with revenue-raising a secondary 
objective.
 The nature and extent of the environmen-
tal impact may vary according to the design 
of the tax and its specific objectives. Some 
environmental taxes are environmentally ef-
fective within a short timeframe and result in 
rapid behavioural change (such as plastic bag 
taxes) while other taxes influence behaviour 
and investment decisions in the longer term 
(transport fuel taxes). 
In practice, taxes can be designed to ad-
dress this potential trade-off and ensure that 
policymakers achieve both environmental 
and fiscal objectives. Environmental taxes in 
Mauritius fulfil this goal, as they have a pos-
itive environmental effect while also raising 
substantial revenues (see box 3).
Trade-offs between environmental 
effectiveness and political feasibility
The environmental effectiveness of a par-
ticular environmental tax may also be com-
promised if the tax principle of parity across 
business segments and business sectors is not 
implemented due to the granting of exemp-
Box 3
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES IN MAURITIUS
Mauritius has implemented a number of en-
vironmental taxes, including the Maurice 
Ile Durable levy, or MID levy, an upstream 
tax on fossil fuels. While one of the primary 
objectives of environmentally related taxa-
tion in Mauritius is revenue raising – in the 
2008/9 fiscal year, environmentally related 
taxes accounted for more than 11% of total 
tax revenues – some of the taxes were intro-
duced with the explicit objective of imple-
menting sustainability on the island of Mau-
ritius (Parry 2011). The levy was introduced 
in June 2008 at a rate of EUR 3.53/tonne on 
coal and LPG, and EUR 3.35/1,000 litres of 
diesel, fuel oil and jet fuel (UNEP 2014). The 
tax rates were doubled in 2011. On the ba-
sis of the purchasing power exchange rate 
for the Mauritian Rand, the price for carbon 
generated by the MID levy was about one 
third lower than the recommended rate to 
bring about CO2 emissions reductions (Par-
ry 2011). 
For 40 years, from the 1970s to the 2000s, 
CO2 emissions per capita in Mauritius were 
rising at a higher rate than GDP growth 
(Khadaroo and Sultan 2012). From 2013-
2016, CO2 emissions from the energy and 
transport sectors were decoupled from GDP 
growth, with CO2 emissions roughly stable, 
while annual GDP growth averaged 3.6% in 
the same period, as shown in the table be-
low. However, the imposition of the MID 
levy alone on coal, while diesel and gasoline 
are subject to both the MID levy and excise 
duties, resulted in some fuel switching away 
from gasoline and diesel to coal (a more car-
bon intensive product) for electricity gen-
eration, which in 2016 amounted to a 2.6% 
increase in the quantity of coal used and a 
4.5% decrease in the amount of fuel oil used 
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tions or reduced tax rates for specific indus-
trial sectors. Trade-offs are often necessary to 
address the more or less legitimate concerns 
of political opponents to environmental tax-
ation, or influential industry stakeholders, to 
win their support and in so-doing, guarantee 
the political feasibility of a particular envi-
ronmental tax (Withana et al. 2014). As noted 
in part 2, any exemption or reduced tax rate 
should be restricted to economic sectors ex-
posed to international competition and limit-
ed in time. Otherwise, there is a risk that busi-
ness will not pay a carbon price that is com-
mensurate with their environmental impact. 
Possible ways of minimising the impact of 
such trade-offs on environmental effective-
ness, particularly with respect to industries 
that compete in international markets, are 
discussed in part 4. 
Unforeseen responses to 
environmental taxation
Finally, policymakers should also be aware 
of unintended or unforeseen responses to en-
vironmental taxes, which may result in neg-
ative environmental impacts and so under-
mine environmental effectiveness. Taxes may 
lead to fuel switching between fossil fuels, e.g. 
if gasoline taxes are increased but kerosene 
taxes are not – due to social equity concerns 
– scooter drivers may mix kerosene with gaso-
line, resulting in far higher levels of pollution 
and engine damage (Shenoy 2010). If kero-
(Statistics Mauritius 2016). Mauritius has a 
target of 35% of total electricity generation 
to be from renewable sources by 2025 and 
although this is unlikely to be met, progress 
is noticeable – total renewable energy in elec-
tricity generation amounted to 22% in 2016, 
down by 2.6% on the previous year. 
Revenues raised specifically by the MID 
levy amounted to USD 3.8 million in 2013 
– contributed to the MID fund, which insti-
tuted sustainability-related projects in the 
country across a number of sectors, includ-
ing energy, transport, buildings, tourism, 
fisheries, industry and agriculture. 
The MID levy was only one of many en-
vironmental fiscal measures in Mauritius. 
The revenues raised by environmental and 
environmentally related taxes – excise on 
PET and plastic bottles, the MID levy, a pet-
rol charge earmarked for public transport 
purchasing, environmental protection fees, 
a CO2 levy/rebate programme on vehicles, 
fishing access rights charges, fees to operate 
in marine protected areas, and the energy in-
efficient products charge fuel excise, excise 
on motor vehicles, registration fees for im-
ported vehicles and road taxes – raised rev-
enues worth USD 270 million in Mauritius 
in 2012 – a forty-fold increase on environ-
mental tax revenues in just ten years (UNEP 
2016). Many of these revenues were ear-
marked for a specific fund or purpose, even if 
the purpose was not an environmental one: 
for example, the petrol tax was earmarked for 
purchase of publicly-owned buses. 
In 2013, USD 103 million was spent on 
green subsidies to drive energy transition 
and greening of the transport and agricultur-
al sectors. Alongside these subsidies, USD 
123 million was expended in the renewable 
energy sector in the same year (UNEP 2016). 
Environmentally related taxes played a sig-
nificant role in domestic revenue mobilisa-
tion for the potential realisation of the SDGs.
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sene taxes are increased, households depend-
ent on kerosene for cooking may switch to 
fuel wood if suitable alternatives are not avail-
able, leading to increased deforestation and 
more severe human health impacts.10 
Trade-offs of this nature can be addressed 
by providing suitable alternatives, ideally by 
means of access to or investment in renew-
10 Although kerosene has significant impacts on human health when used as a 
cooking fuel, health impacts from solid fuel are more severe  See Silwal and 
McKay (2014) for research into the relative impacts of solid fuel and kerosene 
stoves on human respiratory health 
able electricity. Improved energy access re-
moves the need for kerosene prices to be reg-
ulated and thus kept artificially low, as is the 
case in many developing countries. Pricing 
kerosene in line with its external costs for hu-
man health and the environment by means 
of environmental taxation will result in its 
disuse as a household or road transport fuel 
(OECD 2005b).
The interactions and possible trade-offs be-
tween environmental taxation and social jus-
tice are discussed in section 3.2.
Box 4
DIFFERENTIATED TAX RATES TO DRIVE SUBSTITUTIONS IN THAILAND
Several environmental tax policies in Thai-
land have not actually resulted in tax in-
creases, but rather a reduction to the tax rate 
for the cleaner option. This includes chang-
ing tax regimes for vehicles – both motorcy-
cles and cars – as well as for fuels. 
In 1991, a package of measures was intro-
duced to raise awareness about the health 
impacts of leaded fuel, liberalise fuel mar-
kets and support oil companies to produce 
unleaded fuels, which also included a differ-
ential tax rate for leaded and unleaded gaso-
line. The tax was environmentally effective 
within a short timeframe. Within 30 days, in 
spite of a price differential of just 1 THB, the 
share of unleaded gasoline had risen to 30% 
(Institute for Global Environmental Strat-
egies 2004). Within 2 years, lead concentra-
tions at monitoring stations had dropped by 
70% in comparison to 1990 levels and within 
four years, leaded gasoline had been elim-
inated (Lovei 1998). Administrative costs 
of the environmental tax were minimal as 
existing collection mechanisms were used. 
Given the small differential between the 
leaded and unleaded tax rates, revenue losses 
resulting from the measure were low. On bal-
ance, the measure more than paid for itself, 
with health benefits estimated to have been 
worth THB 7 billion, giving a cost-benefit ra-
tio of 32:1 for the policy (Institute for Glob-
al Environmental Strategies 2004). Also in 
Thailand, a 10% excise tax has been levied on 
battery producers using new lead as an input 
in the battery production process, while bat-
tery producers using recycled lead from used 
car batteries were subject to a 5% rate, boost-
ing demand for recycled lead. 
A less successful example of differenti-
ated excise rates in Thailand is the differ-
entiated excise taxes levied on motorcy-
cles. An excise tax of 10% was introduced on 
two-stroke motorcycles, which emit larger 
amounts of CO and CO2, and a tax of just 3% 
on cleaner four-stroke motorcycles. How-
ever, this measure was less successful and 
only in force for one year, as the Ministry 
of Finance came under pressure from man-
ufacturers (Israngkura 2014). In this case, 
substitutions were economically painful for 
certain actors, and the political cost of the 
measure proved to be too high. 
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3.1.3 Design of effective environmental 
taxes: Setting the tax rate
Environmental taxes can take the form of 
so-called Pigouvian taxes, which internalise 
externalities by either internalising all envi-
ronmental costs within the price, or tax rates 
can be set at a level commensurate to achiev-
ing a particular environmental objective (Pig-
ou 1932, Baumol and Oates 1988). The Bau-
mol and Oates approach is more practice-ori-
ented. Calculating the value of environmental 
externalities is a difficult process and the re-
sults are often disputed. A further advantage 
to the Baumol and Oates approach is that it 
allows a government to set environmental 
taxes at a level that is commensurate with the 
intended environmental objective (Baumol 
and Oates 1988). 
A concrete example of this approach is the 
UK Landfill Tax. The initial tax rate was set 
with the objective of internalising the exter-
nal costs associated with landfill. However, 
the objective of the tax was amended in 2002 
following a review, when it became clear that 
a much higher tax rate would be necessary to 
encourage waste producers and the waste in-
dustry to switch to more sustainable alterna-
tives to landfill (Herd, Cournede and Suther-
land 2004, GoUK 2016). Today, the tax rate has 
been described as “several times greater than any 
reasonable estimate of the external costs associated 
with landfill” (Mirrlees et al. 2011, Part 2, p. 243). 
From this case one can derive two important 
lessons on tax rate setting. First, from a po-
litical economy point of view, a high tax rate 
may be necessary to achieve the specified ob-
jectives of an environmental tax. Second, re-
view is necessary to optimise environmental 
taxes and ensure that they are effective. Both 
elements can help optimise the environmen-
tal effectiveness of environmental taxes and 
both lessons are in line with the tax and policy 
based principles described in part 2, section 
2.5.
In some cases a high tax rate is not neces-
sary to bring about behavioural change. The 
most environmentally effective taxes in the 
short-term are those where cleaner alterna-
tives are easily available at a comparable price 
and thus, substitutions are easy to implement. 
In such cases, differentiated tax rates e.g. on 
leaded and unleaded petrol, on low-sulphur 
and conventional diesel, or car batteries using 
recycled lead or new lead in the manufactur-
ing process have proven to be effective within 
a fairly short timeframe (see box 4). 
Environmental taxes on products with rel-
atively high elasticity of demand where sub-
stitutions are easy typically result in a short-
term rise in tax revenues at the start of the 
tax programme and a reduction in revenues 
over time as economic actors respond to the 
tax by consuming and producing more sus-
tainably. The environmental effectiveness of 
such taxes can be optimised by facilitating 
access to substitutions and raising awareness 
of their availability, e.g. time-limited subsidies 
to level out higher purchase costs, or labelling 
schemes. In such cases, trends in tax revenues 
can generally be used as an indicator for the 
environmental effectiveness of the tax, as fall-
ing revenues indicate that the tax has led to a 
change in consumer or producer behaviour 
and has reduced pollution as a result.11 
In cases where substitutions are less readi-
ly available and the price elasticity of demand 
is therefore higher, environmental taxes as a 
share of total government revenues may de-
cline for reasons other than environmental 
effectiveness in the short-term. One reason 
11 The extent to which falling revenues indicate reduced pollution is dependent on 
a number of factors – not least whether substitution effects lead to take-up of 
cleaner alternatives, or equally polluting alternatives not subject to an equiva-
lent environmental tax  
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is that energy taxes tend to be levied per unit 
of physical consumption – ad quantum – and 
to be fixed in nominal terms. Thus, their real 
value in relation to the price of the product 
taxed tends to fall over time. In response to 
this devaluation, policymakers can lay down 
automatic increases to the tax rate in law (a 
so-called escalator) or increase the tax rate 
regularly and predictably in accordance with 
the tax principles described in part 2. Such 
measures can stabilise revenue streams over 
time, while maintaining the dynamic impact 
of the tax on behavioural change, investment 
patterns and innovation. 
In some cases, in OECD countries, envi-
ronmental taxes have brought about relative-
Box 5
VIETNAM’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TAX (EPT) 
In 2012, Vietnam implemented an Environ-
mental Protection Tax, which set a range of 
tax rates for pollutants, including fossil fu-
els, pesticides and plastics. For details of the 
tax, including tax rate ranges and details of 
the tax base see Chapter II.. 
In terms of environmental effectiveness, 
there is evidence of behavioural responses 
to the tax. In a business as usual scenario, 
CO2 emissions in Vietnam are predicted to 
increase from 247 million tonnes of CO2e in 
2010 to almost 800 million tonnes of CO2e 
by 2030 (GoV 2015). Stable tax revenues 
during the first phase of the tax from 2012-
2014 reflect the relative stability of trans-
port fuel consumption – which accounts for 
at least 90% of total revenue. Subsequent ris-
es in revenues were attributable to tax rate 
increases, not increases in transport fuel 
consumption. This would seem to indicate 
that the EPT slowed the rapid rise of trans-
port fuel consumption and thus growth in 
emissions from the transport sector and cre-
ated incentives for behavioural change.
Modelling commissioned by the GIZ in 
2014 suggests that the tax resulted in CO2 
emissions reductions of about 2 million 
tonnes in both 2012 and 2013, equivalent to 
a decrease of about 1.7% (Huong 2014). Sub-
sequent increases to the tax rate in 2015 and 
2018 can be expected to have a greater im-
pact on CO2 emissions, with modelling indi-
cating annual CO2 emissions reductions of 
over 9 million tonnes, or 7.9%, under a high 
tax scenario (Willenbockel 2011).
Nonetheless, the full potential of envi-
ronmental improvements from the EPT is 
yet to be realised. The initial introduction 
of the EPT in 2012 and subsequent tax rate 
increases in 2015 were accompanied by tax 
reductions elsewhere in the value chain. In 
2012, by the abolition of the gasoline price 
surcharge and in 2015, increases to tax rates 
on gasoline, diesel and kerosene alongside 
import tax rate reductions in ASEAN. Tax 
rates were therefore partially motivated 
by the need to mobilise domestic revenue, 
rather than to a requirement to reduce pol-
lution in the country. In addition, tax rates 
on coal and other pollutants aside from road 
transport fuels remain towards the lower 
end of the range of rates proposed. While 
robust data is limited, it is possible that the 
EPT has encouraged fuel shifting towards 
dirtier fuels for transport and power genera-
tion – diesel and coal – which would result in 
increasing pollutant emissions into the air 
(see Cottrell et al. 2016).
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ly radical changes in behaviour, which have 
resulted in falling revenues on a scale that 
cannot be addressed by means of a tax rate es-
calator. For example, Finland has been a long-
time user of carbon taxes and is now at a stage 
where the revenues the government is able 
to accumulate through the tax are not com-
mensurate with what they had previously ob-
tained. Finland is therefore introducing a new 
type of tax (stockpile fees) whose sole objec-
tive is to account for the loss in revenue de-
rived from the application of the carbon tax. 
It is worth noting that it took Finland almost 
20 years to get to the point where it is suffer-
ing from a substantial reduction in carbon tax 
revenues and therefore, the potential long-
term loss in the accumulation of revenues 
should not deter developing countries from 
implementing environmental taxation in the 
medium term.
The legal framework for the Environmen-
tal Protection Tax in Vietnam incorporates 
the possibility for policymakers to respond 
to falling revenues or to lack of behavioural 
responses to the tax, as it specifies a range of 
possible tax rates on several pollutants, which 
can be increased relatively easily within the 
tax rate range by a committee in the Nation-
al Assembly. This design has the potential to 
maintain the environmental effectiveness of 
the tax over time, as tax rates can be adjusted 
easily in response to changing behaviour or 
falling revenues (for more details see box 5).
The potential to increase tax rates is an es-
pecially important consideration in low-in-
come countries, where tax-to-GDP ratios 
typically amount to 10-20% of GDP – indi-
cating an urgent need to mobilise domestic 
revenues to fund sustainable development 
(Besley and Persson 2014). Proposing a range 
of tax rates in framework legislation means 
that policymakers can introduce taxes at a 
low rate, so ensuring that the tax is political-
ly feasible, while creating a framework within 
which rates can be increased later on at a rela-
tively low administrative cost in response to a 
review of the fiscal, economic, environmental 
and social impacts of the tax or in response to 
changing requirements for domestic revenue 
mobilisation. 
A further reason to adjust tax rates or mod-
ify environmental tax policy packages is that 
economic actors respond to a tax in different 
ways over time. In general, the price-elasticity 
of demand, i.e. how responsive demand is to 
price change, is higher in the long term than 
in the short term. This is particularly true for 
cases where demand in the short term is rela-
tively inelastic, i.e. where demand is relatively 
unresponsive to price change. A case in point 
is the transport sector, where substitutions 
from less to more efficient vehicles, or from 
fossil fuel to electric vehicles, have only re-
cently begun to gain momentum. In such cas-
es in the first instance, economic actors adopt 
less polluting behaviours in response to a tax 
– shifting to other transport modes, eco-driv-
ing, etc. – and in the longer term, make struc-
tural changes and investments (OECD 2010). 
This has implications for the environmental 
effectiveness of the tax and its optimal design 
and implies that regular tax rate increases are 
necessary to keep revenues stable and main-
tain a dynamic incentive in favour of continu-
ous environmental improvement. 
3.2 SOCIAL IMPACTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
3.2.1 Taxes and equity
Taxation can reduce inequality through di-
rect redistribution and through revenue mo-
bilisation to fund progressive public spend-
ing. In OECD countries, progressive public 
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spending accounts for the bulk of inequality 
reduction, as it does also in Latin America, 
which has seen considerable progress in the 
period 1998-2012 in relation to the reduction 
of inequality as a result of fiscal policy (Clift-
on et al. 2017). In many developing countries, 
however, neither taxation nor public spend-
ing is effective in reducing inequality (Zheng 
et al. 2018). Whether and how environmental 
taxation might be able to contribute to ine-
quality reduction in developing countries is a 
question that will still be left open.
Justice in taxation cannot be determined 
without considering how a government real-
locates resources (Murphy and Nagel 2002). 
Thus, from a tax justice perspective, this re-
port assumes that one of the goals of the fiscal 
system as a whole should be to realise vertical 
equity within the tax system, i.e. to reduce ine-
quality (GIZ 2015, Murphy 2015). 
Given the potential inherent regressive-
ness of consumption taxes in general, and en-
vironmental taxes in particular, we propose 
for governments to strive to obtain a neu-
tral impact once flanking measures directly 
linked to the tax are taken into account. At 
best, the overall impact of an environmen-
tal tax policy package – taking accompanying 
measures to compensate or protect the poor 
into account – should ideally attempt to im-
prove the opportunities of people living in 
poverty (see e.g. GIZ 2015). 
As previously noted, many low- and mid-
dle-income countries have relatively unequal 
societies in comparison to high-income coun-
tries. As a result, there is a clear risk that envi-
ronmental taxation, a policy instrument that 
deliberately brings about an increase in the 
price of goods and services, can have a neg-
ative impact on the most vulnerable. These 
high rates of inequality in low- and middle-in-
come countries feed into concerns about neg-
ative equity impacts, which are a major barrier 
to the implementation of environmental tax-
ation. 
The potentially regressive impacts of envi-
ronmental taxation are only one aspect of ine-
quality associated with environmental policy. 
Four dimensions of inequality are discussed 
in this report: Inequality of exposure to envi-
ronmental degradation, inequality of contri-
butions to pollution, inequality of outcomes 
resulting from environmental taxation and 
inequality of representation in policymaking 
(Chancel and Piketty 2015). 
Inequality of exposure to degradation
The poor suffer disproportionately from 
the impacts of many forms of environmental 
degradation – air and water pollution, forest 
degradation – and thus, environmental policy 
instruments have the potential to contribute 
directly to poverty reduction and social equi-
ty (OECD 2005b). Moreover, climate-relat-
ed shocks and stress, as well as environmen-
tal degradation, are major obstacles to pover-
ty reduction, and failure to mitigate climate 
change represents a serious long-term threat 
to poverty eradication and the achievement 
of the SDGs (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Thus, 
the poor may also benefit disproportionately 
from efforts to reduce environmental degra-
dation or mitigate climate change.
Inequality of contributions to pollution
In relation to equality of contributions to 
pollution, Lucas Chancel and Thomas Piket-
ty have found that global emitters of CO2 are 
highly concentrated. They estimate that the 
richest 1% emit 14-19% of total global CO2e 
emissions and the richest 10% emit 40-51% of 
the global total. The poorest 50% emit just 11-
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15% and the poorest 10% somewhere in the 
range of 0.9-1.5% (Chancel and Piketty 2015). 
While income alone cannot predict individu-
al CO2e emissions, income and consumption 
levels remain the main drivers to explain vari-
ations in total CO2e emissions by households 
and individuals, and thus these factors are the 
best available proxies to construct global dis-
tribution of emissions. 
Given the ability of the wealthy to con-
sume more than the poor, it is reasonable to 
assume that there are similar distribution 
patterns by income group for other kinds of 
consumption-related pollution, such as natu-
ral resource use and waste. Therefore, imple-
menting the polluter pays principle will lead 
to the wealthiest in society being dispropor-
tionately liable to pay environmental taxa-
tion. 
Implementing the polluter pays principle 
would set out to deliver both fairness (those 
who pollute, pay) and equity (subjects of the 
state contribute in proportion to their respec-
tive abilities).
Inequality of outcomes: 
Progressive and regressive effects 
of environmental taxation
All environmental policy instruments can 
have regressive or progressive impacts on 
household incomes. However, while the im-
pact of environmental taxation on household 
income tends to be closely examined by stake-
holders in the policy process, the impacts of 
regulation or inaction tend to be less transpar-
ent and less closely scrutinised. 
While trends may be identified, it is not 
possible to make generalisations when com-
paring the impact of different environmental 
policies, as this requires specific information 
on the measures at hand. Some research has 
shown that for the energy sector, non-price 
instruments, such as feed-in-tariffs or energy 
efficiency standards, tend to have more sig-
nificant regressive impacts than taxation or 
pricing (Fay et al 2015, Levinson 2018). Other 
researchers suggest that environmental reg-
ulation may have fewer direct impacts on a 
household’s disposable income (Goulder and 
Parry 2008). 
What is clear is that inaction in the face of 
severe environmental degradation will have a 
negative impact on social equity, because the 
poorest in developing countries suffer dispro-
portionately from environmental degrada-
tion, as they are least able to adapt to change, 
and are most dependent on natural resources 
for their livelihoods. Severe environmental 
deterioration is itself an obstacle to poverty 
alleviation (Cottrell et al. 2013, Hallegatte et 
al. 2016, OECD 2005b). 
In practice, regulation is in many cases 
suboptimal in terms of both cost-effective-
ness and environmental effectiveness, and 
may therefore represent a poor use of limit-
ed budgetary resources – a particularly im-
portant consideration in a developing coun-
try context (see e.g. Pizer and Sexton 2017, 
Goulder and Parry 2008).
Modelling has indicated that economic in-
struments bring about pollution abatement 
at a considerably lower cost than regulations 
used to achieve the same objective. In simu-
lations applied to a range of pollutants, abate-
ment costs are 45-90% lower for economic in-
struments (taxes or trading) than regulation 
(technology mandates) and 65% lower for fuel 
taxes (Goulder and Parry 2008). However, the 
simulations used to produce these estimates 
did not take administrative costs or the pos-
sible negative impact of the tax on consump-
tion – which may fall in response to higher 
prices – and thus on GDP growth. Some of the 
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potentially negative effects on GDP growth 
can be addressed by targeting spending on 
energy efficiency technologies to foster a shift 
towards greener, energy efficient consump-
tion (Ekins 2009, Goulder and Parry 2008).
What kinds of environmental 
taxes can be regressive?
It is difficult to infer from the outset wheth-
er environmental and environmentally relat-
ed taxes will have regressive or progressive 
impacts. The following reviews the research 
currently available and attempts to draw 
some cautious conclusions.
Evaluating the impacts of environmental 
taxation on specific income groups is not a 
simple exercise, as the impacts are not neces-
sarily uniform, even within individual coun-
tries. Regressive impacts are a minor concern 
if household spending on items subject to en-
vironmental taxation are relatively low, but 
more of a concern in cases where spending is 
much higher. In Mexico, for example, average 
expenditure on electricity does not exceed 
2% of household spending across all income 
deciles and thus represents only a small share 
of the household consumption basket (Pizer 
and Sexton 2017).
Environmental taxes and environmentally 
related taxes can have indirect impacts due to 
rising commodity and product prices as a re-
sult of the pass-through effect of tax increas-
es, e.g. rising fuel prices result in higher food 
prices. These impacts are hard to predict and 
vary depending on the consumption baskets 
of poor households, their ability to substitute 
for greener alternatives, and their direct and 
indirect sensitivity to changing transport, en-
ergy or commodity costs. The urban poor, gen-
erally most dependent for their basic needs 
on goods transported from elsewhere, can be 
expected to be most vulnerable to such effects 
(Fay et al. 2015). As a high proportion of in-
come of poor households is spent on food, en-
ergy and fuel, indirect effects should be mon-
itored carefully and compensated for where 
necessary. 
Environmental taxes and environmentally 
related taxes applied on stationary uses of en-
ergy such as electricity and gas for heating and 
cooling tend to have (more or less) regressive 
impacts in most countries. As shown in table 
1.1, these kinds of taxes include carbon and 
energy taxes on fuels and taxes on electricity. 
In developing countries where electrification 
rates are relatively low, or where energy-con-
suming durable goods are beyond the reach of 
poor households, energy and electricity taxes 
tend to be progressive. However, as incomes 
grow, and households are connected to the 
grid, energy taxes are likely to have a high-
er impact on low-income households (Pizer 
and Sexton 2017). Regressivity of domestic 
energy taxes may be exacerbated if poorer 
households live in older, less efficient housing 
and use less efficient household appliances. 
Therefore, when implementing environmen-
tal taxes on domestic energy use, low- and 
middle-income countries should take particu-
lar care to design appropriate compensation 
mechanisms, e.g. lifeline tariffs or progressive 
electricity prices.
Transport taxes, such as vehicle registra-
tion taxes, and congestion charges (see table 
1.1), can generally be regarded as progres-
sive or neutral in middle-income and low-in-
come countries, particularly in countries with 
low levels of car ownership amongst poor-
er income deciles (Flues and Dender 2017, 
Sterner 2012). Transport fuel taxes have been 
shown to be strongly progressive in African 
and large Asian countries, as well as in Turkey, 
Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica and Brazil (Mor-
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ris and Sterner 2013; Pizer and Sexton 2017). 
Research in India has shown that agriculture 
is also not very sensitive to fuel taxation in-
creases, and that few fuel-sensitive sectors af-
fect the poor more than the rich (Morris and 
Sterner 2013).
On the other hand, small-scale fishermen, 
farmers and Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) may be vulnerable to negative equity 
impacts from transport fuel price increases. 
These impacts will affect household income 
and should be taken into account when de-
signing taxes in the transport sector (Fay et al. 
2015). In the main, however, transport taxes 
can be reasonably expected to have progres-
sive outcomes.
The impact of taxes on water supply and 
sanitation on households depend on wheth-
er poor households are connected to water 
supply and sanitation services, or/and access 
irrigation services. If they are connected to 
and use such services, then taxes or user fees 
on water and wastewater will tend to have re-
gressive impacts (OECD 2005b). Indeed, wa-
ter affordability poses a problem for the poor-
est households in both developed and devel-
oping countries (OECD 2017a). 
Not to tax water supply and sanitation is not 
a solution, however. Keeping water prices ar-
tificially low for all consumers prevents cost 
coverage and often leads to deteriorating ser-
vices and infrastructure, which may dispro-
portionately affect the poorest households, as 
switching to alternatives such as bottled wa-
ter is expensive. Hence, to avoid negative eq-
uity impacts, water charges should be comple-
mented by appropriate welfare mechanisms 
while ensuring that sufficient revenues are 
raised from wealthier deciles to maintain in-
frastructure and services (OECD 2017a).
There has been little research done on tax-
es on biodiversity, waste, natural resources 
and agriculture that permit generalisations 
on their equity impacts, as these vary substan-
tially by country and instrument. Where the 
livelihoods or expenditures of poor house-
holds are directly affected, as tends to be the 
case for taxes in the agricultural sector, regres-
sive impacts are more likely. Impact assess-
ment and the development of accompany-
ing measures are crucial to prevent negative 
equity impacts. Where natural resources are 
extracted for export, whether minerals or tim-
ber, populations in developing countries will 
benefit from additional revenues to the ex-
chequer, although regressive indirect effects 
may also result (OECD 2005b, Cottrell et al. 
2016).
The majority of studies on the distribu-
tional impact of environmental taxes do not 
take behavioural change into account but ap-
proach the issue from a static perspective (Ko-
sonen 2012). Given that the underlying rea-
son for introducing environmental taxation 
is to reduce pressure on the environment by 
bringing about behavioural change, and giv-
en that price elasticity of demand for ener-
gy products tends to be much higher in the 
short run than the long term, this is a major 
oversight. This finding implies that the eco-
nomic actors financially able to adjust to price 
changes, do so, and are thus at least able to 
influence their own tax burden to some ex-
tent (Kosonen et al. 2012). Social compensa-
tion measures to enable households to pur-
chase more energy-efficient equipment, such 
as LPG stoves, can facilitate substitutions and 
thus foster behavioural change.
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Synergies and trade-offs
Studies of macroeconomic reforms in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mexico and Thailand have conclud-
ed that poverty and environmental deteriora-
tion are mutually reinforcing (Sheng 2017). In 
an article proposing a conceptual framework 
for public financial management, Sheng Fu-
lai of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme suggests that the close relationship 
between poverty and environment calls for 
an integrated approach to budgetary decision 
making, as public spending on the environ-
ment can contribute to poverty alleviation 
and vice versa, and linking the two in budget-
ary decisions can generate positive effects in 
both areas (Sheng 2017).
Further synergies can be identified be-
tween environmental taxation and social eq-
uity in the case of environmental taxes with 
progressive impacts. Transport fuel taxation 
is likely to have socially progressive impacts 
in developing countries, where transport fuel 
taxation can be considered a ‘luxury tax’. In 
India, for example, transport fuel expenditure 
amounts to less than 2% of total income for 
the lowest income decile and 8% of total in-
come for the wealthiest income decile (Mor-
ris and Sterner 2013). The same can be said 
of taxation of air travel, which can be imple-
mented by means of a kerosene tax on aero-
plane fuel, air ticket taxes on individual pas-
sengers, or tourism eco-taxes and charges 
which explicitly target comparatively wealthy 
tourists. Implementing environmental taxes 
on luxury items can hence generate multi-
ple benefits, including enhanced social equity, 
improved environmental quality, and addi-
tional revenues. 
Policymakers can also exploit synergies be-
tween environmental taxation and social eq-
uity by using the tax revenues as a means of 
domestic revenue mobilisation to finance de-
velopment and the achievement of the sus-
tainable development goals (SDGs) as called 
for in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. For 
example, in Tunisia environmentally related 
taxes on registration of vehicles have been 
used to part-fund the PROSOL project, which 
installed solar water heating equipment in 
119,000 households and saved the govern-
ment USD 100 million in fossil fuel imports 
over the lifespan of the installed solar water 
heaters (Trabacchi et al. 2012). In Morocco, 
revenues from an environmentally related tax 
on plastics imports have been directed to an 
environmental fund to foster the creation of a 
formalised waste separation sector (Ghariani 
2015). More details on Morocco can be found 
in Chapter II.
There are also clear synergies between so-
cial equity and environmental taxation in 
relation to the potential for environmental 
taxes to contribute towards improved fiscal 
governance. Given that many kinds of envi-
ronmental and environmentally related taxes 
are difficult to evade, these taxes can boost to-
tal welfare and capture resources previously 
lost to tax evasion (Subhanij et al. 2018). In-
deed, it has been estimated that in countries 
with higher rates of tax evasion, the benefits 
of introducing hard-to-evade carbon-energy 
taxes more than pay for themselves as a result 
of improvements in the efficiency of the tax 
system, whether or not they have a positive 
impact on environmental quality (Liu 2013).
Policymakers may have to accept trade-offs 
between environmental effectiveness and 
social justice considerations, particularly in 
countries where fuels used by the poor (such 
as kerosene for cooking) are exempt from tax, 
taxed at lower rates, or subsidised due to so-
cial concerns. The trend of taxing diesel fuel 
used for commercial, industrial and farming 
activities and for public transport and haulage 
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at a lower rate than gasoline, despite the fact 
it has a higher impact on local air pollution, is 
attributable to such concerns (OECD 2005b). 
Such trade-offs can be minimised or avoid-
ed if environmental tax rates are designed to 
take social justice into account, e.g. by means 
of progressive or lifeline tariffs, which guar-
antee the provision of a certain amount of 
electricity or water at no or minimal cost to 
vulnerable households. Lifeline tariffs are 
common in many developing countries, e.g. 
the Republic of South Africa, where poor 
households eligible for the scheme receive a 
monthly allocation of free basic electricity of 
50 kWh from the national treasury – which 
may be increased by local authorities – and 
a subsidised tariff for consumption of up to 
350 kWh, consumption which is effectively 
cross-subsidised by wealthier electricity users 
(see Kruyshaar 2017 for details). Countries 
with a wide prominence of informal housing 
(slums and favelas), should consider the intro-
duction of subsidised lump-sum charges on 
energy products. The purpose of such a charge 
is to make a policy statement, that all levels of 
society are being equally burdened by a car-
bon price, and at the same time make the price 
commensurate to the taxpayer’s ability to pay. 
Win-win measures, such as distribution 
of substituting products – clean stoves, ener-
gy-efficient appliances and technologies – are 
preferable to tax exemptions or lifeline tar-
iffs, as the latter undermine incentives to con-
sume more efficiently. The extent of the trade-
off between environmental effectiveness and 
social equity is likely to be extremely limit-
ed, given that the poorest 50% of population 
globally emit 11-15% of total CO2e emissions 
(Chancel and Piketty 2015). 
The impacts of environmental taxation 
on household income should be carefully as-
sessed prior to implementation of any tax. 
Suitable compensation mechanisms should 
be put in place in parallel to the tax to avoid 
the risk of higher prices increasing the depth 
and severity of poverty. It is likely that envi-
Box 6
INEQUALITY IN POLICYMAKING – THE UNEQUAL 
BENEFITS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES
The unequal benefits of fossil fuel subsidies 
deliver further insights into inequality in 
policymaking in relation to environmental 
fiscal policy. Fossil fuel subsidies are fiscal 
or regulatory instruments that put a nega-
tive incentive on the consumption of fos-
sil fuels. In many low- and middle-income 
countries, reform of fossil fuel subsidies is 
the first step to the introduction of environ-
mental taxes. Reform is in effect difficult 
because subsidies are an untargeted wel-
fare measure, which maintain energy pric-
es at low levels for all consumers in society. 
These benefits are not captured equally by 
all income groups. In low- and middle-in-
come countries, the wealthiest 20% of the 
population capture 61% of gasoline subsi-
dies, 54% of LPG subsidies and 42% of die-
sel subsidies, while the poorest 20% of the 
population receive just 3%, 4% and 7% re-
spectively (Coady, D., Flamini, V. and Sears, 
L. 2015). Therefore, the poorest and least 
represented sectors of society have the least 
to lose and the most to gain from fossil fuel 
subsidy reform. 
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ronmental and environmentally related taxes 
levied on household energy and water con-
sumption will have the greatest negative eq-
uity impacts. In these cases, it is important 
to use limited revenues cost-effectively, by 
targeting compensation to poor households 
wherever possible, rather than keeping prices 
low for all domestic consumers. Where tar-
geting is not possible, lifeline tariffs and rela-
tively broad-based compensation are an alter-
native.
Environmental taxation and 
inequality in policymaking
This is the fourth dimension of inequality 
and stems from lower levels of involvement 
of certain social groups – such the urban and 
rural poor, women, children, ethnic minori-
ties, populations in geographically remote re-
gions – in the policy process. In relation to en-
vironmental taxation, this may refer to lack of 
involvement in the choice of and design of the 
tax as well as unequal access on the part of vul-
nerable groups to social welfare or compensa-
tion mechanisms. Lack of representation of 
vulnerable groups is significant, because it 
may lead to policies that favour greater pro-
tection of higher-income groups, and perpet-
uate the administration of regressive policies. 
Failing to incorporate marginalised groups in 
decision-making is also likely to have implica-
tions for the environmental effectiveness of 
policies, particularly in cases where commu-
nities have long-standing traditions of natu-
ral resource management (Hallegatte 2015). 
Evidence of the specific impact of the margin-
alisation of social groups on the design of en-
vironmental taxation is scarce and a field for 
further research.
3.2.2 ETR and other 
dimensions of inequality 
Environmental taxation and gender
A number of complexities are associat-
ed with assessing the gender impact of tax 
policies, including a lack of gender disaggre-
gated data and lack of clarity on the broad-
er impact of redistributive policies on wom-
en (Joshi 2015, Chalifour 2010). At the same 
time, little research has been conducted on 
the gender-specific impacts of environmental 
taxation. In industrialised countries, Nathalie 
Chalifour has explored the gender impacts 
of carbon taxation in Canada from a feminist 
perspective (2010) and a considerable body 
of research has looked into the gender im-
pacts of indirect taxes, but not specifically en-
vironmental taxes (see e.g. Grown and Valo-
dia 2010, Joshi 2015). Research has also been 
conducted on the gender impacts of fossil fuel 
subsidy reform (IISD 2016a). Extrapolating 
from these findings can inform some initial 
conclusions on the gender impacts of envi-
ronmental taxation, although area requires 
further research.
Environmental taxation does not have an 
explicit bias against women, i.e. environmen-
tal taxes do not have specific provisions that 
treat men and women differently. However, 
environmental taxes may have an implicit 
bias against women if provisions in tax law 
have a differentiated impact on women and 
men due to gendered social or economic be-
haviour – i.e. if men and women spend their 
income on goods that are taxed differently 
(Casale 2012).
If a fiscal system is focussed on indirect 
taxation rather than corporate and personal 
income taxes – and in developing countries, 
indirect taxes typically contribute as much as 
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50-60% of government revenues – there is a 
danger that this could lead to an implicit bias 
against women, because women tend to have 
lower incomes than men and are thus less 
able to take advantage of tax exemptions and 
work-related deductions available to those in 
formal employment (GTZ/BMZ n.d., Grown 
and Valodia 2010). Female-headed house-
holds may also be more vulnerable to energy 
price rises resulting from environmental tax-
ation, due to women’s lower incomes (IISD 
2016a). Women in developing countries tend 
to purchase more goods and services that pro-
mote health, education and nutrition and to 
spend more of their income on basic com-
modities and consumer goods, which creates 
the potential for women to bear a larger bur-
den of indirect consumption taxes than men 
(Femnet 2017, GTZ/BMZ n.d.). However, as 
many basic consumption items are zero-rat-
ed for VAT or subject to reduced VAT rates in 
developing countries, and given substantial 
variations between countries, such concerns 
must be examined in light of specific nation-
al tax provisions (Grown and Valodia 2010, 
Joshi 2015). If environmental taxes are im-
posed on goods and services which women 
are more likely to pay for – such as household 
energy or water – then women are likely to be 
disproportionately affected by such a tax, un-
less provisions are made to exempt vulnera-
ble households. 
Table 1.2 shows the results of existing re-
search on tax and gender and draws some in-
itial conclusions on the potential impacts of 
environmental taxation on a sectoral basis 
using an abbreviated version of the analyti-
cal framework proposed by Chalifour (2010). 
While generalisations can be a useful indi-
cator of possible impacts, given the special 
social and economic conditions of women in 
different country contexts, empirical research 
on the basis of disaggregated data is required 
to make definitive statements about particu-
lar types environmental taxation in a par-
ticular country. Because assumptions cannot 
be made about use of revenues and flanking 
measures, the table does not include criteria 
relating to the gender impacts of tax policy 
packages, such as revenue use. 
As shown in table 1.2, it is likely that income 
disparities between genders will be negative-
ly affected by environmental taxes on energy, 
natural resources and wastewater, but posi-
tively affected by transport fuel taxation, due 
to the different gendered spending behav-
iours of women and men – although it is con-
ceivable that men shift the incidence of en-
vironmental taxation increases, e.g. on trans-
port fuels, to their female partners (Grown 
and Valodia 2010). On balance women are 
likely to disproportionately benefit from ef-
forts to mitigate climate change, as they tend 
to be poorer and more exposed to the negative 
impacts of environmental degradation and 
will be hardest hit by climate change impacts 
(OECD 2008). 
Furthermore, revenue use is an important 
aspect of environmental taxation, such that 
the analysis of an environmental tax policy 
should include an examination of the tax and 
complementary policies, including decisions 
relating to use of revenues, and not the impact 
of the tax in isolation (Chalifour 2010). Policy-
makers can design compensation measures 
and safeguarding policies that compensate 
for inequalities in intra-household revenue 
distribution and ensure that women are prin-
ciple recipients of the revenues, e.g. by means 
of conditional cash transfers, or by focussing 
benefits on low-income households (IISD 
2016a). If such measures are implemented, 
policymakers can ensure that environmental 
taxes have, at worst, a gender-neutral impact 
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Table 1 2: Framework for the gender analysis of environmental taxation in developing countries
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and at best, result in higher levels of gender 
equality (Joshi 2015, Chalifour 2010). 
Morocco introduced compensation meas-
ures with a specific gender focus. Tax reve-
nues from the plastic tax are directed to the 
Fond National pour l’Environnement (FNE) 
and used to finance activities to promote the 
recycling and recovery of plastic waste and to 
create a formalised waste separation sector. A 
minimum of 20% of total tax revenues are to 
be allocated to informal waste collectors, with 
particular attention paid to gender issues in 
fund distribution (Ghariani 2015). After the 
first two years of the tax, a total of USD 44 mil-
lion had been allocated to the FNE. Eighteen 
recycling projects had been awarded fund-
ing, expected to generate 1,050 jobs for waste 
pickers, 5% of whom are estimated to be fe-
male (World Bank 2016b). Funds were used 
to encourage the formation of waste picker 
cooperatives at regularly inspected and san-
itary landfill sites. Formalised waste pickers 
were becoming the owners and employees of 
waste sorting facilities, thus improving work-
ing and sanitary conditions, and providing a 
more stable source of income including social 
insurance provision (see Chapter II for more 
information). Section 3.2.3. looks at the de-
sign of compensation measures.
Environmental taxation and 
marginalised groups
Very little research has been conduct-
ed looking into the impact of environmen-
tal taxation on marginalised groups, such as 
ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, 
or populations in geographically remote re-
gions. Multiple and cross-cutting dimensions 
of inequality are likely to produce greater dis-
advantage than one dimension of inequality 
alone. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that negative social impacts are likely to be 
similar, but more pronounced, to those for 
women from low-income households. How-
ever, further research is necessary to draw any 
substantive conclusions.
3.2.3 Addressing regressive impacts 
with social compensation mechanisms
Several studies have highlighted the im-
portance of revenue use in relation to the ul-
timate impact of environmental taxation on 
social equity. Indeed, in almost all modelling 
simulations where all or a sufficiently high 
proportion of carbon-energy taxes are recy-
cled as lump sum cash transfers to the popula-
tion, the overall impact of a carbon tax is to im-
prove social equity (Fay et al 2015, GTZ/BMZ 
2015, OECD 2014). An analysis of 20 devel-
oping countries has shown that for each USD 
100 of additional carbon-energy taxation col-
lected and redistributed, the bottom quintile 
gains USD 13, while the richest quintile loses 
USD 23 (del Granado, Coady and Gillingham 
2010, Fay et al. 2015). A 2017 OECD paper 
by Flues and Dender (2017) has investigat-
ed methods of reducing affordability risk us-
ing CGE modelling, and projected that using 
around one-third of revenues from the tax re-
form for income-tested cash transfers would 
improve energy affordability against a busi-
ness-as-usual scenario without the tax (Flues 
and Dender 2017). 
The results of this research suggest that 
sound design of compensation measures can 
prevent negative impacts on social equity 
while retaining a substantial proportion of 
revenues for other purposes. In theory, then, 
it is clearly possible to recycle revenues or 
design compensation measures in a way that 
is progressive and shields the vast majority 
of low-income households from the negative 
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impacts associated with energy price rises 
(Preston et al. 2013, OECD 2014). In practice, 
many developing countries face difficulties in 
targeting compensation measures accurately, 
and broad coverage of compensation meas-
ures is implemented as a means of ensuring 
that vulnerable households are not negative-
ly affected. This may result in a relatively high 
proportion of the revenues raised through 
environmental taxation being used for social 
protection purposes, but, if well designed, will 
not undermine the environmental effective-
ness of the tax – particularly given the distri-
bution of polluters by income group. 
A range of policy options can address nega-
tive social impacts. Raworth et al. have ranked 
the options available to policymakers accord-
ing to their impacts and design. Most prefer-
able are socially transformative policies, such 
as redistribution of control over assets, labour 
rights reform or measures which tackle wom-
en’s care burdens. Ranked second are co-ben-
efits policies designed to exploit win-win out-
comes for sustainable development, such as 
conditional cash transfers or access to afforda-
ble renewable energy, water, or other house-
hold services. Least preferable are safeguard-
ing policies, which compensate for the social 
cost of environmental taxation through cash 
transfers or social protection (for details see 
Raworth et al. 2014).
Ultimately in relation to social equity, what 
is important is the progressivity of the fiscal 
system as a whole, including social welfare 
and other forms of compensation, rather than 
the progressivity of individual measures. As 
Box 7
SOCIAL COMPENSATION IN INDONESIA 
Since 2005, Indonesia has developed a wid-
er arc of social assistance policies and target-
ed interventions, starting with time-bound 
cash transfers parallel to energy pricing 
reforms in 2005 and 2008. Since 2005, the 
development of social security has been a 
response to rising energy prices resulting 
from fossil fuel subsidy reform. 
Reform of transport fuel subsidies on gas-
oline and diesel in Indonesia in 2015 saved 
the government USD 17 billion in that year 
and led to substantial price increases. The 
government protected the population in a 
number of ways. Some policies directly tar-
geted the vulnerable: The 1 million house 
programme, development of a sustainable 
social security system and a targeted social 
assistance programme using smart cards to 
support access to education, healthcare and 
cash transfers. Other policies focussed on 
increasing spending – on education by 28%, 
on health by 75% and on infrastructure by 
104%.
An ongoing impact evaluation scheme 
was built into the Hopeful Family Pro-
gramme (PKH) to monitor the social wel-
fare scheme’s impact, effectiveness and cov-
erage. This showed that, in the short term, 
transfers within the PKH directly increased 
the income of very poor households while 
promoting healthy behaviour, increasing 
health spending and encouraging children 
to stay in schools for longer. Higher alloca-
tions of funding to rural villages and infra-
structure have also had a positive impact on 
the poor in the country.
Sources: IISD 2016b, IEA 2016a, ADB 2015. 
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demonstrated, revenue collection and spend-
ing policies may complement each other and 
derive a larger purpose, with revenues raised 
by means of potentially regressive environ-
mental taxes used to mitigate possible regres-
sive impacts. Best case examples include In-
donesia and Morocco (see also Chapter II).
3.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
3.3.1 The earmarking debate 
in developing countries
Taxes are by definition unrequited pay-
ments that flow into the government budget 
and are typically centrally administered 
(OECD 2001b). There is no theoretical reason 
to treat revenues from environmental taxa-
tion any differently from revenues from other 
kinds of taxes (Schlegelmilch and Joas 2015). 
On the other hand, expenditure of environ-
mental tax revenues for non-environmental 
purposes is often called into question – not 
least by environment ministries. This is a par-
ticular issue in developing countries, where 
environment ministries tend not to be priori-
tised and are as a rule relatively poorly funded. 
Nonetheless upon reflection, it is clear that it 
is neither feasible nor desirable to earmark all 
environmental tax revenues for environmen-
tal purposes.
From a theoretical perspective, earmarking 
of environmental tax revenue may constrain 
the effective management of public financ-
es, leading to revenue misallocation (see e.g. 
World Bank 2005a). In many countries, ear-
marking of tax revenues is not permitted by 
law. In Chile, for example, earmarking would 
require constitutional amendment and in 
Vietnam, earmarking is not legally feasible 
(Cottrell et al. 2016). 
This theoretical example highlights the 
problem: If a country were to implement a 
carbon tax at the same rate as the carbon tax in 
Sweden, i.e. roughly USD 130 per tonne (see 
GoSwe n.d. for details), this would have the 
potential to raise very substantial amounts of 
revenue, perhaps as much as 20% of total tax 
revenue in a low- or middle-income country. 
Depending on the country’s social and eco-
nomic level of development, it may very well 
not be desirable for it to allocate 20% of its 
total tax revenue for environmental purpos-
es. Indeed, calling for the revenues to be used 
in this way might fundamentally undermine 
calls for a relatively high tax rate, which may 
be required to drive the behavioural chang-
es necessary to reduce carbon emissions or 
bring about environmental improvement. 
Nonetheless, many governments make po-
litical declarations regarding the use of reve-
nues from environmental taxation. This kind 
of loose symbolic earmarking can be helpful 
to communicate policy priorities, boost the 
credibility of government, foster political ac-
ceptance, bring potential opponents on side 
and prevent policy reversals, or diversion of 
revenues to less desirable outcomes (Cottrell 
et al. 2018). Spending a portion of the environ-
mental tax revenues on green infrastructure, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency tech-
nologies can increase the overall environmen-
tal effectiveness of tax measures and lessen 
the cost of reducing pollution (Ekins 2009).
In some circumstances, legally earmarking 
at least a portion of revenues can address is-
sues relating to mistrust of government, cor-
ruption, and related concerns that revenues 
will not be spent on a declared purpose. To 
address these issues, one option is to create 
an independently managed fund to distribute 
revenues from environmental fees or charg-
es. A successful example of this model can 
A CLIMATE OF FAIRNESS: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
64
be seen in Denmark, where the Public Ser-
vice Obligations Tariff, in place from 1998 to 
2016, raised funds that were administered by 
a non-profit, independent agency Energienet.
dk being responsible for security of supply, 
energy infrastructure and renewable energy 
deployment. 
However, independent funds may also face 
governance and implementation challenges. 
When it was introduced in 2012, revenues 
Box 8
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FEES IN VIETNAM, HA GIANG PROVINCE
Ha Giang province has 215 mines. In 2016, 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and En-
vironment and the Ha Giang Provincial 
People’s Committee have granted 72 ef-
fective mining exploitation licences in the 
province. The An Thong Joint Stock Com-
pany operates an iron mine in Minh Son 
commune, Bac Me district. The mine has an 
annual exploitation capacity of 750 tons and 
a permitted exploitation period of 30 years. 
In 2016 – 2017, the An Thong compa-
ny paid over USD 8.7 million to the state 
budget including USD 5.7 million in royal-
ties and USD 3.3 million in environmental 
protection fees. In Minh Son commune, a 
total of 30 hectares of protected forest was 
lost for mining site development, while a 
water source was seriously polluted due to 
wastewater discharged from mineral pro-
cessing activities. This caused a water short-
age for 600 households with 3,000 people in 
the commune. Mineral transportation ac-
tivities damaged 10 km of road from Minh 
Ngoc to Minh Son commune (Bac Me dis-
trict).
The Vietnamese government has been 
collecting a mining environmental fee to 
mobilise revenues for environmental re-
habilitation activities since 2016. Howev-
er, revenues have not been properly man-
aged or spent for environmental purposes 
in the affected areas. In December 2016, an 
amended Decree on the mining environ-
mental fee (Decree No 164/2016/NĐ-CP) 
was approved, including much clearer re-
quirements on environmental fee transpar-
ency and allocation. It established that fee 
revenues would be allocated to those locali-
ties where mining activities took place. 
Since this change, various civil society or-
ganisations – including Oxfam in Vietnam, 
the Vietnam Mining Coalition, Center of 
Development and Integration (CDI) and 
Ha Giang Union of Science and Technology 
Association (Ha Giang USTA) – have raised 
awareness about the potential for the en-
vironmental protection fee to address the 
negative impacts of mining in the Minh Son 
commune through capacity building for lo-
cal authorities and citizens. The group in 
Ha Giang successfully used the decree as a 
legal basis to support citizens and facilitate 
dialogues to promote fair benefit sharing 
in the community. As a result, in February 
2018, Bac Me District People’s Committee 
allocated USD 500,000 of environmental 
protection fee revenue for infrastructure 
development in Minh Son commune, while 
the company invested USD 175,000 to re-
pair and upgrade the road system and im-
plement dust control measures from Janu-
ary to March 2018. 
Source: Vietnam Mining Coalition, Oxfam Vietnam
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from the Clean Environment Cess in India 
were earmarked for the National Clean Envi-
ronment Fund, renamed the National Clean 
Energy and Environment Fund in 2017. In 
practice, however, a significant proportion of 
revenues have been diverted to cover budget-
ary shortfalls within ministries, and the fund 
itself has been criticised for lack of transpar-
ency and slow funding allocation (Cottrell et 
al. 2013). Whichever model is used, the chal-
lenge in practice in developing countries is 
that revenues may be diverted by successive 
governments to cover non-environmental 
spending requirements. 
Box 9
THE BRAZILIAN ECOLOGIC ICMS (CONSUMPTION TAX):  
ESTABLISHING CONDITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFER SYSTEMS
One of the Brazilian VAT type taxes is called 
ICMS (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercado-
rias e Serviços). The Ecologic ICMS is not an 
environmental tax per se, but it strives to 
have an environmental effect, to the extent 
that it conditions revenue transfer – from 
the state to the municipalities – for the ful-
fillment of certain environmental policies. 
The ICMS is a VAT that is imposed and 
paid at state level. According to the Brazilian 
constitution, 75% of the revenues accumu-
lated via the ICMS are kept by the state and 
25% are transferred to the municipalities. Of 
these 25% owed to the municipalities, 75% 
should be distributed according to certain 
factors determined by the constitution and 
the remaining 25% should be distributed ac-
cording to certain rules instituted by state 
law. The Ecologic ICMS comes out of these 
disposable 25% identified in state law. 
The purpose of the Ecologic ICMS is two-
fold: (i) to reimburse the municipalities for 
the environmental investments they make 
(especially in increasing conservation are-
as); and (ii) to reward the municipalities for 
the environmental investments made, since 
the benefits are shared by all neighboring 
municipalities, especially when it comes to 
sewage treatment and waste management. 
Each state has its own legislation. How-
ever, the main areas of action at municipal-
ity level are: maintenance (and possibly ex-
pansion) of municipal and state conserva-
tion areas, sanitation, waste management, 
and water quality control. In the State of Rio 
de Janeiro, for example, the Green ICMS, 
as it is known in that state, is calculated in 
the following proportions: 45% for conser-
vation units, 30% for water quality, and 25% 
for administration of solid residues. 
The transfer of Green ICMS is not a right. 
The transfers are proportionate to the goals 
achieved by the municipalities in each of 
the priority areas. The higher the score, the 
higher the transfer. 
The Ecologic ICMS has been adopted by 
17 Brazilian States. It has been extremely 
successful in attaching environmental obli-
gations to municipalities, in exchange for a 
greater share of the State revenues accumu-
lated via consumption. The Ecologic ICMS 
revenues are not generally earmarked to 
support the local government ‘s environ-
mental expenditures, although municipal-
ities may pass additional legislation to that 
effect. 
Source: Tatiana Falcão
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Environmental fees or charges are levied to 
pay for a particular service, such as water sup-
ply and sanitation, or waste collection. In the-
ory, all revenues from fees and charges should 
be used for this stated purpose. Implement-
ing fees and charges, rather than taxes, can 
be a route in developing countries to ensure 
that revenues are used for an environmental 
purpose. Thus, environment ministries in de-
veloping countries in particular often have a 
preference for environmental fees and charg-
es that flow to a specified fund, rather than to 
the general budget. However, this can result in 
inter-ministerial disagreement on the imple-
mentation of environmental taxes. For exam-
ple, the failure of Thailand’s Draft Framework 
Law on Economic Instruments for Environ-
mental Management and later proposals for 
environmental taxation instruments includ-
ed in the Framework Law (see box 4) was in 
part due to disagreements between environ-
ment and finance ministries on the responsi-
bility for revenue use and distribution. 
The implementation of fees and charges 
cannot guarantee that the revenue will be em-
ployed for environmental purposes. For ex-
ample, environmental protection fees paid 
by mining companies in Vietnam since 2006 
have not necessarily been used to address the 
adverse impacts of mining on the natural en-
vironment. To address such policy failures, 
a transparent and robust legal framework is 
important, as demonstrated by the case of Ha 
Giang province in Vietnam (see box 8). If the 
legal basis for earmarking is clear, stakehold-
ers within and outside can make a strong case 
for appropriate levels of expenditure on envi-
ronmental protection.
The ICMS Ecologico in Brazil – a VAT-type 
tax – is an interesting case of fiscal transfer 
from the central government to municipali-
ties conditional on the fulfilment of environ-
mental priorities (see box 9). Fiscal transfers 
within the ICMS Ecologico are proportionate 
to the environmental goals achieved in the 
municipalities. In this way, central govern-
ment revenue allocation creates incentives 
for investment in environmental protection 
at municipality level. Conditional fiscal trans-
fers are a means for central government to 
address challenges in prioritising revenues 
for environmental purposes at municipality 
level. 
3.3.2 Economic impacts 
and considerations
Impacts on GDP growth, 
competitiveness and investment
By definition, environmental taxes are “in-
tended to distort production decisions and have a 
disproportionate impact on polluters” (OECD 
2010, p.144). In general, taxes which negative-
ly impact some firms will tend to benefit oth-
er firms and thus, at national level, negative 
impacts will tend to be attenuated by positive 
impacts elsewhere (OECD 2008). An effec-
tive environmental tax should have a posi-
tive influence on investment decisions in fa-
vour of energy efficiency or pollution-reduc-
ing technologies. Given this required shift 
towards more environmentally friendly in-
vestment, the potential impact of an environ-
mental tax on GDP growth is generally not a 
pertinent measure of whether or not an envi-
ronmental tax can be considered effective.
At the same time, environmental taxes are 
often found to be less detrimental to a coun-
try’s economic performance than other forms 
of taxation. A green tax shift, reducing capital 
or labour taxation while increasing environ-
mental taxation (typically in a revenue-neu-
tral way), may increase economic output, as 
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modelling approaches indicate (Hewett and 
Ekins 2014). For example, the 2007 COMETR 
report found an increase of up to 1% in GDP as 
a result of environmental tax reform in six Eu-
ropean countries and implied that the effect 
of environmental taxes may even increase na-
tional competitiveness over time (COMETR 
2007). Similarly, a 2015 report by the OECD 
and IMF for the G20 found that environmen-
tal taxes are amongst the most preferable fis-
cal policy instruments to boost environmen-
tally sustainable growth by pricing environ-
mental externalities and improving resource 
allocation (OECD and IMF 2015).
The global economy is not a level playing 
field in relation to energy and resource tax-
ation. In the face of resource or energy price 
increases, industrial stakeholders with rela-
tively inelastic demand for energy and/or re-
sources are concerned about their compet-
itiveness and tend to oppose the introduc-
tion of environmental taxation. In such cases, 
there may indeed be trade-offs between the 
international competitiveness of energy-in-
tensive industries and environmental effec-
tiveness. If support measures are implement-
ed to protect industry from price increases, 
the environmental effectiveness of a tax may 
be compromised. Conversely, without sup-
port measures, it may not be possible to guar-
antee political acceptance for environmental 
taxes and the competitiveness of energy- and 
resource-intensive industry may suffer. 
Competitiveness concerns linked to ener-
gy price increases are often exaggerated, for a 
number of reasons. First, fluctuations on glob-
al markets tend to be more significant than 
price increases stemming from a tax. Second, 
many energy-intensive goods are not highly 
traded internationally and where they are, the 
costs can generally be passed on to the con-
sumer. Third, responses to the tax may lead to 
significant energy efficiency savings. Fourth, 
revenues can be used to mitigate negative im-
pacts and support investment in appropri-
ate technologies (Green Fiscal Commission 
2010). 
Nonetheless, as a general rule, countries 
tend to protect their energy-intensive indus-
try from international competition and im-
plement support measures. These measures 
should be time-limited and subject to regular 
review to prevent lock-in, minimise trade-offs 
between international competitiveness and 
environmental effectiveness, and to ensure 
that large potentials for pollution reductions 
are exploited. Ways of ensuring international 
competitiveness include carbon tax exemp-
tions for energy-intensive industries and bor-
der tax adjustments to ensure that products 
traded on the international market are not 
disadvantaged by domestic taxes, and that im-
ports do not have an unfair competitive ad-
vantage due to tax regulations elsewhere. We 
return to the issue of border tax adjustments 
in part 4.
As a general rule, the trade-off between en-
vironmental quality and the distortive impact 
of pricing industrial pollution at a sufficiently 
low level to safeguard international competi-
tiveness does not pay off and delivers limited 
benefits for the economy and for society. Low 
tax rates send a distorted signal to producers 
and lead to misallocation of capital and re-
sources, poor investment decisions, and re-
duced incentives for energy efficiency. Insuf-
ficient monetary incentives to avoid pollut-
ing behaviour by adopting new technology or 
investing in innovation to reduce pollution, 
result in pollution oversupply and innova-
tion undersupply, creating an inappropriate 
competitive advantage for environmental-
ly harmful products and industries (OECD 
2010). Nonetheless, many countries choose 
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to exempt industry from environmental tax-
es for political economy reasons. It would be 
preferable for countries to levy the tax in the 
first instance, and support industry to install 
new energy-efficient or low-polluting tech-
nologies. Two innovative domestic approach-
es to address competitiveness in Sweden and 
Denmark are described below in box 10.
There are clear synergies between sustain-
able investment and environmental taxation. 
Increasing the price of environmental pollut-
ants, such as carbon, increases the return on 
investment in mitigating technologies, such 
as renewable energy. In the UK, for example, 
the introduction of a minimum carbon price 
with the specific objective of incentivising 
investment in low-carbon electricity gener-
ation, alongside strict emissions rules and a 
shift to biomass at Drax, previously the UK’s 
largest coal power station, has resulted in the 
share of coal in electricity generation falling 
by over 71%, to just 5.8% of total electricity 
generation between 2014 and 2016 (Depart-
ment for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy 2016). An increase in the tax rate of 
India’s Clean Environment Cess was similar-
ly conceived with the objective of increasing 
investment in renewable energy (see box 2).
Job creation, new industries 
and innovation
The potential for green economy transition 
to create jobs is relatively undisputed, with 
renewable energy employment just under 10 
million in 2017 (see e.g. IRENA 2017, UNEP 
2011). Investments in new green economic 
sectors incentivised by environmental tax-
ation have considerable potential to create 
new employment. 
While it is not easy to isolate the impacts 
of environmental tax incentives from other 
Box 10
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO SAFEGUARD 
COMPETITIVENESS: SWEDEN AND DENMARK
In Sweden, a charge on NOX emissions was 
introduced in 1992. NOX emissions do not 
increase proportionally to fuel consump-
tion and therefore cannot be derived from 
the nitrogen content of fuel, but have to 
physically be measured. To reduce the ad-
ministrative burden, the NOX charge was 
levied on larger power installations produc-
ing more than 25 GWH annually. To min-
imise competitiveness impacts, all of the 
revenue was recycled back into the industry, 
in proportion to the volume energy generat-
ed – meaning that the most efficient plants 
received a highest refund, thus incentivis-
ing both reduced emissions and higher ef-
ficiency in electricity generation. This inno-
vative environmental charge reduced NOX 
emissions by 60% between 1990-1995 (see 
Cottrell et al. 2016).
In Denmark, energy and carbon taxes 
have been levied on industrial lighting and 
heating, while energy-intensive manufac-
turing processes have been made subject to 
lower tax rates or exempt. In this way only 
energy-intensive processes are exempted 
from taxation, rather than the entire energy 
consumption of energy-intensive firms.
Source: Cottrell et al. (2016); Green Budget 
Europe and Danish Ecological Council (n.d.).
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factors influencing job creation and job loss-
es within the economy, there is evidence that 
environmental taxation has led to job crea-
tion in both OECD countries and developing 
countries. However, environmental taxation 
may also cause employment losses in ener-
gy-intensive and “brown” industrial sectors. 
Policymakers must take care to ensure that 
job losses in brown sectors such as mining, 
natural resource extraction, and highly pollut-
ing manufacturing – many of which tend to 
employ poor, low-skilled workers – are com-
pensated for to avoid negative equity impacts. 
Preferably, employment programmes should 
be linked to environmental goals to exploit 
possible win-win outcomes of the transition 
to a green economy. For example, Bangla-
desh’s solar homes programme has brought 
solar power to around 2 million homes and 
has created more than 60,000 jobs for women 
and youths installing and maintaining solar 
equipment (Raworth et al. 2014).
The typical approach in OECD countries 
is to recycle revenues to reduce labour costs 
(see e.g. Ekins 2009). In the case of the EU, 
modelling has indicated that a Europe-wide 
carbon-energy tax sufficiently high to bring 
about CO2 emissions reductions to meet the 
EU’s 2020 targets, with 10% of revenues re-
invested in energy-efficiency technologies, 
would create 1 million jobs by 2020 with sta-
tistically immaterial impacts on GDP growth 
(down by 0.04% compared to baseline) (Ekins 
2009). Similarly, in Germany, the so-called 
Ecotax implemented from 1999 had creat-
ed 250,000 jobs by 2003, or 0.75% more jobs 
than predicted in a business as usual scenario 
(EEA 2011). In Tunisia, it has been estimated 
that the PROSOL programme, which is part-
ly funded by import duties on the import of 
air conditioning units to the country, created 
around 3,000 jobs in solar water heating for 
households by 2012 (Trabacchi, Micale and 
Frisari 2012). In terms of equity considera-
tions, it is important that policymakers con-
sider potential negative impacts on the em-
ployed, and implement support and compen-
sation measures.
Environmental taxation stimulates in-
novation by increasing the price paid by 
polluters, thus engendering suitable incen-
tives within the economy for innovation to 
take place. While measuring innovation can 
be challenging, it is clear that taxation gives 
business more scope to innovate than regu-
lation, either through patented inventions or 
through modifications to existing technolo-
gies and processes (OECD 2010). The Swed-
ish NOx charge described in box 10 for ex-
ample resulted in 55% of firms subject to the 
charge installing abatement technology with-
in one year (OECD 2010). For innovation to 
be stimulated by environmental taxation the 
rate has to be sufficiently high and predictable 
(to guarantee return on innovation invest-
ment) and there has to be a degree of policy 
commitment and credibility (OECD 2010). 
The benefits of innovations tend to be inter-
national, as they can be shared across jurisdic-
tions.
Inflation and environmental taxation
Environmental taxes are as a general rule 
levied ad quantum, i.e. on a quantity of a pol-
lutant, rather than ad valorem, i.e. as a set pro-
portion of the total value of an environmen-
tal good or service. This is logical, as it is the 
amount of pollutant, not its value, that will 
impact the environment. Over time, against a 
background of inflation, ad quantum taxes will 
lose value as a proportion of the total price of 
a pollutant and may impart less of a burden on 
the taxpayer (Falcão 2016). As a result, many 
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policy analysts have called for automatic esca-
lators, indexed to inflation or GDP growth, to 
be integrated within environmental tax poli-
cy instruments (see e.g. Ekins 2009, Cottrell et 
al. 2018). Turkey, for example, has introduced 
a Special Consumption Tax indexed to infla-
tion. 
Some have argued that there is a risk that 
environmental taxation might drive inflation. 
Developing countries are particularly vulner-
able to price shocks and tend to have higher 
rates of inflation. In these countries, there is 
a risk of a tax escalator leading to anticipatory 
inflation, which may feed back into price lev-
els and amplify inflation inertia (Beaton et 
al. 2013). In general, however, the influence 
of environmental taxes on prices tends to be 
relatively small in comparison to global price 
fluctuations, and rising prices tend to cause 
short-term spikes in inflation, which flatten 
out in the medium term (Beaton et al. 2013). 
If implemented, multilateral approaches to 
carbon pricing would require pricing carbon 
by using an international index composed of 
a number of string currencies in order to mit-
igate inflationary and currency related risks 
(Falcão 2016). 
PART FOUR: POTENTIAL AND PROSPECTS
The potential equity benefits of providing an 
environmental purpose and effect to environ-
mental taxes outweigh the risk of potentially 
regressive impacts, provided welfare meas-
ures are carefully designed to protect vulner-
able groups. In light of this, part 4 looks at the 
potential synergies between greater fairness 
in the tax systems of developing countries 
and the administration of environmental tax-
es, both nationally and internationally. 
4.1 IMPROVING DOMESTIC 
FISCAL GOVERNANCE WITH 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
Taxation is one of the central functions of 
a state, necessary to raise revenue and pro-
vide the services required to support the func-
tioning of society and its underlying econo-
my (see e.g. Besley and Persson 2014, Murphy 
2015). A tax system that increases equality by 
allocating the tax burden according to one’s 
ability to pay, and invests in improved fiscal 
governance, can influence the public sense of 
solidarity and responsibility, and thus boost 
tax morale. Improving fiscal governance has 
the potential to create a virtuous circle of ris-
ing tax revenues, increased trust in govern-
ment and improved tax compliance, govern-
ance and institution-building (Besley and 
Persson 2014, Bräutigam 2008).
There is a significant difference between 
the administrative capacity of developed and 
developing countries to raise and adminis-
ter taxes (Besley and Persson 2014). Typically, 
developing countries raise revenues equiva-
lent to 10-20% of GDP. In comparison, OECD 
countries on average raised revenues worth 
34.3% of GDP in 2015, and seven OECD 
countries had tax-to-GDP ratios of over 40% 
(OECD 2016a). This discrepancy in tax-to-
GDP ratios does not reflect differences in 
statutory tax rates in developing and OECD 
countries, but rather points to differences in 
the size of the informal economy in develop-
ing countries and fiscal capacity to collect and 
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enforce taxes and thus to prevent tax avoid-
ance and evasion. Informal economies are es-
timated to account for approximately 39% of 
total GDP in developing countries and 20% in 
developed countries (Jun 2018). These figures 
indicate that formalising work relations, re-
ducing tax evasion and investing into simplic-
ity and transparency in the tax system should 
be absolute priorities for developing coun-
tries. 
Environmental taxes could be part of the 
solution to these challenges. The taxation of 
fossil fuels and other energy sources derives 
income both from the formal and the infor-
mal sector. By taxing the fossil fuels on an up-
stream level, for example, prior to reaching 
the informal sector as a final consumer, it cap-
tures the rent associated with that economic 
sector and hence indirectly accounts for at 
least part of the income generated by the in-
formal sector (Falcão 2018b). 
Moreover environmental taxes are difficult 
to evade, as they tend to be levied on immo-
bile tax bases, such as energy consumption, 
agricultural inputs, carbon emissions and 
waste, and on goods and services which tend 
to have prices which are relatively transpar-
ent (Cottrell et al. 2018, Fay et al. 2015, Liu 
2013). Introducing taxes that are not easy to 
evade may have intangible benefits in terms 
of improvements to tax morale. In countries 
with high rates of tax evasion, carbon-energy 
taxes more than pay for themselves as a re-
sult of improvements in the efficiency of the 
tax system (Liu 2013). Moreover, recycling 
mechanisms for environmental tax revenues 
can reduce the gap between the tax burden in 
the formal and informal sectors and thus en-
courage micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) to enter the formal sector (Fay et al. 
2015). 
This approach could be challenged under a 
tax justice perspective, as it would purport a 
preference for indirect taxes, which risks hav-
ing a more regressive impact than direct tax-
es on income. However, this criticism would 
only stand if one were to only consider the 
progressivity of individual measures. In fact, 
from a tax justice perspective, the overall pro-
gressivity of the tax system should be priv-
ileged over the progressivity of individual 
measures. 
In low-income countries characterized by 
widespread poverty, strengthening revenue 
mobilization and accountability seems to be 
the most promising approach to tax policy 
(Zheng et al. 2018). 
4.2 STRANDED NATIONS: LOSS OF 
CARBON WEALTH DUE TO DEVALUATION 
OF FOSSIL FUEL ASSETS 
The United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP 2011, p. 14) has labelled the 
last decades “an era of gross capital misalloca-
tion”, with much capital invested in property, 
financial assets and fossil fuels. Although in-
vestment in renewable energy reached a new 
high of USD 266 billion in 2015, substantial 
capital misallocation continues, with ongoing 
investment in coal and gas generation and a 
‘locked in’ of capital in conventional power 
production.
In the future, assuming the goals set in the 
2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCC 2015a) are 
met, a large proportion of the past investment 
made in fossil fuels and other conventional 
(yet polluting) energy sources is likely to de-
value. 80% of coal deposits, 50% of oil reserves, 
and 40% of gas reserves will need to be kept in 
the ground, if the rise in global temperature 
is to remain below 2 degrees Celsius by 2050 
(Lange et al. 2018). 
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The countries most impacted by these de-
velopments will be low- and middle-income 
countries. Carbon assets in Middle Eastern 
and North African countries made up on 
average 40% of the region’s total wealth in 
2014, while in Sub-Saharan Africa this figure 
amounted to 9% (Lange et al. 2018). In 2012 
alone, extractive fossil fuel industries gener-
ated resource rents worth five times the total 
aid flows (Oxfam 2016a). Moreover, the value 
of fossil fuel reserves in developing countries, 
excluding China, have been estimated to be 
worth about USD 21 trillion – or about USD 
627 billion per year up to 2050 (Oxfam 2016b). 
Divestment on a large scale poses a serious 
threat, with the least resourceful countries 
facing the greatest loss in prospective reve-
nue raising ability. 
Box 11
REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM FOSSIL FUEL EXTRACTION 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation (REDD+) is a mech-
anism developed by the signatories of the 
UNFCCC. REDD+ creates a financial val-
ue stored in forests and offers developing 
countries results-based payments for ac-
tions to reduce or remove forest-based CO2 
emissions and to invest in low-carbon de-
velopment. The REDD+ mechanism could 
provide an interim policy solution to incen-
tivise developing countries not to use fossil 
fuel reserves. Both deforestation and fos-
sil fuel extraction relate to an activity that 
bears harmful climate impacts –– and in 
both cases, not engaging in the activity will 
impose a cost. 
Paying developing countries not to ex-
tract fossil fuels would live up to the inter-
national environmental legal principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibility” 
discussed in part 2. Implementing such a 
mechanism, while requiring political will 
internationally, would have the advan-
tage of being able to build on the experi-
ence of REDD+, where the mechanism has 
been shown to be relatively effective. One 
advantage of paying developing countries 
not to extract fossil fuels is that measuring 
the CO2 emissions avoided as a result of 
the non-extraction of fossil fuels would be 
a fairly simple exercise. A formula to calcu-
late the amount of compensation to be paid 
for non-extraction of fossil fuels could be 
developed relatively easily, taking a number 
of factors into account, including avoided 
emissions and global fossil fuel prices. 
This approach is equitable and might be 
politically feasible in the future, given that 
political will has been forthcoming in rela-
tion to the ratification of the Paris Agree-
ment and the implementation of measures 
such as REDD+. Moreover, the proposal has 
the potential to appeal to developed coun-
tries, if they are permitted to use payments 
for avoided emissions as part of their con-
tribution to mitigation. Likewise, develop-
ing countries are likely to live up to their 
Paris Agreement commitments if they are 
offered a financial incentive not to extract 
fossil fuels. A REDD+ type approach could 
work in tandem with other forms of envi-
ronmental taxation to re-compose the rev-
enue mix in fossil fuel-reliant developing 
countries. 
Source: Adapted from Caney 2016.
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These countries are referred to in litera-
ture as the “stranded nations”. Typically, these 
states are highly dependent on fossil fuel-de-
rived revenues, and host carbon-dependent 
industries and infrastructure. Poverty still 
tends to be the main concern in these strand-
ed nations. 
While it is imperative to find a solution to 
the problems faced by stranded nations, there 
are already, in international policy-making, a 
few alternatives that could be effective transi-
tioning policies to assist them to reduce their 
dependence on carbon-based energy sources. 
One possibility might be the development of 
a mechanism along the lines of the REDD+ 
programme (Reducing Emissions from De-
forestation and Forest Degradation). REDD+ 
pays those who would otherwise harvest tim-
ber, to protect the integrity of the forest. Like-
wise, developed countries could commit to 
paying developing countries not to extract 
fossil fuels. This proposal is developed further 
in box 11.
4.3 BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT TO ENABLE 
UNILATERAL HIGH ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
If countries implement environmental tax-
es unilaterally, they may have concerns about 
competitiveness impacts on the industries 
that are subject to international competition. 
Losses in international competitiveness are 
more of a concern in a scenario where few 
countries adopt environmental taxes, or 
where tax rates are comparatively high. This 
is a particular concern for taxes on carbon or 
Box 12
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS (BTAS)
Equity is an issue that ought to be taken in 
account also under a competition frame-
work. Because petrol is a commodity that is 
traded internationally, many countries ap-
ply border taxes in order to safeguard the 
domestic industry’s competitiveness in 
international markets. Border Tax Adjust-
ments work by either taxing an import, so 
that it is taxed at the same level as the do-
mestically produced product, or on export, 
in order not to impose an undue burden on 
the nationally produced product when it is 
known that the foreign product is not bur-
dened by a like tax. 
The WTO is responsible for regulating 
when a border adjustment is admissible and 
when it is not. In order for BTAs to be admis-
sible, the tax so applied (or credited) must 
be applied both in the foreign and in the 
domestically produced products – it cannot 
unduly burden the foreign derived product. 
Moreover the tax can only be applied in a 
product, not a process (also referred to as tax 
ocultes) (Falcão, 2016). 
For example, a domestic tax on fuel can 
legitimately be applied on similar imported 
fuel, but a tax that is domestically applied on 
the energy consumed during an industrial 
process (for example, to produce steel) can-
not be applied on similarly imported steel. 
Since environmental (and environmental-
ly related) taxes can be both product and 
process-oriented taxes, the design of the 
tax is determinant in defining the types of 
like-charges that one can apply at the border 
with the intent to safeguard the competi-
tiveness of the national industry.
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energy, which can affect energy-intensive in-
dustry quite substantially. While competi-
tiveness impacts due to energy price increas-
es tend to be exaggerated, particularly in cases 
where taxes are low, governments wishing to 
implement a tax at a higher rate may wish to 
explore options to protect their industry in-
ternationally. 
Border Tax Adjustments (BTA) could be 
used by a number of countries cooperating on 
carbon pricing schemes, to the extent they all 
apply a pre-agreed carbon price (see box 12). 
That would allow them to keep the carbon 
price applied domestically, without having to 
grant an exemption at the border when the 
product finally comes to be exported. Agree-
ing on a pre-set price range for carbon could 
create a market for products that internalise 
the cost of pollution. 
By bundling into groups, or acting unilat-
erally, countries interested in factoring in the 
cost of carbon into production can help create 
momentum for other countries to also adopt 
carbon pricing strategies. 
Concerted action by like-minded groups 
of countries could help protect the countries 
involved from shortfalls in international com-
petitiveness, and create pockets of geographic 
zones where the environmental cost of doing 
business is not subsidised. This is an approach 
that could already be currently employed by 
the Nordic countries, for example, taking into 
account their similar views and practices to-
wards carbon taxation (Falcão 2016). 
Moreover, unilateral border tax adjust-
ments could be employed by countries cur-
rently applying carbon taxes, for example, in 
order to keep their competitive position in 
the global market. This approach would not be 
ideal, because it would demur from the posi-
tive environmental action employed domes-
tically. However, it might be a good stepping 
stone to provide an incentive for countries 
to implement domestic environmental taxes 
without exposing their markets to a potential 
competitive disadvantage when competing 
for markets internationally. 
To the extent more countries adopt similar 
measures, efficiency and environmental gains 
can be derived by drawing political decisions 
and working as a group to heighten the re-
gional, and potentially global level of environ-
mental protection. 
4.4 CREATION OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
BODY TO DRIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
TAX REGULATION UNDER THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE WTO
One potential route towards enhanced co-
operation would be to create an intergovern-
mental body to address environmental tax 
issues that cannot be addressed unilaterally. 
As further demonstrated in the 2017 In-
ter-Agency Task Force Report, four intergov-
ernmental agencies lead the work on inter-
national tax policy analysis: the World Bank 
(WB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the OECD and the United Nations. Of 
these four, only the latter two work on policy 
setting, many times with diametrically op-
posed viewpoints that are consistent with the 
membership base of each organisation. Al-
though this is a changing picture, particularly 
at OECD level, where membership is expand-
ing to be inclusive of emerging economies, it 
is unlikely that it will ever be inclusive, at poli-
cy development level, of developing and least 
developed countries. 
In light of the above, there is serious disa-
greement, between these four intergovern-
mental organisations and their agencies, in 
the characterisation of certain issues and their 
corresponding regulation. The discussion on 
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Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) is a prime exam-
ple. There is, as of yet, no standard definition 
of IFFs, making it extremely difficult to mon-
itor and to report produce data on such flows. 
(Falcão and Chowla, 2016). Political consider-
ations make it impossible to agree on one con-
ceptual framework, impacting the very coun-
tries that these organisations aim to assist. 
As with the international tax work, envi-
ronmental taxation and regulation is cur-
rently being discussed and monitored by all 
four organizations. However, only the United 
Nations (via UNEP) has the prerogative to 
set environmental policies and targets that 
involve environmental taxation and regula-
tion. As further explored in Section 2, the UN-
FCCC and the Paris Agreement have made 
viable the introduction of environmental tax 
policies aimed towards the fulfilment of the 
goals set at the Paris Agreement. 
If we were to translate the picture above to 
environmental regulation, therefore, only the 
United Nations would have a norm setting 
function. 
In addition to hosting an intergovernmen-
tal agency, the United Nations Committee 
Fig  1 3 Schematic representation of international organisation roles in international tax cooperation
Source: United Nations (2017) Financing for Development: Progress and Prospects 2017. 
©2017 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.
Notes: Examples of norm setting include model conventions and multilateral treaties. International 
policy analysis examples are research papers, handbooks, BEPS Action Plan reports. Oversight of 
implementation includes peer reviews and the assessment of compliance with international standards. 
National policy analysis and advice includes surveillance, assessment of tax administrations, 
and policy proposals. Examples of capacity building work are the OECD/UNDP Tax Inspectors 
without borders initiative, the Global Tax Program of the World Bank, the UN DESA Capacity 
Development Unit, the OECD Global Relations programme and IMF technical assistance.
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of Experts, the United Nations’ tax regulato-
ry body, has recently taken on the mandate 
to analyse the suitability of applying envi-
ronmental taxes, starting with carbon taxes. 
The United Nations Committee of Experts 
is a committee composed of 25 tax experts, 
nominated by their governments, to sit at the 
Committee and act in their personal capacity. 
Many NGOs have argued for the elevation 
of the tax committee to the status of an in-
tergovernmental organisation. However, con-
sensus has been proven difficult to achieve on 
this topic. 
In spite of that, it is to be recognised that 
the United Nations currently hosts (i) the 
widest country membership (ii) policy mak-
ing capabilities in both environmental law 
and international taxation (iii) an agenda that 
fits environmental objectives within the 2030 
development goals for sustainable develop-
ment and (iv) the normative framework in in-
ternational public law to effectively host uni-
lateral, bilateral and multilateral environmen-
tal tax frameworks to oversee the objectives 
of the Paris Agreement. 
An all inclusive governance structure for a 
360 degree regulation of all areas of environ-
mental law, including taxation, would be the 
next natural step in this field.
4.5 INTERNATIONAL TAX 
COOPERATION – COULD CARBON 
PRICING SET A PRECEDENT?
Reducing the scope from environmental 
to carbon taxation further improves the pros-
pect of having one or two cooperative institu-
tions to regulate the outflow of carbon emis-
sions. 
When analysing the basic structure of the 
UNFCCC, the most authoritative legislation 
piece in the administration of climate-based 
emissions, one sees enormous attention de-
voted to countries’ emissions reporting ob-
ligations. As previously discussed in part 2, 
this is justified by the timely introduction of 
the Kyoto Protocol, imposing quantitative 
restrictions on carbon emissions for some 
countries. It is a policy designed to operate 
nationally or regionally, therefore on a down-
stream basis at retail level, and concentrating 
on emissions control. 
The more recent Paris Agreement (Unit-
ed Nations 2015a) was introduced with the 
intent to correct that, by recognising the im-
portance of integrated, holistic and balanced 
non-market approaches (United Nations 
2015a, Article 6 (8)) to assist developed and de-
veloping countries in fulfilling their commit-
ments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
As further supported in Falcão (Falcão 2016), 
the Paris Agreement denotes the first time 
since the inception of the UNFCCC, that the 
parties to the Convention have made an overt 
commitment to make use of non-market ap-
proaches including carbon prices, carbon tax-
es and other fiscal measures aimed at curbing 
and eventually peaking carbon emissions re-
lease into the atmosphere.
There are two dimensions to carbon tax reg-
ulation. One is the policy setting, legal frame-
work, that is clearly delimitated by the United 
Nations under the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement. The second dimension refers to 
international tax competition and trade reg-
ulation. Both have to be aligned in order for 
domestic, bilateral and multilateral carbon 
pricing techniques to work, particularly on a 
cross-border basis. In 2016, Falcão suggested 
an institutional framework to oversee policy 
formulation, legal regulation and dispute res-
olution, through a joint oversight of the car-
bon pricing techniques at UN and WTO lev-
els (Falcão 2016). 
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According to Falcão, the WTO would be 
conferred the duty to oversee any domestic 
law or treaty covering both indirect taxes and 
environmental policies that have a cross bor-
der effect on trade. The WTO has a Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) which would be fully 
apt to resolve conflicts regarding the admin-
istration and application of a carbon tax, and 
confer binding power to the decision granted. 
The picture below illustrates how the UN and 
the WTO might interact within their respec-
tive institutional frameworks: 
Ideally, a global multilateral solution should 
be drawn to price carbon on a global scale, 
taking into account the economic and social 
constraints of each country. In 2016, Falcão 
(Falcão 2016) proposed a framework for the 
administration of a Multilateral Carbon Tax 
Treaty (MCTT) which would engage both de-
veloped and developing countries on an equal 
footing. The objective of the proposed MCTT 
was to create a binding obligation for coun-
tries to apply a tax. This is an extremely unu-
sual commitment to be made internationally, 
where the standard is for countries to come to 
an agreement on how to partition a tax. Levy-
ing a tax is a State act intrinsically connected 
to the enforcement of a country’s sovereign 
rights. As a result, international tax treaties 
seldom create an obligation to tax, or identi-
fy the level at which the tax should be levied. 
However, the ratification of the Paris Agree-
ment has created the legal construct for the 
admission of one such multilateral agreement 
that would propose tax rates to be applied by 
countries according to their levels of econom-
ic development. 
Fig  1 4: WTO and UN shared competence over a proposed Multilateral carbon tax approach
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4.5.1 Other Initiatives
During the COP21 in Paris, the World 
Bank and the IMF initiated a high-level Car-
bon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC) 
which brings together leaders from govern-
ment, private sector, academia and civil soci-
ety to expand and promote the use of carbon 
pricing policies. The CPLC aims to enhance 
cooperation to share information, expertise 
and lessons learned on developing and im-
plementing carbon pricing, and to strengthen 
and improve carbon pricing policies to redi-
rect investment and manage investment risks 
and opportunities. It works to bring together 
government and business to accelerate the 
use of carbon pricing around the world. Its 
long-term vision is to implement carbon pric-
ing on a global scale and with rising ambition 
sufficient to help meet the Paris Agreement 
temperature goals, aiming for carbon pricing 
to cover 50% of all emissions by 2025. One ex-
plicit means by which this vision should be 
achieved is by promoting global cooperation. 
The High Level Commission on Carbon 
Prices of the CPLC, led by Nicholas Stern 
and Joseph Stiglitz, has predicted that a car-
bon price of USD 40-80/tCO2e by 2020, and 
USD 50-100/tCO2e by 2030, will be necessary 
to achieve the Paris targets. (Carbon Pricing 
Leadership Coalition 2017). To achieve car-
bon prices of this magnitude, multilateral co-
operation will be necessary. 
PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
This report set out to explore whether and 
in what ways environmental taxation might 
have the potential to address the inequality of 
outcomes currently experienced by different 
income groups as a result of environmental 
degradation. This report has shown that envi-
ronmental taxation is a cost-effective policy 
instrument that can improve environmental 
standards and reduce the impacts of pollution 
on human health. Thus, if well designed, tak-
ing both environmental and equity impacts 
into account, environmental taxation can re-
sult in environmental improvement while 
also meeting the requirements of social equi-
ty and tax justice. 
Environmental taxes can help countries de-
liver on the commitments assumed through 
international environmental agreements, 
such as the UNFCCC and the Paris Agree-
ment, and on the sustainable development 
goals envisaged through the 2030 Agenda 
that require heightened social and economic 
standards, for which development resource 
mobilisation is key. The internalisation of the 
cost of pollution through the attribution of a 
local and, subsequently, a global price on car-
bon should be an aim pursued by all nations 
across the globe.
For developing countries with relatively 
scarce financial resources, environmental tax-
es can generate a double positive, to the ex-
tent they are able to lead to a heightened envi-
ronmental standard while mobilising domes-
tic revenues for the achievement of the SDGs. 
The designation of a clear definition for “envi-
ronmental tax” according to its ability to carry 
an environmental purpose, but also to deliver 
a positive environmental effect, is key in see-
ing through the objectives of an environmen-
tal tax policy that is capable of generating a 
“double positive” effect. 
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Environmentally related taxes should be 
pursued within the context of a wider fis-
cal and environmental policy approach but 
should be distinguished to the extent they are 
not able to deliver on the environmental com-
mitments assumed through the Paris Agree-
ment. To that effect, the principles of envi-
ronmental law, general principles of taxation 
and the principles of social justice should be 
promoted. 
Given the differing impact levels of climate 
change and the imbalanced contributions to 
pollution, limiting average global tempera-
ture rise to 2 degrees Celsius may require dif-
fering levels of commitment by certain na-
tions, and the proposition of short-term sup-
port policies such as the development of a 
mechanism along similar lines to the REDD+ 
programme, i.e. paying developing countries 
to not extract fossil fuels, might be an interim 
solution. 
Living up to the Paris Agreement com-
mitment implies developing multilateral ap-
proaches capable of reducing GHG emissions 
in general and carbon emissions in particu-
lar. An institutional governance framework is 
suggested within the scope of this report, to 
draw political compromise and stir multi-par-
ty agreement on environmental protection 
measures in international tax cooperation for 
the implementation of measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, including carbon 
taxation. 
In implementing environmental taxation 
in developing countries, the country context 
should be analysed and appropriate measures 
developed to protect the vulnerable, taking 
multiple dimensions of inequality into ac-
count. 
There are clear synergies between environ-
mental taxation and improved fiscal govern-
ance. Environmental taxes tend to be difficult 
to evade, which has the potential to boost tax 
morale and create a virtuous circle of institu-
tion building, creating acceptance for the im-
position of other taxes. These synergies may 
be positive for developing countries as they 
can improve fiscal capacity to address other 
tax justice issues and develop a more vertical-
ly progressive fiscal system with broad cover-
age.
The time is now to set the standards under 
which environmental tax and environmen-
tally related tax mechanisms will be judged 
for the coming ten years. It is imperative to 
get the conceptual frameworks, and standards 
right, in order to both advise developing coun-
tries on the implementation of sound policies, 
and to assess the extent to which those poli-
cies are effective, both from an environmental 
and social justice perspectives. Pollution sees 
no borders. Let us leave no one behind. 
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CHAPTER II 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN PRACTICE
Environmental, Economic and Social Effects of 
Environmental Taxes in Selected Developing Countries
(by Jacqueline Cottrell)
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND 
REPORT OBJECTIVES
This report looks at several case studies of 
environmental taxation in so-called develop-
ing countries. The first objective of the report 
is to provide a deeper understanding of en-
vironmental taxation and its environmental, 
economic and social impacts in developing 
countries. The second objective of the report 
is to consider the potential for environmental 
taxes to be implemented in developing coun-
tries within broader tax reform processes to 
create a more progressive tax system. 
The third objective of this report is to con-
sider the degree to which environmental tax-
ation in so-called developing countries may 
be able to contribute to fair taxation by com-
plying with the vision and objectives of the 
Global Alliance for Tax Justice. The Alliance’s 
vision is a world where progressive tax poli-
cies support people to share in local and glob-
al prosperity, access public services and so-
cial protections, and benefit from an economy 
that acts in the interest of people and the envi-
ronment. The objectives of the Alliance are to 
affirm the roles of governments to implement 
such policies, mobilise domestic resources for 
public services and other government func-
tions, strengthen state accountability, reduce 
state dependence on aid and debt financing, 
and correct the power imbalance between cit-
izens and multinational corporations (Global 
Alliance for Tax Justice 2018).
The fourth and final objective of this report 
is to supplement and complement the scop-
ing study by examining the impacts of envi-
ronmental taxation in depth in several short 
case studies focussing on countries and in-
struments also covered in the scoping study. 
1.2 THE CASES COVERED IN THIS REPORT 
The report works through a series of exam-
ples of environmental taxation in industri-
alising countries. The cases examined were 
chosen to provide a balance between different 
regions of the world – Asia, Africa and South 
America. However, finding good cases under-
pinned by robust data on the impacts of spe-
cific environmental tax measures in low-in-
come countries in particular is quite challeng-
ing. 
For this reason, the four country cases in 
this report look at the impacts of environmen-
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tal tax in four middle-income countries, as 
follows:
  The Environmental Protection Tax in Viet-
nam 
  The Plastics Tax in Morocco 
  Carbon Taxation in Mexico
  Differentiated electricity pricing in China 
These country case studies are followed by 
an analysis of environmental taxes in low-in-
come countries (LICs) and attempts to draw 
some general conclusions for these countries.
For each case, the report will consider 
whether or not an environmental tax was a 
successful policy within the specific policy 
context of the country in question, and on 
the basis of available data. As in Chapter I, the 
criteria used to evaluate whether or not an en-
vironmental tax can be considered to be an ef-
fective measure are: 
1. Environmental effectiveness – did the tax 
bring about reductions in pollution (e.g. 
SO2, NOx, CO2 or other greenhouse gas 
emissions) and / or result in reduced con-
sumption of energy or other scarce resourc-
es?
2. Social impacts, including indirect impacts 
resulting from changing relative prices and 
impacts within the tax system as a result 
of increases in indirect taxes within the tax 
system, which tend to have regressive im-
pacts.
3. Economic and fiscal impacts, including 
impacts on GDP growth and internation-
al competitiveness, employment, and gov-
ernment revenues.
It should be noted that it is not easy or 
straightforward to find robust data on the im-
pacts of environmental taxes. Extrapolating 
which changes are due to the direct and indi-
rect impacts of an environmental tax on pric-
es, behaviour and the macro-economy is not 
a simple matter. External factors, such as oil 
price fluctuations, the state of the economy 
prior to the introduction of the tax, the avail-
ability of substitutes to high-polluting sub-
stances and a plethora of additional variables 
also influence the behaviour of investors and 
consumers. Thus, effectively isolating and 
quantifying the impact of a tax alongside oth-
er complementary measures is quite difficult 
– particularly in low-income countries, where 
the capacity to carry out in-depth studies and 
develop appropriate econometric models is 
limited.
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter examines the environmental, 
social and economic/fiscal impacts of four 
environmental tax instruments in the global 
South: Vietnam, Morocco, Mexico and China. 
It then goes on to look at some more gener-
al findings on LICs. The final sections draw 
some conclusions regarding the impact of en-
vironmental taxation on social equity and de-
lineate possible ways to mitigate these; pro-
pose some possible ways forward; and high-
light opportunities for further research.
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PART TWO: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN PRACTICE 
2.1 THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION TAX IN VIETNAM
2.1.1 The policy context
Vietnam implemented a broad-based pack-
age of environmental taxes in the Environ-
mental Protection Tax Law in 2012 (Law 
57/2010/QH12), which targets a range of pol-
lutants, as shown in Table 2.1. Tax rates can be 
relatively easily adjusted within a given tax 
rate range by a standing committee in the Na-
tional Assembly. Current tax rates have been 
in place since 2015, when tax rates were in-
creased for gasoline, diesel and kerosene. As 
shown in Table 2.1, most rates are by now at 
the higher end of the rate range. 
The introduction of taxation of environ-
mental pollutants is one element within 
a broader process of greening the Vietnam-
ese economy, as expressed in the 2012 Viet-
nam Green Growth Strategy (VGGS), which 
focusses on greening production, reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, and greening life-
styles (Cottrell et al. 2016). Other green fiscal 
measures include a natural resource tax and 
an environmental protection fee. The impacts 
of these measures are less well documented 
and are not analysed here. 
Alongside the VGGS, in recent years a 
greater focus on implementing the Sustain-
able Development Goals and fulfilling the 
commitments of the Paris Agreement have 
increased pressure within the country both 
Tax base Tax rate range Tax rate 2018 (USD)
Gasoline 0.04-0.17 USD / litre 0.13 USD / litre
Aircraft fuel 0.04-0.13 USD / litre 0.13 USD / litre
Diesel 0.02-0.09 USD / litre 0.06 USD / litre
Mazut oil 0.01-0.09 USD / litre 0.29 USD / litre
Kerosene 0.01-0.09 USD / litre 0.05 USD / litre
Lubricating oil 0.01-0.09 USD / litre 0.09 USD / litre
Coal(brown/black/fat) 0.44-1.31 USD / tonne 0.65 USD / tonne
Coal (anthracite) 0.44-1.31 USD / tonne 1.31 USD / tonne
HCFCs 0.04-0.13 USD / kg 0.04 USD / tonne
Soft plastic bags 1.31-2.18 USD / kg 2.18 USD / kg
Restricted use herbicide 0.02-0.09 USD / litre 0.02 USD / litre
Restricted use chemicals 0.04-0.13 USD / kg 0.04 USD ( kg
Table 2 1: The Environmental Protection Tax in Vietnam: Tax rate ranges and current rates
Source: Environmental Protection Law, Vietnam, 2012
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to increase tax rates within the existing range 
in the law, and to increase the upper limit of 
the tax rate ranges. However, when the Min-
istry of Finance proposed a tax rate increase 
in 2018, this was rejected by the National As-
sembly and has been postponed.
Vietnam’s Nationally Determined Contri-
bution (NDC)12, submitted to UNFCCC un-
der the Paris Agreement, commits the coun-
try to reducing CO2 emissions by 8% com-
pared to business-as-usual (BAU) between 
2021 and 2030. Given Vietnam’s projected in-
crease in emissions in its NDC – from 474.1 
million tCO2e in 2020 to 787.4 million tCO2e 
by 2030 – a reduction of 8% on BAU still repre-
sents an absolute increase in emissions of 288 
million tCO2e (GoV 2015).
13 With interna-
tional support, the NDC proposes emissions 
reductions of up to 25% on BAU. Even this 
higher figure would result in a greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions increase of 235 million 
tCO2e. 
Although fulfilling these NDC pledges 
would not bring about absolute reductions in 
CO2 emissions, it would slow the current rap-
id growth of GHG emissions in the country. 
Commitments such as these, and a large num-
ber of national policy documents – decrees, 
laws and circulars – all indicate a degree of 
commitment in Vietnam to start to integrate 
environmental policies with other measures 
to boost growth, restructure the economy, 
address energy security concerns, and access 
international finance (particularly climate fi-
nance). Environmental improvements in Vi-
etnam have thus been integrated into many 
12 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are the commitments 
submitted to the Paris Agreement prior to its ratification  Once the Paris Agree-
ment was ratified, these INDCs became NDCs – Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions – indicating the signatories’ commitment to fulfilling their NDC 
13 The term CO2e expresses GHG emissions in terms of CO2 based on their relative 
global warming potential (GWP)  CO2 has a GWP of 1, while methane has a GWP 
of roughly 25: Meaning that emitting one tonne of methane is equivalent to 
emitting 25 tonnes of CO2 
aspects of policy making as a co-benefit of 
policies aiming to promote other goals (Zim-
mer, Jakob, & Steckel, 2015). Environmental 
taxes are part of this process and their imple-
mentation has inevitably had impacts on the 
environment, social equity and the broader 
economy. These impacts are examined below.
2.1.2 Environmental effectiveness
There is some evidence for positive behav-
ioural responses and reduced pollution and 
emissions as a result of the EPT. In a BAU 
scenario, CO2 emissions in Vietnam are pre-
dicted to increase from 247 million tonnes of 
CO2e in 2010 to almost 800 million tonnes of 
CO2e by 2030 (GoV 2015). However, stable 
tax revenues between 2012 and 2014 reflect 
the relative stability of transport fuel con-
sumption – which accounts for at least 90% of 
total revenue – during the first implementa-
tion phase of the EPT, prior to tax rate increas-
es in 2015. Subsequent increases in revenues 
are attributable – at least in part – to tax rate 
increases, and not only to increases in trans-
port fuel emissions (see Table 2.2 for details of 
revenue raised). Thus, the EPT may have been 
a factor in slowing the rapid rise of transport 
fuel consumption and growth in emissions 
from the transport sector.
Modelling commissioned by the (GIZ) in 
2014 suggests that the tax resulted in CO2 
emissions reductions of about 2 million 
tonnes in both 2012 and 2013, equivalent to 
an annual fall in emissions of roughly 1.7% 
(Huong 2014). Subsequent increases to the 
tax rate in 2015, and possible increases in the 
future, can be expected to have a greater im-
pact on CO2 emissions, with modelling indi-
cating annual CO2 emissions reductions of 
over 9 million tonnes, or 7.9%, under a high 
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tax scenario, such as that of taxes on gasoline, 
diesel and coal at the top end of the rate ranges 
proposed (Willenboeckel 2011). 
The full potential of environmental im-
provements from the EPT is yet to be realised. 
The initial introduction of the EPT in 2012 and 
subsequent tax rate increases in 2015 were ac-
companied by tax reductions elsewhere in the 
value chain. In 2012, the EPT was introduced 
in parallel to the abolition of the gasoline 
price surcharge and in 2015, increases to tax 
rates on gasoline, diesel and kerosene were 
introduced alongside import tariff reductions 
between members countries of ASEAN, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Tax 
rates were therefore partially motivated by 
the need to mobilise domestic revenue, rath-
er than to a requirement to reduce pollution 
in the country. In addition, tax rates on poorer 
quality coal (not anthracite) and other pollut-
ants, aside from road transport fuel, remain to-
wards the lower end of the range of rates pro-
posed. While robust data is limited, it is possi-
ble that the EPT has encouraged fuel shifting 
towards dirtier fuels for transport and power 
generation – diesel and coal – which would re-
sult in increasing pollutant emissions into the 
air (see Cottrell et al. 2016).
As the EPT is not indexed to inflation, tax 
rates have been falling in real terms since it 
was introduced in 2012 – although inflation 
has been falling steadily since 2012, when 
it was at 9.1%, to 3.5% in 2017 (World Bank 
2018d). Tax rate increases in 2015 may have 
compensated for this to some extent, but in-
dexation to inflation would address this prob-
lem in a more systematic way. 
2.1.3 Social impacts of the EPT
Concrete data on actual recorded impacts 
of the EPT on social equity are not available in 
the public domain. However, two modelling 
exercises have been undertaken in Vietnam 
to evaluate the environmental, social and eco-
nomic impacts of the EPT. These results are 
looked at below.
Prior to the implementation of the EPT, 
modelling conducted as part of an impact as-
sessment indicated that household welfare 
would decline slightly across all groups, but 
that these welfare impacts, particularly in a 
low tax scenario, would be relatively low and 
relatively equally distributed across all house-
hold categories (Willenboeckel 2011). The re-
sults of this ex ante modelling are shown in 
Table 2.3.
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Revenue as % of GDP 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.64 0.98
Revenue as % of total tax revenues 2.64 2.24 2.22 3.65 5.35
Total tax revenues (million USD)* 536 546 560 1,200 1,900
Table 2 2: Revenues from the environmental protection tax 2012-2016
*Currency conversions on the basis of rate at the end of each accounting period
Source: GoV (Government of Vietnam) 2018 
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As shown in Table 2.3, in the high-tax sce-
nario, modelling indicated that the impact of 
the EPT would be progressive overall. The im-
pact on welfare would be least significant for 
the poorest income quintile, whether rural or 
urban, farm or non-farm, and most significant 
for the fourth income quintile, with the high-
est predicted impact being a decline of 1.18% 
in the income of urban non-farm households 
(Willenboeckel 2011). Moreover, it should 
be noted that the figures in the table do not 
take into account potential welfare gains due 
to environmental improvements. Such im-
provements tend to benefit lower income 
quintiles more, because poor households are 
most adversely affected by high levels of pol-
lution (see Chapter I for a discussion of the 
causes of the inequity of impacts of environ-
mental degradation). This implies that envi-
ronmental improvements may have mitigat-
ed the impact of falling household income to 
some extent and that, with appropriate use of 
tax revenues to drive green economy transi-
tion, the EPT has the potential to have a neu-
tral or indeed a positive social impact. 
Despite the progressive impact of tax over-
all, the high tax scenario predicted a loss of half 
a percentage point of household income for 
the lowest income quintile. Vietnam achieved 
middle-income status in 2011. In 2012, when 
the EPT was implemented, 13.4% of the popu-
lation were living under the lower middle-in-
come poverty line of USD 3.20 a day (World 
Bank 2018b). For these households, even a 
0.5% drop in income could have a potentially 
severe impact on welfare.
Given these findings, at the time of imple-
mentation, rates at the lower end of the tax 










Non-farm 1 -0.16 -0.53 Farm 1 -0.20 -0.66
Non-farm 2 -0.21 -0.72 Farm 2 -0.26 -0.86
Non-farm 3 -0.30 -1.01 Farm 3 -0.27 -0.89
Non-farm 4 -0.36 -1.18 Farm 4 -0.27 -0.91
Non-farm 5 -0.25 -0.83 Farm 5 -0.24 -0.80
RURAL AREAS
Non-farm 1 -0.13 -0.42 Farm 1 -0.17 -0.58
Non-farm 2 -0.21 -0.72 Farm 2 -0.21 -0.70
Non-farm 3 -0.29 -0.96 Farm 3 -0.26 -0.88
Non-farm 4 -0.34 -1.15 Farm 4 -0.27 -0.91
Non-farm 5 -0.26 -0.85 Farm 5 -0.23 -0.75
*1 is the lowest income quintile (poorest), 5 the highest income quintile (richest). In the table, welfare 
is measured by the Hicksian equivalent variation as a percentage of base income. This measure 
expressed the tax burden as a lump-sum reduction in real income with equivalent welfare impact.
Source: Willenbockel 2011
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rate range were imposed on the pollutants 
listed in the EPT law. Vietnam’s Vice Finance 
Minister stated that those affected negative-
ly by the EPT would receive increased pay-
ments from local government and that there 
would thus be no social impact on the popu-
lation. Whether such social protection meas-
ures were implemented in practice is unclear. 
However, social welfare is poorly targeted in 
Vietnam and until very recently, the poorest 
quintile received on average only USD 0.09 
per day in government transfers, while the 
richest quintile received USD 1.60 (Halle-
gatte et al. (eds) 2016).
Following the implementation of the EPT 
in 2012, GIZ and the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Finance commissioned Computable Gene-
ral Equilibrium (CGE) modelling in 2014 to 
gauge the impacts of the EPT against a BAU 
scenario (Huong 2014). This ex post model-
ling also indicates that the EPT had a slight ne-
gative social impact, but does not go into de-
tail regarding the impact on income quintiles, 
focussing instead on poorer and wealthier re-
gions of Vietnam and disaggregating the data 
in relation to urban and rural populations.
Table 2.4 shows the impact of the EPT 
on the poverty rate in Vietnam in 2012 and 
2013. Overall, the poverty rate declined slight-
ly more slowly as a result of the EPT than 
it would have done in a BAU scenario, from 
11.1% to 9.8% between 2012 and 2013, a devia-
tion of  -0.2% in 2012 and -0.1% in 2013. 
The data in the table shows that impacts 
on poverty tended to be slightly more pro-
nounced in poorer regions – the North Cent-
ral Coasts, the Central Highlands, and the Me-
kong River Delta. As noted above, for house-
holds living close to or below the poverty line, 
vulnerability to relatively small price increa-
ses tends to be higher. 
However, even in the poorest regions, 
the deviation from BAU was relatively low, 
with the highest deviation -0.5% in 2012 in 
the North Central Coasts. Although prior to 
the implementation of the EPT policymakers 
committed to taking special care to target so-
cial welfare measures or compensation to vul-
nerable populations in poorer regions, the-
re is no concrete data available in the public 











Figure 2 1: Distribution of income in Vietnam by income quintile
Source: World Bank 2018b
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Modelling also indicated a small drop in 
household consumption of just under -0.6% 
on average in comparison to BAU as a result 
of the EPT in 2012 and 2013 – presumably due 
to higher fossil fuel prices, which reduced real 
household incomes (Huong, 2014). 
On the other hand, income distribution as 
measured by the Gini coefficient14 improved 
very slightly in comparison to BAU in 2012 
and 2013 in Vietnam – from 42.10 rather than 
42.11 in 2012, and by the same margin in 2013 
– presumably because the real incomes of 
poorer households deteriorated to a lesser ex-
tent than the real incomes of wealthier house-
holds. This is probably because fossil fuels, 
especially petroleum, are a smaller item in the 
14 The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of distribution used as a gauge of 
economic inequality, measuring income distribution (or less commonly, wealth 
distribution) among a population  A Gini coefficient of 0% expresses perfect 
equality in a society, while a value of 100% expresses perfect inequality  Thus, 
the lower the Gini coefficient, the more equal a society  
consumption basket of poorer households 
than in richer households (Huong, 2014). 
This is in line with the findings of Morris and 
Sterner (2013) that taxes on transport fuels in 
developing countries can be regarded as “lux-
ury taxes” which tend to have progressive im-
pacts on household income (for details of this 
discussion, see Chapter I).
On the whole, the social impacts of the EPT 
are likely to have been relatively insignificant. 
This is reiterated by anecdotal evidence col-
lected from interviews in March 2016 with 
policy experts from the Central Institute of 
Economic Management (CIEM), a govern-
mental policy think tank linked to the Minis-
try of Planning and Investment. Experts from 
CIEM suggested that the negative social im-
pacts of the EPT had been minimal, due to 
falling oil prices, the low tax rates applied, and 
parallel tax reductions since the introduction 













Vietnam 12.6 11.1 10.9 0.2 9.8 9.7 0.1
By urban/rural
Urban 5.1 4.3 4.2 0.15 3.7 3.7 0.04
Rural 15.9 14.1 13.9 0.17 12.7 12.6 0.13
By region
Red River Delta 7.1 6.0 6.0 0.0 4.9 4.9 0.0
North Mountain Region 26.7 23.8 23.7 0.1 21.9 21.8 0.1
North Central Coasts 24.5 21.3 20.7 0.5 18.3 18.1 0.3
South Central Costs 10.9 9.5 9.4 0.1 8.1 7.9 0.2
Central Highlands 20.3 17.8 17.5 0.3 20.3 16.0 0.2
South-East Region 1.7 1.3 1.3 0.0 1.7 1.1 0.0
Mekong River Delta 11.6 10.1 9.8 0.3 11.6 9.1 0.1
Source: Huong 2014
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of the tax in 2012. This may change in the fu-
ture if the tax rates applied are increased – 
as was proposed in 2018. In this case, policy-
makers must implement social compensation 
measures in parallel to address possible nega-
tive social impacts on low-income quintiles.
2.1.4 Economic and fiscal impacts
Modelling prior to the implementation of 
the EPT suggested there would be an increase 
in production prices as a result of energy price 
increases, which could in turn lead to reduced 
competitiveness of exports and so negatively 
impact GDP growth (Willenboeckel 2011). 
This finding was corroborated by ex post 
modelling conducted in 2014, which indicat-
ed a decline of 0.2% in GDP growth in com-
parison to a BAU scenario in both 2012 and 
2013 (Huong 2014). This impact is quite large 
relative to the magnitude of the low tax rates 
applied and is attributable to fossil fuels be-
ing an important sector in the economy, and 
an important input for most sectors of the 
economy. On the other hand, these reductions 
should be seen in the context of high GDP 
growth rates in the country of 5.2% in 2012, 
5.4% in 2013 and 6% in 2014 (World Bank 
2018e).
Employment also fell by a similar mag-
nitude in comparison to the BAU scenario, 
while there was a 0.7% drop in investment in 
both 2012 and 2013, presumably attributable 
to higher production costs as a result of high-
er energy prices, resulting in lower rates of re-
turn on investment (Huong, 2014). 
These impacts on GDP growth and invest-
ment have been compensated for to some ex-
tent by the substantial contribution of the 
EPT to domestic revenue mobilisation in Vi-
etnam. Indeed, as a result of the introduction 
of the EPT, government revenues increased 
by 1.6% in 2012 and 1.2% in 2013 (Huong, 
2014). Revenues from the EPT accounted for 
more than 5% of total tax revenues in 2016, as 
shown in Table 2.2. 
These revenues have flowed into the gen-
eral budget and have not been earmarked for 
social compensation or to fund environmen-
tal improvement. It is not desirable from a 
fiscal governance perspective to earmark en-
vironmental tax revenues for environmental 
purposes, as earmarking can result in a mis-
match between revenues raised and the cost 
of achieving particular environmental policy 
goals. However, using a proportion of reve-
nues from environmental taxation to achieve 
environmental goals can reduce the overall 
cost of green economy transition and gener-
ate co-benefits for low income quintiles most 
adversely affected by environmental degrada-
tion and pollution (see Chapter I).
2.1.5 Conclusions
The EPT in Vietnam is often held up as a 
best practice example of environmental tax-
ation in the context of non-OECD countries, 
because the environmental tax law is quite 
comprehensive and covers a wide range of en-
vironmental pollutants, and the design of the 
tax facilitates easy adjustment. 
Modelling indicates that the EPT may have 
had a small negative impact on GDP growth 
and employment in comparison to BAU. 
However, given that overall GDP growth in-
creased on average by 5.5% annually between 
2012-14 and employment increased by 1% in 
the same period, these minor impacts were 
compensated for by positive developments in 
the economy as a whole. 
The EPT appears to have had a positive im-
pact on social equity, with a large proportion of 
EPT revenues being raised through transport 
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taxes, which tend to be progressive. Equali-
ty of income improved in the time since the 
raft of environmental taxes was implement-
ed. Nonetheless, for households living on or 
below the poverty line, even a small decrease 
in household income can impact quality of 
life and ability to pay for essential goods and 
services. While there is no data available to 
indicate the extent of such impacts, higher 
tax rates in future will require policymakers 
to pay more attention to equity impacts and 
to ensure that targeted social compensation 
measures are in place. 
2.2 THE PLASTICS TAX IN MOROCCO
2.2.1 The political context
In the past, no formal separation systems 
for household waste existed in Morocco. In 
the year 2000, the World Bank estimated that 
environmental and health costs associat-
ed with substandard municipal solid waste 
practices amounted to roughly 0.5% of GDP 
(World Bank 2016b). At this time, few mate-
rials were recycled, resulting in large volumes 
of waste to landfill and as a consequence, high 
levels of air, soil and water pollution. None-
theless, the waste sector was economical-
ly significant during this period, generating 
over USD 17 million annually and employ-
ing roughly 10,000 economically vulnerable 
waste pickers, up to 10% of them children, in 
the informal recycling sector in unsanitary 
and dangerous conditions.
In response, in 2008 the Moroccan govern-
ment developed a 15-year, 3-phase package 
of measures known as the National Waste 
Management Programme (Programme Na-
tional des Déchets Ménagers, PNDM). This 
programme included a number of ambitious 
objectives for the year 2020: collect 90% of 
all household waste; set up sanitary landfill 
sites for all urban centres and to rehabilitate 
or close all existing landfill sites; recycle 20% 
of all waste; professionalise the waste sector; 
and to raise awareness of all economic actors 
about the waste problem (GoM 2018b).
The package of measures included in its 
second phase a new environmental tax on 
plastics, which came into force in January 
2014. The objective of the tax, and other meas-
ures, was ambitious – namely, to incentivise 
an increase in the rate of material collected 
and recycled from 5% in 2016 to 20% by 2020. 
Initially, a plastics tax of 1.5% was imposed on 
primary materials and products for the do-
mestic plastics industry and on sales of plas-
tics and ex-factory plastics, as well as on the 
total value of plastics imports. Subsequently, 
the list of goods to which the tax applied was 
broadened, while the tax rate was reduced to 
1%.
Tax revenues are directed to the Nation-
al Environment Fund (Fond National pour 
l’Environnement – FNE) and are used to fi-
nance activities to promote the recycling and 
recovery of plastic waste, which represents a 
significant proportion of household and in-
dustrial waste in the country, and to create a 
formalised waste separation sector. A strate-
gic committee for recycling value chains with 
the participation of key actors – local govern-
ments, plastics tax payers, the recycling indus-
try and civil society organizations – was set up 
to oversee fund distribution. Allocation rules 
specify that a minimum of 20% of total tax 
revenues are to be allocated to informal waste 
collectors, with particular attention paid to 
gender issues in fund distribution (Ghariani 
2015). All applications for funding from the 
FNE must integrate the environmental and 
social dimension in their proposals and have 
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conducted a thorough policy impact assess-
ment to that end (GoM 2018b).
In the sections below, the impact of expend-
iture from the FNE is examined in parallel to 
the impacts of the plastics tax. Particularly in 
the case of social impacts, revenue expendi-
ture is an integral part of the tax itself, as all tax 
revenues are earmarked for the FNE, and ex-
penditure has played a crucial role in reducing 
the economic vulnerability of waste pickers. 
2.2.2 Environmental effectiveness
The tax has had a positive environmental 
impact by creating an incentive for manufac-
turers to use recycled plastics, rather than new 
raw materials, as inputs into their manufac-
turing processes. Although no data is available 
in the public domain on the extent of the shift, 
the Government of Morocco reports that the 
tax has boosted resource efficiency and has 
had a positive impact on resource consump-
tion within the country (GoM 2018a). The 
private sector responded quickly to the plas-
tics tax and was keen to set up new recycling 
facilities, which were financed using revenues 
from the plastics tax. In this way, the plastics 
tax has boosted investment in new sectors 
and fostered economic development.
Although the tax levied on individual prod-
ucts is rather low, manufacturers can make 
significant savings by using recycled plastics 
as inputs to manufacturing, as they cost sig-
nificantly less. This acts as a strong incentive 
for manufacturers to shift to using recycled 
plastics as an input to the production process, 
as shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2 2: Production costs for Moroccan firms with / without recycled plastics as raw materials
After access to recycled plastic raw material
Production cost structure
Logistics
Break even Point “Best in Class”
Access to recycled plastics can boost competitive-















Break even Point “Best in Class”
The cost structure demonstrates the importance 
of raw materials, at between 60-80% of the total 
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The impact of the tax yield that was spent 
on solid waste management has been sub-
stantial. Revenues have been used to increase 
the number and size of sanitary landfills in the 
country. There were 22 sanitary landfills oper-
ating in Morocco at the end of 2016, which re-
ceived about 53% of all municipal solid waste 
collected in the country, up from 32% in 2012. 
Once all five landfill sites currently under con-
struction are completed, about 80% of all mu-
nicipal solid waste will be collected in sanitary 
landfill sites (2016b). The new system reduces 
pollution at landfill sites, pressure on natural 
resources and volumes of waste to landfill, 
while improving water and air quality (due to 
reduced methane emissions) and resource ef-
ficiency. The government is on course to fulfil 
its target of closing or rehabilitating all infor-
mal and unsanitary open dumps by 2020, and 
the vast majority of landfill sites are now oper-
ating to much higher environmental and so-
cial protection standards (World Bank 2016b).
Some landfill sites are installing facilities 
to tap biogas from organic waste. In 2016, the 
Fez landfill site had already converted biogas 
into more than 1MW of electricity and was 
providing electricity for 30% of street lighting 
for the city (World Bank 2016b). The site at 
Oum Azza is planning to sell biogas to a local 
cement factory and to use biogas to produce 
electricity to sell to the national grid. The site 
is the first project in Morocco to sell Certified 
Emission Reductions through the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism and will in its lifetime 
generate around 0.5 million tonnes of CO2 
emission reductions (World Bank 2016c). The 
successful experience at the Oum Azza site 
is serving as a model for the eighteen recy-
cling projects being funded by plastics tax rev-
enues distributed by the FNE. 
2.2.3 Social impacts
For Morocco, data is available on the World 
Bank’s Poverty And Equity Data Portal. It 
shows the distribution of income or con-
sumption by quintile in 2006, as shown in 
Figure 3 (World Bank 2018b). In that year, 17% 
of the population were living under the low-
er-middle-income poverty line of USD 3.20 a 
day and the Gini coefficient for the country 
was 40.7 (World Bank 2018b). More up-to-










Figure 2 3: Distribution of income in Morocco by income quintile
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date figures are not available on the World 
Bank database, but a 2018 report indicates 
that inequality appears to have been relative-
ly stable in Morocco since the 1990s, and es-
timates an average Gini coefficient of 41.2 in 
2010-2015 (AUC/OECD 2018). Regional in-
equality is also an issue in the country, with 
higher poverty rates in poorer and remote ar-
eas relative to cities and coastal areas. In view 
of this, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
poorest income quintiles in Morocco were 
relatively vulnerable to price changes when 
the plastics tax was introduced. 
In spite of this potential vulnerability to price 
changes, given the low value of many plastics, 
including PET used in plastic bottles and do-
mestically produced goods, it is unlikely that 
the tax had more than a minimal impact on 
household welfare. The tax resulted in a price 
increase on an imported 1.5 litre PET plastic 
bottle of 0.08 Euro cents per bottle, and for do-
mestic bottles, 0.04 Euro cents – a barely per-
ceptible price change, even for households on 
extremely low incomes (GoM 2013). 
It is possible that any impacts that may 
have been felt had a greater impact on wom-
en, as women tend to be responsible for 
spending on basic household requirements, 
such as water, foodstuffs and electricity (see 
Chapter I). Households in poorer and more 
remote regions, with on average lower in-
comes, may also have been affected by these 
minor price increases. However, there are no 
data available to corroborate this proposition 
and it seems reasonable to accept the Moroc-
can government’s suggestion that the price 
changes were barely perceptible, even for 
households in poverty.
By January 2016, i.e. after the first two years 
of the tax, a total of USD 44 million had been 
allocated to the FNE. One the central aims 
of expenditure is to integrate informal waste 
pickers within the formal waste sector. At 
least 20% of total tax revenues are directly 
allocated to support recycling activities tar-
geting waste pickers. These high levels of ex-
penditure have generated a number of posi-
tive social benefits. By 2016, 18 recycling pro-
jects had been approved and awarded funding 
through the FNE, which are expected to gen-
erate around 1,050 waste picker jobs in the 
formal sector (World Bank 2016b). 
FNE funds are used to encourage the for-
mation of waste picker cooperatives, thus cre-
ating new economic opportunities for waste 
pickers at regularly inspected and sanitary 
landfill sites. Formalising the system enables 
informal waste pickers to become the owners 
and employees of waste sorting facilities. It 
has thus improved working and sanitary con-
ditions and provided a more stable source of 
income, including social insurance provision, 
and easier access to banking services. 
Although concrete data does not appear 
to be available, substantial environmental 
improvements in and close to landfill sites, 
and the resulting improvement of municipal 
waste collection rates of 80% – double those 
of 2007 – can reasonably be expected to ben-
efit almost all income groups. It is also rea-
sonable to assume that there have been pos-
itive effects on the health of waste pickers, 
populations living close to landfill sites, and 
urban populations in general – particularly 
those previously unserved by waste collec-
tion, or suffering from low waste collection 
rates. This is corroborated by the World Bank, 
which has estimated that the damage costs as-
sociated with inappropriate municipal waste 
management halved between 2000 and 2014, 
from EUR 7 per capita to EUR 3.5 per capita 
(World Bank 2016b).
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2.2.4 Economic and fiscal impacts
The plastics tax has had positive fiscal and 
economic impacts. Because the tax was im-
posed on plastic materials used in domestic 
production at the point of manufacture, but 
on the entire value chain of imported plastics 
products, the tax has had a greater impact on 
the price of imported products in comparison 
to domestic products. The government also 
consulted a range of stakeholders in the in-
dustry to ensure that any negative impacts on 
competitiveness could be quickly mitigated. 
As a result, the competitiveness of domestic 
industries in Morocco was not adversely af-
fected – indeed, as shown in Figure 2.2, com-
panies have improved their competitiveness 
as a result. 
Revenues have been considerably higher 
than predicted, with revenues of about EUR 
40 million in 2014-2015. In 2018, the govern-
ment estimated that plastics tax revenues 
amount to roughly EUR 14 million annual-
ly (GoM 2018a). These revenues have been 
used to create new MSMEs in the waste sec-
tor by subsidising capital investments in sort-
ing schemes and bringing together informal 
waste-pickers into formalised cooperatives 
to recycle waste. Increased recycling rates will 
reduce plastics imports, thereby also generat-
ing foreign currency savings. 
Furthermore, use of recycled plastic waste 
as an input to manufacturing will enhance 
resource efficiency and reduce raw materi-
al costs for domestic industries. As shown in 
Figure 2.2, these savings can be substantial 
and thus have measurable positive impacts 
on competitiveness. These efficiency gains far 
outweigh any cost increases resulting from 
the tax.
Finally, there is also evidence that such ap-
proaches are being taken up in other value 
chains, such as batteries, used tyres, and waste 
oils, which may further boost competitive-
ness across the economy in the future (World 
Bank 2016b).
2.2.5 Conclusions 
There is no evidence that the plastics tax 
in Morocco had a direct negative impact on 
poorer households. Because the tax was in-
troduced as part of a package of measures to 
bring about improvements in the waste sec-
tor, which included measures to improve so-
cial inclusion and enhance social equity, the 
overall impact of the tax and expenditure of 
plastics tax revenue has been positive, both 
environmentally and socially. 
Recent estimates indicate that as much as 
60% of all employment is in the informal sec-
tor in Morocco: an informal sector that ac-
counts for between 11-33% of GDP (AUC/
OECD 2018). Hence, measures to integrate 
workers and micro, small and medium sized 
enterprises (MSMEs) from the informal sec-
tor within the formal economy and enhance 
access to social welfare are extremely im-
portant and may serve as a model for further 
measures in the future.
2.3 CARBON TAXATION IN MEXICO
2.3.1 The political context
The carbon tax was introduced as part of a 
range of measures to reduce GHG emissions 
in Mexico. The 2012 General Law on Climate 
Change was passed to make voluntary com-
mitments binding which were made by Mexi-
co in 2010 during the UNFCCC negotiations 
in Cancun. The law stipulates that Mexico 
should cut GHG emissions by 30% by 2020 
and 50% by 2050, compared to 2000 levels. The 
law highlights the high level of political will 
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in the country to reduce GHG emissions sub-
stantially, and has led to the introduction of 
additional measures to reduce emissions, in-
cluding the creation of a climate change fund, 
the implementation of a 2014-2018 climate 
change programme, and constitutional ener-
gy sector reform. Between 2018-2021, Mexico 
will pilot voluntary emissions trading with 
over 100 companies, with a view to introduc-
ing a mandatory scheme in the future.
The country made a commitment in its Na-
tionally Determined Contribution (NDC) 
under the Paris Agreement to reduce GHG 
emissions by 22% and black carbon emis-
sions15 by 51% between 2020-2030. These 
reductions are equivalent to a reduction in 
carbon intensity, i.e. CO2 emissions per unit 
of GDP, of almost 40% between 2013-2030 
(GoMex 2015).
15 Black carbon – or soot – is a short-lived climate pollutant  It is a light absorbing 
constituent of particulate matter formed by the incomplete combustion of fossil 
fuels, biomass and biofuels  Major sources include vehicles (particularly diesel 
driven road vehicles), non-road mobile machinery (e g  forest machines), ships, 
residential heating (e g  coal or wood burning stoves) and open biomass burning 
(e g  burning of agricultural waste)  There is significant uncertainty regarding the 
warming potential of black carbon, but in the short term, it is assumed to be 
high  Source: EEA (2013) GoMex (2015) 
The introduction of the carbon tax in Mex-
ico was also internationally significant, be-
cause Mexico was one of the first industrialis-
ing countries to have introduced carbon taxes 
in the run-up to the 21st session of the con-
ference of the parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in Paris in 2015. But it was also 
important due to the Mexican economic con-
text: Before the introduction of the energy 
sector reform that phased out fossil fuel sub-
sidies, liberalised the oil industry, and imple-
mented a carbon tax, the country had a tradi-
tionally strong reliance on income from oil 
sales.
When the carbon tax was introduced, it was 
one element within a broad fiscal reform in 
Mexico, covering personal, corporate, con-
sumption and energy taxes (see Table 2.5). 
The carbon tax in Mexico covers around 40% 
of total greenhouse gas emissions in the coun-
try and entered into force on 1 January 2014. 
The first proposal for the tax was sent to the 
Mexican Congress in 2013. However, rates 
Year Measure Further information
2014 Carbon-energy tax on fossil fuels produced 
in Mexico and fossil fuel imports
See Table 2.6 for rates and exemptions.
2014-
2017
Gradual phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies Gasoline and diesel prices fully deregulated 
in 2017
2015 Ad quantum fuel taxes on transport fuels 
introduced to replace Mexico’s fuel price 
stabilization mechanisms
Effective rate: roughly EUR 140/tCO2, 
which applies to roughly one third of all 
CO2 emissions in Mexico
2018-
2021
Three-year pilot for a voluntary emissions 
trading scheme 
60 domestic and international businesses, 
mandatory participation envisaged in 
future.
Table 2 5: Carbon-energy tax reforms in Mexico 2014-2018
Source: OECD 2017b and EDF et al. (2015)
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proposed were substantially higher than 
those ultimately implemented and natural 
gas was ultimately zero-rated, which under-
mines the environmental effectiveness of the 
tax – natural gas combustion generates rough-
ly 45% of total emissions from the power sec-
tor. 
The carbon tax rate varies as shown in Ta-
ble 2.6, and is capped at 3% of the sales price of 
the fuel. The tax rate is linked to the consumer 
price index, and thus will not lose real value 
over time as a result of inflation. As a result 
of this so-called indexation to the consumer 
price index, the carbon tax rate has increased 
by roughly 10% between 2014 and 2017.
Outside road transport, the carbon tax is 
the only tax imposed on fuel use. In the road 
transport sector, the impact of the carbon tax 
is very modest, accounting for less than 1% of 
the final retail price of gasoline (Arlinghaus 
and van Dender 2017). The tax covers fossil 
fuel sales and imports by manufacturers, pro-
ducers, and importers. 
Companies liable to pay the tax may choose 
to pay 20% of their total carbon tax with 
Certified Emission Reduction certificates 
(CERs) from Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM) projects developed in Mexi-
co. This 20% payment could be made using 
CERs worth the equivalent value of the tax 
outstanding at the time of paying the tax. The 
rules for paying carbon taxation with CERs 
were published in December 2017, and lim-
ited data is available regarding the success of 
the scheme. CDM projects in Mexico have 
struggled to find sufficient demand interna-
tionally, since the European Union (EU) ruled 
that only CDM from so-called “Least Devel-
oped Countries” would be eligible within the 
EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 
2013 (MexiCO2/EDF/IETA 2018). Hence, 
Table 2 6: The carbon tax: Proposed and enacted rates per tCO2
*Currency conversion at average EUR-MXN exchange rate 2016
From: Arlinghaus and van Dender 2017, GoMex 2015, EDF et al. 2015
Product
Proposed tax rate EUR 
/ tCO2*
Enacted tax rate EUR 
/ tCO2
Revenues raised in 
2014 (million EUR)
Natural gas 2.68 0 0
Propane 3.17 1.78
47 (total for LPG)
Butane 3.88 2.31
Gasoline 3.42 2.19 223.1
Kerosene 3.55 2.25 22.8
Diesel 3.50 2.30 136.5
Fuel oil 3.43 2.22 47.0
Petroleum coke 0.29 0.24 24.9
Coal coke 0.42 0.80
0.5 (total for coal)
Mineral coal 0.46 0.72
TOTAL REVENUES 501 8 million EUR
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this scheme may go some way to creating new 
demand.
2.3.2 Environmental effectiveness
The original legislative proposal for the 
carbon tax was watered down substantially 
in the Mexican Congress and, in its current 
form, acts as a relatively minor incentive to re-
duce emissions. The Mexican Ministry of En-
vironment, SEMARNAT, has estimated that 
the carbon tax leads to the abatement of 1.8 
million tCO2 annually, or 0.38% of total CO2 
emissions in the country in 2014 (MexiCO2/
EDF/IETA 2018; World Bank 2018a). These 
low reductions are in part because the enact-
ed rates are about one third lower than those 
proposed. Nonetheless, the tax rate is impor-
tant due to its signalling effect and represents 
an important political step in the transition 
from the subsidisation of fossil fuels to their 
taxation. 
Natural gas is the main fuel for power gen-
eration in Mexico and accounted for about 
45% of carbon emissions from energy use in 
2012 (IEA 2016a). However, natural gas is cur-
rently zero-rated. This boosted political ac-
ceptance for the measure when it was pro-
posed in the National Congress, but reduces 
the potential incentive effect of the tax to shift 
investment away from coal or other high-car-
bon fossil fuels. 
Some critics of the tax in Mexico have not-
ed that there has not been sufficient invest-
ment in low-carbon alternatives to fossil 
fuels, such as renewable energy and public 
mobility, to foster CO2 emission reductions 
(Cespedes 2015). In spite of this and the low 
carbon tax rate, Mexico is expected to decou-
ple electricity generation from carbon emis-
Figure 2 4: Electricity generation and energy-related CO2 emissions, 1990-2040 under the 

























Source: © OECD/IEA 2017 World Energy Outlook, IEA Publishing. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c
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sions if existing policies and measures and 
announced policy intentions are implement-
ed, according to IEA projections, as shown in 
Figure 4 (2016b). 
However, while the current low carbon 
tax rate cannot be expected to bring about 
reduced CO2 emissions in power generation, 
the incentive effect of the tax and its impact 
on CO2 emissions and low-carbon invest-
ment may change significantly in the future 
if the tax rate is increased and the tax base 
broadened to include natural gas.
2.3.3 Social impacts
In Mexico in 2016, 34.8% of the population 
were living under the upper-middle income 
poverty line of USD 5.50 a day and the Gini 
coefficient was estimated at 43.4 (World Bank 
2018b). An analysis of income or consump-
tion by income quintile reveals an extremely 
unequal distribution, with the richest quintile 
accounting for over 50% of total income, and 
the poorest just 5.7% in 2016, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.5.
It is difficult to find robust impact analy-
sis of the carbon tax on the energy sector. In 
countries with comparatively unequal in-
come distribution, such as Mexico, transport 
fuel taxes are often in effect luxury taxes (see 
Chapter I). Hence, given the unequal income 
distribution in Mexico, it is likely that the di-
rect impact of the carbon tax on transport fu-
els would be that of a “luxury tax”, affecting 
high-income households far more than the 
poorest quintiles. This conclusion is backed 
up by at least one report, which indicates 
that carbon taxation and fuel excises on gas-
oline have had a progressive effect, with 52% 
of the tax being paid by the richest income 
quintile (Cespedes 2015). This is also in line 
with well-established findings that transport 
fuel taxes tend to be progressive in almost all 
countries. 
On the other hand, given the high inci-
dence of poverty and income inequality in the 
country, relatively minor adjustments in do-
mestic energy prices and transport fuel prices 
in Mexico have the potential to have a signif-
icant impact on household spending in the 
two lowest income quintiles. Nonetheless, 
potential negative impacts from the carbon 
tax can be expected to be relatively limited 










Figure 2 5: Distribution of income or consumption by quintile in Mexico
Source: World Bank 2018b
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makes up less than 1% of the price of transport 
fuel and second, due to the zero-rating for nat-
ural gas, which means that the carbon tax also 
has a very limited impact on domestic ener-
gy prices (Arlinghaus and van Dender 2017). 
In 2016, 59% of non-road energy use was not 
taxed at all (natural gas and kerosene), while a 
further 37% was subject to an effective carbon 
tax rate of between 0-5 EUR per tCO2 (Arling-
haus and van Dender 2017). Thus, the carbon 
tax is not likely to have had negative impacts 
on domestic household income, or to have 
had a significant negative effect on the poor-
est households.
Energy sector reforms did result in the 
“Gasolinazo” protests in January 2017. How-
ever, they appear not to have been linked to 
the carbon tax, which was set at too low a rate 
to provoke mass protest. At first, when fossil 
fuel subsidies were phased out in 2014, the 
impact on household incomes was minimal, 
as falling crude oil prices and ongoing price 
regulation ensured that fuel prices did not 
rise. Fluctuating oil prices, a falling exchange 
rate, inflation and continuing deregulation 
resulted in sudden fuel price increases of 14-
20% within the space of a month in January 
2017. In response, protests broke out. 
It is notable that the revenues from the 
carbon tax are not used to compensate poor-
er households, nor to create employment or 
invest in other measures to drive inclusive 
growth. As a result, the equity impacts of the 
carbon tax appear to have been broadly neu-
tral, while energy sector reforms had a nega-
tive impact on social equity and household in-
comes by early 2017. Had the negative equity 
impacts of energy sector reform been mitigat-
ed with additional welfare measures, the Gas-
olinazo protests might well have been pre-
vented.
2.3.4 Economic and fiscal impacts
No detailed analysis of the macro-econom-
ic impacts of the carbon tax has been under-
taken. Industry organisations opposed the 
tax, but provided little robust analysis to sup-
port their claims that competitiveness would 
be reduced (see e.g. Cespedes 2015). 
The tax has also been criticised due to con-
cerns that the low rate would not drive in-
vestment in renewable energy. However, en-
ergy sector reforms have introduced several 
market instruments which aim to create long-
term certainty for investors. They included 
the introduction of clean energy certificates, 
providing a source of income for clean en-
ergy producers, and long-term contracts for 
power producers, specifying fixed prices per 
unit of electricity for clean energy generation 
to make up for the low carbon tax rate, which 
has not incentivised investment in low-car-
bon energy (IEA 2016b). While not the most 
economically efficient approach, introducing 
additional measures alongside a carbon price 
is common in many countries to guarantee 
the price of renewable electricity, and thereby 
guarantee a return on investment, which can 
reduce the overall costs of transition and mit-
igate opposition.
The carbon tax in Mexico raises revenues 
worth about USD 1 billion per year – equiv-
alent to less than 0.1% of Mexico’s GDP, or 
about 0.3% of total tax income (Arlinghaus 
and van Dender 2017). Revenues could be 
boosted by broadening the tax base to include 
natural gas, and by increasing the tax rate. 
Revenues are not earmarked, but flow into 
the general budget and are not used to im-
prove social welfare.
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2.3.5 Conclusions
In Mexico, the carbon tax was too low to 
have a significant impact on climate mitiga-
tion, or on social equity. Nonetheless, the tax 
and associated reform in the energy sector 
represent an important shift away from sub-
sidising of fossil fuels towards their taxation. 
Reform of fossil fuel subsidies in the energy 
sector was implemented without sufficient 
attention to the need for social compensation 
to protect the poor from the direct and indi-
rect impacts of price increases. This failure 
resulted in protests in January 2017 and may 
jeopardize the sustainability of the reform in 
the future. 
2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES TO 
REDUCE SO2 EMISSIONS IN CHINA 
2.4.1 The political context
In the 2000s, reducing air pollution in gen-
eral and SO2 pollution in particular was be-
coming a matter of increasing political ur-
gency in China, as the serious impacts of at-
mospheric SO2 and other pollutants on air 
quality and the role of SO2 as a contributor to 
particulate matter (PM) became more wide-
ly known and understood. In 2008, PM con-
centrations in 111 Chinese cities contributed 
to more than 280,000 premature deaths and 
680,000 cases of chronic bronchitis, at a cost 
of more than USD 29 billion annually (Zhang 
et al. 2008). In the mid-2000s, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection estimated that the 
economic cost of acid rain resulting from SO2 
emissions amounted to USD 13 billion annu-
ally (quoted in Schreifels et al. 2012). 
The necessity to respond to the severe im-
pacts of air pollution was reflected in China’s 
10th five-year plan from 2001-2005, in which 
the central government set national targets to 
reduce SO2 emissions to 10% below average 
emissions in 2000. Part of these efforts includ-
ed the reform of the pollution levy on SO2. 
There had been pollution levies in place in 
China since the 1970s and in the 1987 Law on 
the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric 
Pollution, local governments became respon-
sible for air pollution control within their ju-
risdiction, including the enforcement and 
collection of pollution levies. However, when 
these were introduced, they were only paya-
ble on “excessive discharge” of pollution, were 
poorly administered and had thus proven to 
be ineffective instruments for pollution con-
trol. In view of the ambitious targets of the 
10th five-year plan, in 2003, pollution levies 
were reformed and subsequently applied to 
all pollution discharge. However, even under 
this system, the levy on SO2 remained ineffec-
tive, as the tax rate of CNY 0.63 / kg SO2 was 
lower than the average abatement cost, mak-
ing it cheaper for enterprises to pay the fee 
than take action to abate SO2 emissions (Jin 
et al. 2016). 
A further step was taken to drive SO2 emis-
sions reductions in 2003: Preferential grid 
prices for desulphurised electricity worth 
RMB 0.015 per kWh – roughly 0.2 Euro cents 
– were introduced to help fund technologi-
cal improvements and incentivise the instal-
lation of flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) 
technology. However, neither the pollution 
levy nor the differentiated grid price for des-
ulphurised electricity was sufficient to drive 
emissions reductions. Efforts to tackle air pol-
lution were unsuccessful and in the 5-year pe-
riod from 2000-2005, SO2 emissions increased 
by about 28%. 
Higher levels of political commitment at 
central government during the 11th five-
year plan to address this deficit resulted in in-
creased pressure on local government to take 
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action and enforce environmental taxes and 
regulations and so bring about SO2 emissions 
reductions (Jin et al. 2016). The 11th five-year 
plan – from 2006-2010 – also proposed a 10% 
reduction, this time on 2005 levels, but intro-
duced a number of additional measures to 
bring about emissions reductions, including 
a higher pollution levy, penalties for low op-
erating rates for FGD technology, improved 
environmental policy governance, and better 
monitoring and enforcement (Schreifels et al. 
2012). 
 In 2007, a number of changes to environ-
mental taxes on SO2 emissions were intro-
duced. First, the preferential grid prices in-
troduced in 2003 were complemented by the 
introduction of penalties of RMB 0.015/kWh 
for plants operating FGD technology only 80-
90% of the time, and a higher penalty of RMB 
0.75/kWh for plants operating FGDs less 
than 80% of the time (Schreifels et al. 2012). 
This modification was enabled by the intro-
duction of continuous emissions monitoring 
systems, which meant that the actual perfor-
mance of power plants could be monitored, 
whereas before the green premium for desul-
phurised electricity had been paid if an FGD 
was installed. 
Second, the pollution levy on SO2 emis-
sions was doubled to RMB 1.26 / kg SO2, 
equivalent to EUR 0.16 / kg SO2. Prior to this 
rate increase in 2007, the levy was lower than 
the average cost of abating SO2 emissions 
(RMB 1.2 / kg) – making it cheaper to pay the 
levy than take steps to reduce SO2 pollution. 
Prior to 2007, the 80% of revenues from the 
pollution levy recycled to firms, theoretically 
to abate SO2 emissions, were often used for 
other purposes. 
These two environmental taxes made it 
economical for power stations to install des-
ulphurising technologies (it was cheaper to 
install the technology than pay the levy) and 
thus created an incentive for power producers 
reduce SO2 emissions. 
In 2007, steps were also taken to improve 
the enforcement and monitoring of emis-
sions – including shifting responsibility from 
local Environmental Protection Bureaus to 
the national level, at the Ministry of Finance; 
installing better infrastructure for emissions 
measurement; and making transfer of re-
al-time data monitoring emissions to govern-
ment mandatory (Schreifels et al. 2012). The 
agencies responsible for monitoring emis-
sions and improved monitoring systems were 
also restructured. Pressure on provincial gov-
ernments to enforce emissions reductions 
were increased, and Environmental Impact 
Assessments submitted by provinces or firms 
were rejected if interim SO2 reduction targets 
had not been met. Lower electricity prices 
paid to small installations created incentives 
for them to close. Between them, these meas-
ures resulted in significant SO2 emissions re-
ductions. 
2.4.2 Environmental effectiveness
The SO2 emissions reduction target of 
the 11th five-year plan – 10% on 2005 levels 
by 2010 – was overreached as a result of the 
measures implemented. In 2010, SO2 emis-
sions had fallen by 14.3% overall and by 23% 
in the power sector. Economy-wide emissions 
fell by 2.8% annually, while SO2 intensity and 
emissions rates of coal-fired power plants fell 
by 10%. Iron and steel production and metal 
smelting were the only sectors that saw SO2 
emissions increases in 2005-2010. By 2010, 
after investments worth more than USD 2 bil-
lion, 86% of coal power stations had installed 
FGD technology, on average in use just un-
der 80% of the time, whereas in 2005 only 14% 
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of coal power plants had FGDs. Overall, sav-
ings due to reduced environmental damage 
from SO2 emissions are estimated to be worth 
about USD 5 billion annually (all data quoted 
in Schreifels et al. 2012).
This success was in part attributable to the 
fact that abatement capacity for SO2 emis-
sions in the power sector was very large, prior 
to the reforms. FGD technology could easily 
be installed in larger power plants and their 
performance improved over time with the co-
operation of just five large state-owned enter-
prises (Jin et al. 2016).
At the same time, however, air pollution 
problems have remained serious in the coun-
try. The environmental measures examined 
here were successful in addressing SO2 emis-
sions in the power sector – which compen-
sated for SO2 emissions increasing in the iron 
and steel and metal smelting sectors. From 
2006-2010, at the same time as SO2 emissions 
were reduced, coal consumption increased by 
40%. While the objective of the measures tar-
geting SO2 in the power sector was achieved, 
other environmental and climate problems 
were not addressed. 
Since 2010, the Chinese government has 
become increasingly committed to improving 
environmental quality. In 2013, in response to 
severe air pollution in many cities, the govern-
ment published a National Action Plan on Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control. In its 2015 
NDC, China pledged that CO2 emissions will 
peak by 2030, while making its best efforts to 
peak earlier, and to lower CO2 emissions by 
unit of GDP by 60-65% from 2005 levels by 
2030 (GoC 2015). In 2017, China was the sin-
gle largest investor in renewable energy and 
accounted for 45% of global spending (Frank-
furt School, UNEP, BNEF 2018). Moreover, 
many of the measures being implemented in 
the country to achieve these objectives are 
market-based instruments, including taxes on 
vehicles, transport fuels, resource extraction, 
energy and pollutants. Since 2014-2015, Chi-
na has piloted emissions trading systems in 
7 provinces and will create the world’s larg-
est carbon market when a national system is 
launched, following a pilot phase in the power 
sector (Carbon Brief 2018). The country also 
launched an Environmental Protection Tax in 
January 2018 on noise, air and water pollution 
and solid waste, targeting public institutions 
and business, expected to raise USD 7.7 bil-
lion annually (GoC 2018). 
2.4.3 Social impacts 
In China, the power system is highly reg-
ulated, meaning that electricity prices at the 
generation, transmission, dispatch and end-
use retail are set and controlled by central 
government. Electricity prices are regarded 
as a way of achieving policy goals, rather than 
as a mechanism to link demand and supply 
(Zhang and Qin 2015). Hence, the cost of the 
penalties paid by power plant operators due 
to the production of sulphurised electricity, 
and the cost of pollution levy payments, both 
of which resulted in an increase in the pro-
duction cost of electricity, were not reflected 
in the end-use pricing regime and thus not 
passed through to electricity consumers in 
China (Zhang and Qin 2015). For this reason, 
there were no direct social equity impacts re-
sulting from the pollution levy and the SO2 
premium / penalty system between 2005 and 
2010.
However, subsidy benefits in the electric-
ity sector were captured far more by wealth-
ier households than by poorer households, 
with the wealthiest 10% consuming 25% of to-
tal electricity on average in the 2000s (Zhang 
and Qin 2015). In 2012, China had a Gini co-
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efficient of 40.2, a reflection of the inequita-
ble income distribution shown in Figure 2.6. 
Such figures highlight the potential for policy 
amendments to enhance social equity in the 
country by introducing fairer electricity pric-
es and targeting subsidies or social protection 
measures to those in need. A tiered electricity 
pricing system piloted in almost all regions 
in 2012, may, in time, address this issue, if im-
plemented alongside effective compensation 
and / or welfare mechanisms for the poorest 
households.
2.4.4 Economic and fiscal impacts
Given the strict regulation of electricity 
prices at government level, there were no di-
rect impacts on GDP growth as a result of 
the premium/penalty system or the pollu-
tion levy on SO2 in the electricity sector. Be-
tween 2006 and 2010, electricity generation 
increased by 80% and GDP growth by 115% 
(Schreifels et al. 2012). At the same time, how-
ever, the pricing premium and pollution levy 
failed to take advantage of the heterogeneity 
of abatement costs between different sectors 
and different regions in China and thus, op-
portunities to cut SO2 at the lowest possible 
cost were missed (Jin et al. 2016). 
In terms of fiscal impact, the Ministry of Fi-
nance normally submits proposals to the Na-
tional People’s Congress on how to spend rev-
enue from the pollution levy on environmen-
tal protection. The price premium paid for 
desulphurised electricity is in effect a green 
subsidy, which may have been compensated 
for by the payment of penalties for SO2 emis-
sions attributable to the limited functioning 
of FGD devices following reforms in 2007.
2.4.5 Conclusions
The political commitment expressed by the 
government in relation to the reduction of 
SO2 emissions, along with the creation of a 
binding target for emissions reductions, en-
sured that provincial governments and the 
managers of state-owned power plants took 
the targets of the 11th five-year plan seriously. 
Targeting SO2 specifically was also a factor in 
the success of the environmental taxes exam-
ined here.
The package of measures implemented ad-
dressed the various barriers to SO2 emissions 
reductions with concrete policy actions, such 
2008
2012





Figure 2 6: Distribution of income by quintile in China 
Third Quintile
Source: World Bank 2018b
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as improved governance, enforcement and 
monitoring, a focus on actual performance 
rather than the installation of FGD technol-
ogy, and the creation of meaningful price in-
centives in favour of reduced SO2 emissions. 
Getting the price right for SO2 emissions was 
crucial: The increase in the pollution levy rate 
meant that it was cheaper for power plants to 
install FGD technology than not. 
In economies where prices are regulated, 
an upstream tax on a pollutant associated 
with energy production – such as SO2 or CO2 
emissions – will not necessarily have any im-
pact on downstream end users. In such coun-
tries, the impact on poorer households of an 
environmental tax is less of a concern than in 
economies where energy prices are totally un-
regulated and all price changes can be passed 
through to domestic consumers.
2.5 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES IN 
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
There is insufficient literature and data 
available on the impacts of environmental 
taxation in low-income countries (LICs) to 
analyse one specific environmental tax in-
strument as a specific case for this report. 
Therefore, this section examines a number of 
cases for which limited data exists to extrapo-
late some general conclusions on the applica-
tion of environmental taxation in LICs.
The sections below examine the impacts 
of both environmental taxes – which have an 
environmental objective and also an environ-
mental effect – and environmentally related 
taxes, levied on a tax base that is a physical 
unit (or a proxy of it) that has a proven specif-
ic negative impact on the environment (see 
Chapter I). This approach has been taken for 
two reasons. First, because LICs tend to im-
plement environmentally related taxes, rath-
er than taxes with an explicit environmental 
objective – although this does not mean that 
these instruments have not had an environ-
mental impact. Second, there is a lack of re-
search and robust data available on both types 
of instruments in LICs and their impacts on 
the environment, social equity and the econo-
my. Thus, this approach broadens the number 
of cases available for the analysis. 
2.5.1 Low tax to GDP ratios 
and institution building
On average, tax revenues and social insur-
ance contributions amounted to 13.4% of 
GDP in 27 LICs in 2016 (ICTD 2018). This 
average masks some relatively high outliers, 
with tax-to-GDP ratios of over 20% – Mozam-
bique, Senegal, Tajikistan and Zimbabwe – 
and a total of six countries with tax-to-GDP 
ratios of less than 10%, including 5.67% in 
Chad and 1.29% in Somalia, as well as seven 
countries with no available data on tax-to-
GDP ratios. 
This is in stark contrast to high-income 
countries (HICs), which have an average tax-
to-GDP ratio of 28.0%, including social insur-
ance contributions. The highest tax-to-GDP 
ratios amongst HICs are in France (45,3%), 
Belgium (44.2%) and Sweden (44.1%). This av-
erage again masks outliers in the Middle East: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Ara-
bia all have tax-to-GDP-ratios of less than 5% 
(ICTD 2018). 
There are several underlying reasons for 
these lower tax-to-GDP ratios in LICs. Weak 
institutions and poor governance limit the ca-
pacity of governments in LICs to implement 
taxation, while perceived corruption and lack 
of transparency may undermine willingness 
to pay tax. The political will to build capaci-
ty and improve fiscal governance are often 
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lacking. In addition, dependence on overseas 
development aid may reduce incentives to 
make unpopular policy choices, such as the 
implementation of tax increases (Besley and 
Persson 2014). A large shadow economy of-
ten prevents the collection of direct personal 
income taxes (PITs) in LICs – indeed, in some 
countries PITs are largely absent, due to lack 
of administrative capacity. On average, less 
than 5% of the population in so-called devel-
oping countries pays PIT, generating 1-2% of 
GDP (Carnahan 2015).
Due to low revenue collection from PITs, 
corporate income taxes (CITs) tend to be cor-
respondingly of greater importance in de-
veloping countries and LICs, with CIT reve-
nues typically amounting to between 1.5-3% 
of GDP in developing countries (Carnahan 
2015). At the same time, multinational cor-
porations often evade taxes by shifting their 
profits to countries with low taxation regimes 
(so-called tax havens), thus eroding the tax 
base in other jurisdictions where they do busi-
ness (base erosion profit shifting, BEPS). LICs 
are often least able to respond to such prob-
lems, as they have weak revenue administra-
tions and poor processes of fiscal governance, 
but at the same time, are amongst those coun-
tries which can least afford to have their cor-
porate tax base eroded. 
Lower tax-to-GDP ratios in LICs severely 
restrict the capacity of governments to tack-
le these shortfalls in fiscal governance and to 
invest in measures for poverty reduction, in-
frastructure, healthcare, education, or green 
economy transition. Thus, poor fiscal govern-
ance has significant implications for policy 
making. 
However, low tax-to-GDP ratios also in-
dicate that there may be potential in LICs 
for environmental taxes to boost fiscal space 
and improve fiscal governance. Revenues 
from environmental taxes can facilitate high-
er levels of spending for the achievement of 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – an 
important commitment made by all signato-
ries to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (see 
Chapter I). In addition, a stronger focus on 
taxation and domestic revenue mobilisation 
could contribute to state building processes 
and generate a ‘governance dividend’ in LICs, 
by fostering the citizen-state relationship and 
creating a shared interest in it (see e.g. Carna-
han 2015). The degree to which environmen-
tal taxes has met these potentials is discussed 
below.
2.5.2 Environmentally-related 
taxes in Low Income Countries 
There is little data available on environ-
mental taxation in LICs. Daniel Slunge and 
Thomas Sterner published research in 2010, 
which provides an overview of the imple-
mentation of Environmental Fiscal Reform 
in East and Southern Africa, particularly in re-
lation to equity impacts (Slunge and Sterner 
2010). While LICs were not a particular focus 
of this research, many of the countries in the 
region remain LICs in 2018, and the findings 
remain relevant to LICs in the region.
Slunge and Sterner found that nearly all 
countries in East and Southern Africa levy 
environmentally related fuel taxes on petro-
leum products. These are typically higher for 
gasoline and lower for diesel, used for pub-
lic transport and in agriculture, and kerosene, 
which is often used as a cooking fuel. They 
also impose vehicle taxes and annual circula-
tion charges, often related to cylinder capacity, 
e.g. in Ethiopia and Tanzania. 
Taxes and fees on natural resource use are 
common, although the latter tend to be purely 
revenue-raising instruments, rather than tax-
A CLIMATE OF FAIRNESS: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
105
es with an environmental objective. Natural 
resource taxes and royalties levied on mineral 
extraction are frequently implemented, e.g. in 
Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Con-
go. Artisanal miners tend to be unlicensed and 
thus are not taxed. Taxes on plastics are also 
prevalent, e.g. plastic bag taxes in Tanzania 
and Uganda.
Fisheries are also subject to fiscal meas-
ures, e.g. by means of fishing vessel permits, 
sales taxes levied on fish sales, and taxes on 
fish exports. Royalties are levied on timber 
extraction, and taxes on timber volumes. User 
fees on electricity and water services are com-
mon, although these usually also include a 
lifeline tariff for low-income households or 
progressive tariffs based on the amount of 
electricity or water consumed. Finally, some 
LICs levy wastewater fees targeting pollutant 
emissions (for details of these measures, see 
Slunge and Sterner 2010).
2.5.3 Environmental tax 
revenues in LICs
As in OECD countries, the highest propor-
tion of environmentally related tax revenues 
in LICs tends to be attributable to transport 
fuel taxes. In Tanzania, for example, motor 
vehicle taxes, excise on petroleum and fuel 
levies accounted for 18.5% of total tax reve-
nue in 2009. This is far higher than is typical 
in OECD countries. However, on a per capita 
basis revenues from environmentally related 
taxes are low in comparison to OECD (GIZ 
2014b). The GIZ survey of international fuel 
Figure 2 7: Fuel prices in selected Low-Income Countries in 2014 in USD per litre
Source: GIZ 2014a
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prices reveals that 11 LICs tax gasoline and 9 
LICs tax diesel at a rate commensurate to us-
ing taxes to generate revenues and encourage 
efficiency in the transport sector. These taxes 
generate a final consumer price of more than 
USD 1.42 for gasoline and USD 1.39 for diesel, 
as shown in Figure 2.7 (GIZ 2014a). 
At the same time, some LICs have high tax-
es on vehicles. In Uganda, for example, an en-
vironmental levy on imported vehicles which 
are over 8 years old, has proved to be an im-
portant source of revenue, raising USD 8.6 
million in 2006 and 2007, and USD 13 million 
in 2008, when the rate of the tax was doubled 
(UNDP/UNEP n.d.). 
Fisheries taxation generated 4% of total tax 
revenues in Mozambique in 2003, but just 
1% in Tanzania in the same year (Slunge and 
Sterner 2010). Uganda’s Sustainable Fisher-
ies User Levy on domestic fishers generated 
USD 2.46 million in 2005, or 0.03% of GDP 
(GIZ 2014b). 
In many LICs, a large proportion of fish-
eries revenue stems from licenses, fees, fines 
and compensation funds from the Europe-
an Union or other distant water fleets, rather 
than from domestic fishers. In some coun-
tries, these revenues make up a significant 
proportion of the total, e.g. 30% in 2001 in 
Guinea Bissau (OECD 2005b). However, 
LICs face a number of challenges in negotiat-
ing access rights and monitoring distant wa-
ter fleets, from e.g. the EU or China, in their 
waters. Thus, although many African LICs de-
pend on fisheries revenues, it is by no means 
obvious that the quotas allocated and the lev-
el of financial compensation secured by these 
countries is appropriate. 
With regards to environmental taxes in 
the forestry sector, governments in both low- 
and middle-income countries face substan-
tial challenges in enforcement and monitor-
ing. For example, a Public Environmental 
Expenditure Review in Tanzania in 2004 re-
vealed that USD 58 million were lost annually 
due to under-collection of forest product roy-
alties (GTZ 2008). 
A 2005 World Bank study of Mozambique 
estimated that revenues from fisheries, for-
ests, mining and agricultural land could be 
increased from 5% in 2003 to 19% of total tax 
revenues by 2015, if appropriate environ-
mental taxes were introduced (World Bank 
2005b). Environmental tax revenues have not 
increased in the meantime, however, and the 
2005-2010 Public Environmental Expendi-
ture Review highlights ongoing weakness-
es in revenue collection, lack of targeted tax 
instruments, and poor allocation to environ-
mental policy priorities (MCEA 2012).
In general, LICs struggle to raise tax reve-
nues on natural resource extraction. This is 
in part due to poor governance and lack of fis-
cal capacity on the part of LIC governments 
and the negative impacts of tax competition, 
tax avoidance, trade mispricing and VAT eva-
sion on the part of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). Recent estimates suggest that the 
African continent loses at least USD 50 bil-
lion annually in illicit financial flows (UNE-
CA n.d.). 
Environmental taxes may be part of the 
solution to these challenges, as they are com-
paratively difficult to evade (for details see 
Chapter I and Liu 2012). Possible ways for 
resource-rich LICs to boost revenues from 
natural resource taxes include increasing roy-
alties levied on mining and resource extrac-
tion to compensate for lost CIT revenues, be-
cause royalties are harder to evade than CITs 
and may be used to finance environmental re-
habilitation following mining operations. In 
such cases, royalties should be balanced with 
other sources of revenue to avoid dependen-
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cy on revenues from natural resource extrac-
tion, which renders countries vulnerable to 
global resource price volatility and has a rel-
atively poor record in enhancing prosperity 
and fostering sustainable development.
2.5.4 Environmental impacts
Impacts of transport fuel 
taxes and vehicle taxes 
Many of the instruments listed above were 
implemented with the objective of raising 
revenue, rather than bringing about environ-
mental improvement. In Tanzania, for exam-
ple, transport taxes are not imposed with the 
objective of bringing about environmental 
improvement. None of the revenues from 
these taxes are earmarked for environmental 
protection or conservation, with just 0.17% 
of the total budget spent on the environment 
in 2009-2010 (GIZ 2014b). Nonetheless, due 
to high tax rates, these instruments create a 
real incentive to improve efficiency and re-
duce fuel consumption. Similarly, the impact 
of high fuel taxes in LICs shown in Figure 2.7 
are very likely to have had impacts on efficien-
cy and fuel consumption, although little relia-
ble data is available to quantify these impacts.
The efficacy of vehicle taxes may be limited 
in LICs, due to the inability of the majority of 
potential vehicle purchasers to cover the up-
front cost of cleaner alternatives, even if such 
vehicles are taxed at a lower rate. For exam-
ple, in Uganda, a 10% environmental levy on 
the value of used vehicles more than 8 years 
old was introduced in the 2005/6 budget, and 
increased to 20% in 2008. Nevertheless, this 
did not reduce purchases of older vehicles, as 
the price of newer, less polluting vehicles re-
mained too high for many and thus, substitu-
tions were very limited (Mabasi 2009). In this 
case there was a clear trade-off between envi-
ronmental effectiveness and fiscal impact – 
the limited environmental impact of the levy 
resulted in it raising USD 8.6 million in 2006 
and 2007, and USD 13 million the following 
year (UNDP/UNEP n.d.).
Impacts of natural resources, 
fishing and forestry taxes 
In the case of fisheries, there is evidence 
that revenues from Uganda’s Sustainable 
Fisheries User Levy have been used to initiate 
a long-term shift towards sustainable fishing 
by improving management practices and cov-
ering management costs (GIZ 2014b). This 
levy is complemented by a permit system for 
fishers, which also raises revenues through 
user fees. The Sustainable Fisheries User Levy 
takes the form of a royalty of 2% charged on 
the value of all fish exports. Roughly USD 2.5 
million is collected annually, of which 20% 
flows into the general budget. The remainder 
is used to improve management practices and 
cover management costs, such as research, 
monitoring, surveillance and enforcement 
(Mabasi 2009). 
On the other hand, despite significant 
amounts of environmental tax or levy reve-
nues raised in some LICs in West Africa, it has 
been estimated that 50% of all marine fisheries 
in the region are overfished. Thus, in LICs the 
environmental impacts of environmentally 
related taxes are unclear. Overfishing is not 
attributable to a single factor, however. Over-
fishing is likely due to the unfavourable na-
ture of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements, 
which e.g. give the EU fishing rights in Afri-
can, Pacific or Caribbean waters in exchange 
for technical and financial support. In 2011, 
the EU fleet caught 400,000 tonnes of fish in 
foreign waters through such agreements, of 
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which 240,000 tonnes were supplied to West 
African countries. The 160,000 tonnes sup-
plied to the EU in the same year have been 
valued at EUR 320 million (Worrell and Men-
dez-Parra 2017). Thus, such agreements result 
in substantially reduced fisheries revenues in 
signatory countries and considerably less for-
eign exchange than if African, Caribbean or 
countries exported the fish themselves. Such 
agreements are also problematic as there is 
a risk that they export the problem of over-
fishing from the EU to elsewhere (Worrell 
and Mendez-Parra 2017). As low-income and 
indeed middle-income countries may have 
poorer enforcement and monitoring than EU 
countries, there is also a greater risk that they 
fail to prevent large-scale illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing in deep waters (Wor-
rell and Mendez-Parra 2017).
It has been estimated that ‘taking back con-
trol’ of fisheries from foreign investors and 
preventing illegal, unreported and unregulat-
ed fishing in West African waters could cre-
ate over 300,000 jobs, equivalent to a 10% in-
crease in the local workforce, and thus po-
tentially raise additional tax revenues, boost 
sustainability of fisheries, and have a positive 
impact on nutrition in the region (Worrell 
and Mendez-Parra 2017). In some LICs, part-
nership agreements earmark a certain pro-
portion of revenues for enhanced control and 
surveillance – for example, in Senegal, reve-
nues have been earmarked to support con-
servation of fish stocks (OECD 2005b). These 
can reasonably be expected to have a positive 
environmental impact.
As a general rule, taxes on natural resource 
extraction tend not to be levied for environ-
mental purposes in LICs and do not have pos-
itive environmental impacts. LICs struggle to 
raise tax revenues on natural resource extrac-
tion commensurate to the external costs of 
environmental degradation and / or human 
health impacts. 
Although there is a wide body of evidence 
that environmental taxes can enhance sus-
tainable forest management, there has been 
little research conducted to look at these im-
pacts in any detail in LICs. Environmental 
taxes in the forestry sector tend to be rather 
complicated in LICs and consist of several 
instruments – stumpage fees, felling taxes, 
charges on extraction of specific species, taxes 
by area or volume of timber, and export tax-
es by volume and species. Taxes may remain 
in place for long periods of time without ad-
justment or review, e.g. the tax rate on timber 
extraction by volume – the permis de coupe – in 
Benin, which was not adjusted for more than 
30 years between 1974 and 2005, and thus de-
valued over time as a result of inflation (GTZ 
2005). Enforcement is often weak, due to poor 
fiscal governance, lack of capacity, and corrup-
tion. 
LIC governments face additional challeng-
es when implementing environmental taxa-
tion in the forestry sector due to lack of avail-
able capital in the economy. Hence, if environ-
mental taxes are levied on forestry products 
upstream, i.e. at the start of the value chain, 
this can increase the price of forestry prod-
ucts further down the value chain and result 
in smaller businesses and private households 
turning to the informal sector. Hence, in many 
cases, the environmental effectiveness of en-
vironmental taxes in the forestry sector is un-
certain.
2.5.5 Social impacts 
Tax on transport fuels and vehicle taxes
In terms of revenue raised, the most impor-
tant environmental tax measures in LICs in 
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the region tend to be transport taxes. As dis-
cussed in Chapter I, particularly in countries 
with comparatively unequal income distri-
bution, transport fuel taxes are often in effect 
luxury taxes and thus, it is by no means ob-
vious that they will have negative equity im-
pacts. Indeed, transport fuel taxes have been 
shown to be strongly progressive in African 
and large Asian countries, as well as in Turkey, 
Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica and Brazil (Morris 
and Sterner 2013). 
In LICs, it is relatively obvious that higher 
income quintiles consume higher volumes 
of transport fuels, as only they have sufficient 
financial means to own private vehicles. Poor-
er quintiles cannot afford such luxury goods. 
Thus, any negative impacts on poorer income 
quintiles tend to be as a result of indirect ef-
fects on the price of public transport and food. 
In Ethiopia, an LIC for which an in-depth 
analysis of the impact of environmental tax-
ation of transport fuels has been conducted, 
the richest income decile spends around 2% 
of income on kerosene, while the poorest de-
cile spends just over 1% (Slunge and Stern-
er 2010). At the same time, there is evidence 
from an analysis conducted in the 2000s in 
Kenya – a low-income country – that fuel tax-
es were broadly progressive in the country, 
even taking both the cost of public transport 
and fuel tax increases into account (Slunge 
and Sterner 2010).
Similar studies elsewhere have demon-
strated that even when both direct and indi-
rect uses of fuels are taken into account, fuel 
taxes in LDCs remain progressive, although 
the progressive impact is weakened as a re-
sult. If kerosene is taxed at the same time as 
diesel and gasoline – to prevent fuel adulter-
ation – this also weakens the progressivity of 
the tax, but does not reverse it (Slunge and 
Sterner 2010).
The impacts of taxes on natural 
resources, fishing and forestry 
There is little data available on the social 
impacts of environmental taxes in these sec-
tors. Very often, taxes are not introduced at a 
sufficiently high rate to have a negative im-
pact on social equity. The general comments 
made in Chapter I on the social equity im-
pacts of these environmental taxes also ap-
ply to LICs. In any case, assessing the equity 
impacts of environmental taxes has to take 
place on an instrument- and country-specific 
basis. Such analyses have been conducted in 
the transport sector in LICs, but similar data 
is not readily available for other sectors. This 
is certainly an important area for further re-
search in the future.
2.5.6 Economic and fiscal impacts
There is very little data on the economic 
and fiscal impacts of environmental taxes spe-
cifically in LICs in the public domain. Isolat-
ing the impact of environmental taxation in 
a complex policy environment is challenging, 
even in countries with higher regulatory ca-
pacity. Thus, definitive statements on the eco-
nomic and fiscal impacts of environmental 
taxes in LDCs cannot be made. In other coun-
tries, there is evidence that environmental 
taxes have at best a positive impact on GDP 
growth in comparison to a business as usual 
scenario, and at worst, have a less negative im-
pact than other direct and indirect taxes (Viv-
id Economics 2012). The fiscal impacts and 
revenue-raising potential of environmental 
taxes are discussed in Chapter I.
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2.5.7 Conclusions for low-
income countries
While inventories of environmental taxes 
do exist, there is little robust data available on 
the environmental, social and economic im-
pacts of environmental taxes in LICs. 
An obvious concern in LICs in particular is 
the extent to which environmental effective-
ness may be compromised due to low ability 
to pay for alternative goods or services. Sound 
policy design can address this problem by pro-
viding low-cost loans or grants to enable sub-
stitutions. However, if complementary meas-
ures are not implemented, consumers may 
have no option but to pay the higher price. 
Thus, in LICs in particular it is essential that 
policymakers take social equity impacts into 
account and introduce compensation packag-
es to mitigate the possible negative impacts 
of higher prices.
There is potential for the environmental 
taxation and tax justice agendas to exploit 
synergies in LICs, if environmental taxes are 
used to mobilise additional domestic reve-
nues to invest in public services and improve 
fiscal governance. Alongside the implemen-
tation of anti-tax avoidance and anti-tax eva-
sion measures and the strengthening of tax 
administrations, introducing hard-to-evade 
environmental taxes might be a good policy 
response to raise revenues. 
This is particularly relevant to low-income 
countries because environmental taxes tend 
to be difficult to evade, as they are general-
ly levied on immobile tax bases, such as en-
ergy consumption, agricultural inputs, car-
bon emissions and waste, and on goods and 
services which tend to have prices which are 
relatively transparent (Cottrell et al. 2016; 
Fay et al. 2015; Liu 2013). In countries with 
high rates of tax evasion, carbon-energy tax-
es more than pay for themselves as a result 
of improvements in the efficiency of the tax 
system (Liu 2013). Moreover, recycling mech-
anisms for environmental tax revenues may 
reduce the gap between the tax burden in the 
formal and informal sectors and thus encour-
age MSMEs to enter the formal sector (Fay et 
al. 2015). However, this thesis merits further 
research before any conclusions can be drawn. 
Robust data and strong evidence demon-
strating the positive environmental impact of 
environmental and environmentally related 
taxes in LICs is relatively scarce. Nonetheless, 
experience in both developed and developing 
countries has shown that environmental tax-
es can deliver environmental improvement 
and halt degradation (Cottrell et al. 2016). 
Environmental degradation and its impact 
on populations in terms of both health and 
prosperity is a very significant challenge faced 
by LICs. A large proportion of the population 
are typically dependent on natural resources, 
such as forestry and fisheries, for their live-
lihoods. Hence, improving environmental 
quality and reducing degradation can have a 
positive impact on social well-being and fos-
ter sustainable pro-poor development.
Environmental and resource taxation re-
quires the allocation of property rights and 
can thus serve to clarify previously incom-
plete rights regimes. It could deliver higher 
levels of protection against environmental 
externalities and overuse of resources, while 
harvesting rents from natural resource use 
(Slunge and Sterner 2010). 
In LICs, poor collection rates due to a lack 
of monitoring and enforcement, combined 
with low tax rates, have kept environmen-
tal and natural resource taxes far below opti-
mum levels. Considerable potential exists to 
increase tax revenue by implementing such 
taxes effectively and increasing environmen-
tal tax rates. While acknowledging that LICs 
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face significant challenges in the implemen-
tation of effective taxation policies, environ-
mental tax revenues could play a role in in-
creasing domestic revenue mobilization. In-
deed, it may be possible for LIC governments 
to exploit win-win opportunities by imple-
menting environmental taxes – reducing en-
vironmental degradation while improving 
governance and increasing the tax take at the 
same time. Ways in which this can be done are 
investigated in more depth in the concluding 
chapter of the report.
 
PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS
3.1 LESSONS LEARNED 
Lack of robust data and in-depth research 
and analysis is a major challenge when under-
taking a desk study of environmental taxa-
tion in developing countries. Although infor-
mation is available in relation to the design 
of instruments that have been implement-
ed, and their tax rates, policy impact assess-
ments are not often available in the public 
domain. Understanding the environmental, 
social and economic policy impacts of envi-
ronmental taxes in developing countries ne-
cessitates further in-depth research, analysis, 
and ex post econometric modelling to bet-
ter understand which of these impacts are di-
rectly related to environmental taxation, and 
which are the result of other factors.
Given the inequality of contributions to 
pollution – the wealthiest 10% of the glob-
al population are estimated to be responsi-
ble for 40-51% of total global CO2 emissions, 
while the poorest 50% account for just 11-
15% – it is reasonable to anticipate that im-
plementing the polluter pays principle or 
the user pays principle will ultimately hit the 
wealthy harder than the poor (Chancel and 
Piketty 2015). Nonetheless, even small chang-
es in household income can have a negative 
impact on poorer households living in pover-
ty, or relatively close to the poverty line and it 
is important that governments make efforts 
to protect such households from both direct 
and indirect price increases.
In the countries covered in this report, en-
vironmental taxes did not result in price in-
creases of a magnitude that could have had a 
significant impact on social equity or house-
hold income. Many environmental taxes are 
levied upstream – at the start of the value 
chain – and as a result, may not have impacted 
consumer prices to a great extent. The plas-
tics tax in Morocco is a case in point in this 
regard, where plastics taxes are levied on plas-
tics upon import, or at the point of manufac-
ture. In countries with planned economies, 
such as China, electricity prices are regulated 
in such a way that upstream taxes do not im-
pact households. This is not the case in Viet-
nam, where energy taxes are imposed down-
stream, much later in the value chain, on the 
consumption of transport fuels. In other cas-
es, taxes were levied at too low a rate to have 
a significant impact on prices, as was the case 
for the carbon tax in Mexico.
Nonetheless, environmentally related tax-
es, most notably fuel excise duties, have been 
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levied at a higher rate in many countries, re-
quiring careful examination of possible equi-
ty impacts, or impacts on poor households, on 
the part of policymakers. For this reason, envi-
ronmental taxes at higher rates and tax rate in-
creases should also be implemented with care 
and steps taken to prevent negative social im-
pacts. In such cases, targeted compensation 
measures or improved social welfare – such as 
investment in health or education – are likely 
to be necessary. Although the plastics tax in 
Morocco did not have any direct negative eq-
uity impacts, the case of Morocco highlights 
the positive impact environmental tax reve-
nues can have when invested in socially inclu-
sive policies.
The Vietnam case exemplified how a sound 
design of environmental taxes can enable 
easy policy review and tax rate revision. This 
in turn ensured the incentive effect of envi-
ronmental taxes in the medium term, as eco-
nomic actors modified their behaviour and 
investment decisions. While tax rate increas-
es were politically comparatively easy to im-
plement in 2015, attempts in 2018 to increase 
the tax rates, and the tax rate range, were re-
jected by the National Assembly. Ultimately, 
improved communication on environmental 
taxes is necessary in most jurisdictions to en-
hance acceptance amongst policymakers and 
state institutions, as well as amongst industri-
al stakeholders and the general public.
Revenue expenditure can play a very im-
portant role in ensuring that environmental 
taxes are environmentally, socially and eco-
nomically effective. The plastics tax in Moroc-
co is a case in point – the tax itself was not suffi-
cient to drive the changes seen in the country, 
but targeted revenue use, with prioritisation 
of social equity issues, ensured that the pack-
age of measures will succeed in achieving the 
objective of recycling 20% of waste by 2020 
and delivered a number of co-benefits at the 
same time. In Mexico, which did not imple-
ment such measures, the carbon tax appears 
to have been neutral in relation to social eq-
uity, whereas if compensation or other meas-
ures had been implemented, positive equity 
impacts may have been the result.
3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
AND SOCIAL EQUITY 
3.2.1 Four dimensions of inequality
There are many dimensions of inequality 
associated with environmental policy and en-
vironmental taxation. Four of the most im-
portant, as identified by Lucas Chancel and 
Thomas Piketty (2015), are examined in detail 
in relation to environmental taxation in de-
veloping countries in Chapter I. The four di-
mensions are listed below:
1. Inequality of exposure to environmental 
degradation
2. Inequality of contributions to pollution
3. Inequality of outcomes resulting from en-
vironmental taxation 
4. Inequality of representation in policymak-
ing 
All four dimensions of inequity correspond 
to a greater or lesser extent with income ine-
quality. The poorest tend to be more exposed 
to pollution and are less likely to emit pollu-
tion in large quantities – due to lack of access 
to pollutants and resources as a result of lim-
ited income and thus limited capacity to con-
sume. Poorer households are also less likely to 
be well represented in environmental policy-
making processes.
In this study, the focus has been on the third 
dimension – inequality of outcomes resulting 
from environmental taxation. In actual fact, 
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there is little clear evidence of severe nega-
tive impacts resulting from price increases as-
sociated with environmental taxation in the 
cases examined in this report. In the Morocco 
case, this may have been because price chang-
es were per plastic item rather small, and were 
absorbed higher up in the value chain, rather 
than influencing the price paid by the con-
sumer. In Vietnam and in Mexico, there was 
some evidence of a progressive direct impact 
as a result of the environmental taxes imple-
mented, as they were levied on products that 
remain for many poor households “luxury” 
goods, e.g. gasoline. In China, no impacts on 
household income resulted from taxes on 
SO2, due to the regulation of electricity prices. 
This trend is also evident in the case of LICs. 
Indirect impacts in particular are difficult to 
measure, however, and policymakers should 
take care to monitor not only direct impacts 
but also the pass through effects of price in-
creases on basic commodities.
These minimal social impacts may be in 
part attributable to governments in countries 
with a significant proportion of the popula-
tion close to the poverty line being (rightly) 
cautious when it comes to implementing any 
measure that will lead to increases in ener-
gy prices, or in the price of basic household 
commodities, such as food or water. Lack of 
capacity to target social welfare measures ef-
fectively also feeds into this concern, as in 
many low-income and lower-middle-income 
countries, coverage of social compensation 
schemes does not exceed 50% of the popu-
lation. As demonstrated in the case of Viet-
nam, transfers may also be inequitable and 
poorly targeted, benefitting the wealthy more 
than the poor. If state resources are limited, 
the middle classes tend to be better and more 
able to demand and obtain support from gov-
ernments at the expense of poor households 
(Hallegatte et al. 2016). How this problem can 
be addressed is discussed below.
3.2.2 Social compensation to 
address possible negative impacts
Given these challenges, alongside a lack of 
capacity to collect robust data to measure pol-
icy impacts to feed into evidence-based poli-
cymaking, how can developing governments 
increase environmental taxation while pro-
tecting the vulnerable?
Clearly, the most preferable solution is to 
improve capacity to implement and target so-
cial welfare schemes accurately. Environmen-
tal tax revenues can be used to finance these 
institutional improvements. Alongside im-
provements to fiscal governance, introduc-
tion of an automatic tax rate escalator, or laws 
which enable regular tax increases to be in-
troduced relatively easily following review of 
policy impacts, can help governments to im-
plement higher tax rates over time. While low 
rates are in place, governments can take steps 
to develop social protection mechanisms and 
ensure that they are functioning. Later, when 
tax rates are increased, poorer households will 
already be protected by a pre-existing and tar-
geted social safety net.
In the interim, a further possible solution 
might be to overcompensate. For example, 
in response to challenges in identifying the 
most vulnerable, in Iran when fossil fuel sub-
sidies were reformed in 2010, the government 
provided compensation to 80% of all house-
holds. For the poor who had benefitted little 
from cheap fossil fuels, the compensation rep-
resented a large share of their income. While 
such a broad-brush approach is not recom-
mended, compensation in Iran distributed ap-
proximately USD 30 billion directly to the 
population and so lifted virtually the entire 
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population out of poverty, leading to wide-
spread acceptance for the reforms (Guillaume 
et al. 2011). Similarly, if policymakers are am-
bitious in their implementation of environ-
mental taxation, revenues raised should be 
sufficient to overcompensate poor house-
holds and deliver on other policy goals at the 
same time.
A further option for countries where there 
are serious concerns that compensation will 
not reach the most vulnerable might be to 
focus on luxury tax bases – those which per 
se tend to be progressive – such as (carefully 
selected) transport taxes or taxes on air trav-
el. Identifying which taxes have the poten-
tial to be most progressive can be helpful in 
all developing countries to introduce redis-
tributive taxation, while raising revenues to 
fund investment in social welfare, institution 
building and improved financial governance. 
The cases examined here Vietnam, Morocco 
and LICs have highlighted the progressive 
impact of transport fuel taxes and their poten-
tial to be introduced as a “luxury tax”. 
The design of social welfare mechanisms 
is also important in terms of social equity im-
pacts, and the efficiency and effectiveness of 
policy, particularly in relation to the extent 
to which policy fosters a transition to an in-
clusive green economy. The International In-
stitute for Environment and Development 
(IIED) has proposed a hierarchy of possible 
policy options to better integrate social and 
environmental policymaking (Raworth et al., 
2014):
Social transformation policies, including 
redistributing control over assets or establish-
ment of property rights, labour rights reform, 
tackling women’s reproductive care burden, 
deepening participation, and ensuring proce-
dural justice.
Co-benefits policies designed to exploit 
win-win opportunities to drive the green 
transition, e.g. conditional cash transfers, ac-
cess to sustainable and affordable energy, wa-
ter, sanitation, transport and housing, sustain-
able produce certification, and pro-poor pay-
ments for ecosystem services.
Safeguarding policies to compensate for 
the social cost of green policies, e.g. uncondi-
tional cash transfers, social protection, redun-
dancy payments, micro-finance access, and 
enterprise and skills training.
IIED suggests that the former two options 
are preferable, as they are most likely to bring 
about lasting improvements to social equity 
and welfare. Use of revenues from the plas-
tics tax in Morocco is an example of a social 
transformation policy looked at in detail here, 
which allocated new rights to previously in-
formal waste pickers and deepened their par-
ticipation in the full economy. In Vietnam, 
social compensation appears to have been 
minimal, with any measures to protect poorer 
households taking the form of cash transfers 
at a communal level. In China, social compen-
sation was not necessary due to price regula-
tion. In many LICs, targeted social compensa-
tion is a challenge, and many countries resort 
to less preferable policy measures as a result, 
such as subsidisation of fossil fuels. 
One interesting case in this regard is that 
of Indonesia, which took steps to invest in 
health and improve access to health services 
following fossil fuel subsidy reform. This is 
a clear example of a co-benefits policy, albeit 
associated with fossil fuel subsidy reform – 
in essence a policy which removes a negative 
price for CO2 emissions – rather than environ-
mental taxation.
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Environmental revenues for social 
investment – the case of Indonesia 
In 2014, prior to reform in Indonesia, fuel 
and electricity subsidies accounted for 24% of 
the state budget and tax revenues were worth 
less than 11% of GDP – one of the lowest tax-
to-GDP ratios in the world. In 2014 the oil 
price halved, creating a window of opportuni-
ty for fossil fuel subsidy reform. In response, 
the government effectively eliminated sub-
sidies for gasoline, while subsidies per litre 
of diesel were capped at USD 0.08 below the 
market price and phased out one year later. 
Subsidies for Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
were reduced shortly afterwards, followed by 
subsidies for electricity for all but the poorest 
electricity consumers in 2017.
Clearly, reforming fossil fuel subsidies to 
such an extent is a concern in terms of im-
pacts on the poor. Prior to reform, almost 40% 
of Indonesia’s population lived at or 1.5 times 
below the poverty line (ADB 2015). Results 
of modelling conducted by the Asian De-
velopment Bank prior to reform to evaluate 
possible impacts in the short and medium 
term varied in both intensity of projected im-
pacts on the poor, the effects of reallocation, 
and macroeconomic indicators (ADB 2015). 
What is certain is that a phase out of subsi-
dies of this magnitude causes price inflation 
for goods consumed by the poor, due to both 
direct and indirect impacts of higher energy 
prices. If welfare investments and compensa-
tion are not effective and targeted, price pres-
sure could see vulnerable groups clustered 
just above the poverty line pushed into pov-
erty.
The Indonesian government decided to 
counter these effects by pro-poor investment. 
As shown in Figure 8, expenditure previously 
devoted to fossil fuel subsidies were diverted 
to a 119% increase in spending on infrastruc-
ture between 2014 and 2017, a 53% increase 
in spending on health and an 11% increase in 
spending on education. Previously, expend-
iture on fossil fuel subsidy reforms exceed-
ed all its social assistance programmes com-
bined by a factor of 10 – with the equivalent 
of 4.1% of GDP spent on fossil fuel subsidies 
in 2012, and just 0.4% of GDP on social assis-
tance (ADB 2015). Given that the vast major-
ity of total investment needs for the achieve-
ment of the SDGs relate to infrastructure – 
water supply and sanitation, transport, power 
and telecommunications – fossil fuel subsidy 
reform has proven to be an important source 
of domestic revenue in Indonesia, being 
mobilised for the achievement of the SDGs 
(SDSN 2015).
While the long-term social and environ-
mental impacts of these changing investment 
patterns are not yet clear, shifts in expenditure 
of such magnitude can reasonably be expect-
ed to have a positive impact on social welfare 
and on the achievement of a number of SDGs, 
most notably those relating to poverty elim-
ination (SDG 1), health (SDG 3), education 
(SDG 4), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), 
affordable and clean energy (SDG 7), sustain-
able infrastructure (SDG 9) and strengthen-
ing means of implementation (SDG 17).
This approach in Indonesia has also been 
applied to some extent in the countries exam-
ined in this study – although there is potential 
for higher amounts of revenue to be raised. 
Vietnam is exploring the potential to use en-
vironmental tax revenues to mobilise a sig-
nificant proportion of domestic revenue for 
deficit reduction and other purposes, while 
Morocco has used revenues to promote social 
inclusion and integrate the informal sector 
within social welfare programmes. In China, 
the newly introduced Environmental Protec-
tion Tax is expected to mobilise USD 7.7 bil-
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lion annually. In Mexico, as in Indonesia, fossil 
fuel subsidy reform from 2014 has freed up a 
large amount of revenue, but the process of 
redirecting this revenue has been less trans-
parent – possibly an underlying catalyst for 
the Gasolinazo protests in 2017. In LICs, envi-
ronmental taxes on “luxury” goods damaging 
to the environment, such as air and road trans-
port fuel, have considerable potential to mo-
bilise domestic revenue and to deliver welfare 
gains due to reduced tax evasion.
3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
AND TAX JUSTICE 
This chapter set out to look at actual cas-
es of environmental taxation in developing 
countries, to see whether there was a poten-
tial to bring together the tax justice and envi-
ronmental taxation agendas. 
The Global Alliance for Tax Justice vision 
of tax justice is a world where progressive tax 
policies support people to share in local and 
global prosperity, access public services and 
social protections, and benefit from an econ-
omy that acts in the interest of people and 
the environment. The aims of the Global Al-
liance for Tax Justice are to affirm the roles 
of governments to implement such policies, 
mobilise domestic resources for public servic-
es and other government functions, strength-
en state accountability, reduce state depend-
ence on aid and debt financing, and correct 
the power imbalance between citizens and 
multinational corporations (Global Alliance 
for Tax Justice 2018).
This report examined the potential for envi-
ronmental taxes to fulfill this vision and meet 
these objectives. First, in relation to boosting 
people’s share in prosperity and thus redistri-
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bution of wealth, the report highlighted the 
injustice of existing policies of social compen-
sation relating to low pricing of pollutants. 
Such measures – such as fossil fuel subsidies 
or electricity pricing regimes – are often not 
targeted, but reduce the price of energy or 
transport fuels for all consumers, in spite of 
a clear ability to pay considerably higher pric-
es on the part of wealthier income quintiles. 
Implementing environmental taxes and so 
reforming the unfair distribution of prosper-
ity may be a route towards improving out-
comes for poorer households. Indeed, several 
cases revealed possible progressive impacts 
resulting from taxation of those pollutants 
often regarded as luxuries in low- and lower 
middle income countries. In this way, envi-
ronmental taxes have the potential to enable 
poorer households to access a greater share of 
national wealth, while benefitting from im-
proved environmental quality and fairer out-
comes, as polluters pay for the damage they 
do through environmental taxation.
The report also looked at ways in which en-
vironmental taxes might be able to act to im-
prove public services and social protection. In 
the Moroccan case, revenues from the plastics 
tax were directly used to this end. In Indone-
sia, removal of a negative carbon price – fos-
sil fuel subsidy – and investment of revenues 
freed up as a result in increased investment 
in health, education and infrastructure can be 
considered to have improved access to public 
services.
Aside from direct improved access, envi-
ronmental taxes can also improve access to 
public services indirectly, through domestic 
revenue mobilisation. For example, Vietnam’s 
EPT accounted for over 5% of total tax reve-
nue in 2016, and the EPT in China is expected 
to raise roughly USD 7.7 billion or 1% of total 
tax revenue in 2018 (GoV 2018; GoC 2018). 
Environmentally related transport fuel excise 
duties have been known to account for al-
most 20% of total tax revenues in some LICs 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Slunge and Stern-
er 2010). Although some of the cases here-
in exemplify the benefits of “thinking big” 
and implementing ambitious policy reforms, 
the potential for environmental taxes to mo-
bilise higher volumes of domestic revenue 
is as yet relatively underexplored. Nonethe-
less, it seems likely that in many developing 
countries increasing the amount of revenues 
raised through environmental taxation has 
the potential to reduce state dependence on 
aid and debt financing, and to facilitate the 
mobilisation of domestic resources for public 
services. 
Moreover, because environmental taxes 
are harder to evade than CITs or PITs, they 
also have the potential to strengthen state 
accountability, improve tax morale and en-
hance fiscal governance. In countries with 
high levels of tax evasion, the benefits of a 
tax on carbon emissions – aside from any cli-
mate or environmental benefits – outweigh 
the costs, simply as a result of welfare gains re-
sulting from reduced tax evasion (Liu 2013). 
Although there is broad agreement that di-
rect taxation is more strongly associated with 
reducing inequality than indirect taxation 
in theory, in practice, as we have seen in this 
report, the distributional effects of environ-
mental taxes vary widely, both between coun-
tries and within countries, and between types 
of environmental tax (Clifton 2017; Sterner 
2012). Due to these differentiations, coun-
try-specific analysis of tax impacts is essential 
for conclusions on the distributive impacts of 
individual tax measures to be drawn.
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3.3.1 Justice, the climate crisis 
and environmental taxation
The impacts of climate change will not be 
felt equally across the globe. All economic pre-
dictions indicate that climate change will hit 
developing countries hardest (see e.g. Halle-
gatte et al. 2016). The poorest in developing 
countries suffer disproportionately from pol-
lution and are most dependent on natural re-
sources for their livelihoods. Severe environ-
mental degradation and climate change rep-
resent an obstacle to poverty alleviation. The 
poorest will be the most vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change due to lack of op-
portunities to protect themselves, respond 
or adapt (Cottrell et al. 2016; Hallegatte et al. 
2016; OECD 2005b). 
The current rate of CO2 emission reduc-
tions will not deliver on the Paris target of 
keeping the average increase in global tem-
perature to well below 2°C above pre-indus-
trial levels. Total reductions pledged in all 
NDCs under the Paris Agreement are not 
sufficient (UNEP 2017). In addition, an Oc-
tober 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) report has highlighted 
the significant difference in terms of climate 
impact between keeping the temperature 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels or 1.5°C. The re-
port suggests that “limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, could reduce the 
number of people both exposed to climate-re-
lated risks and susceptible to poverty by up to 
several hundred million by 2050 (...)” (empha-
sis added, IPCC 2018b, paragraph B.5.1). 
To prevent these impacts on the poor and 
achieve climate justice, all countries must 
step up and commit to more ambitious GHG 
emissions reductions. The most cost-effective 
and thus politically feasible way of achieving 
these reductions is the introduction of a car-
bon price, alongside additional measures to 
facilitate the transition to a low-carbon econ-
omy. A carbon tax, including a tax escalator to 
ratchet up tax rates on a regular basis, could 
help all countries meet their CO2 emission 
reductions obligations under the Paris Agree-
ment while raising revenues to help meet the 
targets of the Agenda 2030 / the SDGs.
The predicted outcomes of the climate cri-
sis are just one of several dimensions of ine-
quality when it comes to environmental poli-
cy. This report has shown that there could be a 
role for environmental taxation in addressing 
these inequalities, and that the vision and ob-
jectives of the tax justice movement and the 
implementation of environmental taxation 
can indeed be compatible in theory and in 
practice.
3.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
We are right at the beginning of under-
standing the equity impacts of environmen-
tal taxation in developing countries. Capacity 
to collect robust data is relatively limited in 
many middle- and low-income countries, con-
straining governments in their ability to prac-
tice evidence-based policymaking. Further 
research into the equity impacts of environ-
mental taxation in these countries will enable 
policymakers in the future to implement the 
measures necessary to improve environmen-
tal quality, slow environmental degradation 
and meet the targets of the Paris Agreement, 
while understanding the impacts of such tax-
es on poorer households and how they can be 
addressed.
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